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ABSTRACT 
 
Accounting, and more specifically auditing, plays an important role in 
charity organisations’ accountability processes.  This has been highlighted 
with the commencement of the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profit 
Commission in 2012 heralding a new era of accountability and regulation. 
It is in this context that this study used a stratified sample of 101 Australian 
charities’ 2011-2012 annual reports to study five aspects of the charity 
audit market, which formed its objectives. These were: a) to estimate and 
develop a model of Australian charity fee audit determinants; b) to 
determine if there was evidence of Big Four audit firm fee premiums in a 
market where the Big Four may not dominate; c) to test for the existence 
of audit fee premium pricing amongst non-Big Four audit firms; d) to test 
for the existence of an audit fee premium for audit firm offices; and e) to 
test for the existence of an audit fee premium for audit firm partners.   
 
This study found support for the choice of audit firm (Big Four audit firm 
versus non-Big Four audit firm) having an influence on audit fee pricing. 
Auditee complexity, a well-established determinant in the private sector 
literature, was also shown to have some influence on charities’ audit fee 
costs, in the form of incorporation (company versus non-company) and 
size as represented by proxy, income being significant. Trading income 
too indicated a possible influence on charities’ audit fees, but these 
findings were limited and require further investigation.   
 
In this study a Big Four audit premium was shown to exist in the Australian 
charity sector. It is also shown that small audit firms with a single client 
may have been discounting audit fees, but further investigation is required 
to confirm this. 
 
In summary, this study put the spotlight on a sector that has not previously 
been examined, and provides deeper insights into the Australian charity 
sector and audit fee pricing. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The objectives of this study were to model audit fee determinants in the 
context of Australian charity (not-for-profit) entities; and for the first time, to 
test for evidence of Big Four and specialist non-Big Four audit fee 
premiums at firm, office and partner levels. 
 
The literature reveals significant developments in audit fees and their 
determinants over the past thirty-five years, following publication of 
Simunic’s seminal work in 1980, particularly in the context of the private 
sector, with over 200 studies into audit fee pricing undertaken Hay (2013). 
In contrast, the literature on audit fee pricing in the not-for-profit sector, 
and more specifically the charity sector, has been limited to two studies by 
Beattie, Goodacre, Pratt and Stevenson (2001) in the United Kingdom, 
and Vermeer, Raghunandan and Forgione (2009) in the United States. 
These two studies, together with a small collection of papers by Baber 
(1983), Baber, Brooks and Ricks (1987), Giroux and Jones (2007), 
Kitching (2007), Kitching (2009), Lowensohn, Johnson, Elder, and Davies 
(2007), Ward, Elder and Kattelus (1994) and Yuan, Lopez and Forgione 
(2012), investigated the broader not-for-profit sector. 
 
Beattie et al. (2001, p. 243) argued that “the demand for accountability in 
this sector is increasing and so audit pricing studies of sub-markets within 
the sector are of importance in their own right.” The importance of 
accountability in the Australian charity sector was also noted in the 
Industry Commission’s report into charitable organisations in 1995 
(Industry Commission, 1995). Concerns about accountability resurfaced 
more recently when the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits  
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Commission exercised its powers to revoke three organisations’ charity 
status for serious breaches of conduct (Australian Charities and Not-for-
profit Commission, 2015). 
 
This study extends the literature on audit fee pricing in the Australian 
charity sector with a deeper examination of the connection between audit 
pricing studies and accountability by charity organisations. Whilst there is 
no definitive measure of the size of the Australian not-for-profit sector, and 
more specifically the charity sector, Hurly (2010) estimated that this third 
sector of the economy (i.e. it is neither public nor private) earns tax 
concessions ranging from $1 billion to $8 billion. The charity sector is of 
particular note, with over 57,000 charities registered with the Australian 
Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (Australian Charities and Not-for-
profits Commission, 2014). 
 
The charity sector across Australia engages with up to 24 regulatory 
authorities in respect of taxation matters, incorporation matters, 
fundraising, lotteries and raffles (Australian Charities and Not-for-profits 
Commission, 2013a). Furthermore, charities are subject to national 
regulatory authorities, including the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits 
Commission and the Australian Taxation Office. The incorporated 
structure of charities, whereby charities can be incorporated as companies 
under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) or under their respective state or 
territories’ legislation (Leslie & Connellan, 2011) adds to the complexity of 
the sector. Furthermore, the nature of the not-for-profit business model 
provides what Beattie et al. (2001, p. 246) described as a “unique setting 
within which to examine the links between market structure and pricing.” 
These authors argued that “the different audit risks and audit market 
structure mean that the charity sector is a valuable setting within which to 
develop and test audit pricing models, thereby extending our 
understanding of pricing issues generally.” 
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This chapter presents the context and structure of the thesis. It 
commences with a background of Australian charities, followed by the 
rationale and significance of the study. An outline of the research, the 
research questions and the research model are provided, concluding with 
an overview of the structure of the thesis.  
 
1.2 Background to the Study 
 
Prior to the formation of the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits 
Commission (ACNC) in 2012, Australia had yet to establish a statutory 
definition of a charity. Hurley (2010), Pro Bono Australia (2012), and the 
Macquarie Dictionary (2012) were referenced to provide a definition. 
Hurley (2010, p.1) defined charities as: “altruistic bodies which seek to 
help members of the community in need. The role of charities is to 
mobilise their members and supports to help others, not to just act in their 
members’ private interests. Their motives mean that all true charities are 
not-for-profit organisations (but not all not-for-profit organisations are 
charities).”  
` 
Pro Bono Australia (2012), in its “The Australian Directory of Not for Profit 
Organisations”, referred to the not-for-profit sector as being made up of 
organisations (sometimes referred to as charities) that “rely on donations 
from individuals, from corporations, and from trusts and foundations to 
continue to work towards making Australia – and the world – a better place 
to be.” 
 
The Macquarie Dictionary (2012) defines charity as “almsgiving; the 
private and or public relief of unfortunate or needy persons.” 
 
Following the establishment of the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits 
Commission in 2012, who had as one of its objectives the establishment of 
a statutory definition of a charity, Australian now has within the Charities 
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Act 2013 (Cth) a statutory definition of a charity.  Section five of the Act 
defines a charity as an entity: 
 
(a) that is a not-for-profit entity; and 
(b) all of the purposes of which are: 
(i) charitable purposes (see Part 3) that are for the public 
benefit (see Division 2 of this Part); or 
(ii) purposes that are incidental or ancillary to, and in 
furtherance or in aid of, purposes of the entity covered by 
subparagraph (i); and 
(c) none of the purposes of which are disqualifying purposes (see 
Division 3); and 
(d) that is not an individual, a political party or a government entity. 
  
In section 12, the Charities Act 2013 (Cth) goes on to define charitable 
purposes to mean any of the following: 
 
(a) the purpose of advancing health; 
(b) the purpose of advancing education; 
(c) the purpose of advancing social or public welfare; 
(d) the purpose of advancing religion; 
(e) the purpose of advancing culture; 
(f) the purpose of promoting reconciliation, mutual respect and 
tolerance between groups of individuals that are in Australia; 
(g) the purpose of promoting or protecting human rights; 
(h) the purpose of advancing the security or safety of Australia or the 
Australian public; 
(i) the purpose of preventing or relieving the suffering of animals; 
(j) the purpose of advancing the natural environment; 
(k) any other purpose beneficial to the general public that may be 
reasonably regarded as analogous to, or within the spirit of, any 
purposes mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (j); 
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(l) the purpose of promoting or opposing a chance to any matter 
established by law, policy or practice in the Commonwealth, a State 
or Territory or another country, if: 
i. in the case of promoting a change – the change is in 
furtherance or in aid of one or more of the purposes 
mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (k); or 
ii. in the case of opposing a change – the change is in 
opposition to, or in hindrance of, on or more of the purposes 
mention in those paragraphs. 
 
For the purpose of this study a charity is defined as an organisation that 
satisfies the statutory definition of a charity; is an entity that is reliant on 
donations and/or grants from individuals, corporations, governments, 
trusts and foundations to continue its work with the objective of providing 
relief to unfortunate and/or needy persons; an act of benevolence. In this 
way charities are distinguished from other not-for-profit entities such as 
sporting groups. 
 
Charities sit within the third sector of the Australian economy, the not-for-
profit sector (Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission 
Implementation Taskforce (2012). To date, audit fee pricing research in 
Australia has predominantly focused on the private sector, whilst 
internationally the not-for-profit sector has been studied in the United 
Kingdom (Beattie et al, 2001) and the United States (Kitching, 2007; 
Kitching, 2009; Krishnan & Schauer, 2000; Tate 2007, Vermeer, 
Raghunandan & Forgione, 2009).  
 
This gap provided a unique opportunity to extend the audit fee pricing 
literature on the Australian charities sector, and to grow our understanding 
of the determinants of audit fee pricing. The research questions were 
aligned with this objective and are discussed in the next section. 
 
6 
 
1.3 Research Focus 
 
In the context outlined above, the current study was aimed at examining 
audit fee pricing in the Australian charity sector by: 
  
 examining the development of a model of charity audit fee 
determinants; 
 looking for evidence of Big Four brand name audit premiums in a 
market where Big Four audit firms may not dominate;  
 exploring the existence of an audit fee premium amongst non-Big 
Four audit firms;  
 looking for evidence of an audit fee premium in individual audit firm 
offices (is the audit firm office specialising in charity audits and 
hence commanding an audit fee premium?); and  
 investigating the existence of an audit fee premium for individual 
audit firm partners, i.e. are these partners specialising in charity 
audits?  
 
The significance of these research focus points are discussed in the 
following section. 
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
 
In its survey of not-for-profit organisations published in 2009, the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, for the first time, provided a formal 
indication of the size of the not-for-profit sector. As at the end of June 
2007, there were 41,008 not-for-profit organisations in Australia. The value 
of this sector stood at $35.9 billion for the 2006-2007 financial year and 
capital expenditure was reported as $8.8 billion. The sector employed 
889,919 employees, and had a combined income of $76 billion, with 
expenditure of $70 billion (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009). In 
addition, Hurley (2010) estimated the value of tax concessions to this 
sector to be in the range of $1 billion to $8 billion (Hurley, 2010, p. 1). The 
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Office for the Not-for-profit Sector (2011) stated that approximately 10% of 
the sector was termed ‘economically significant’, meaning they employed 
staff or accessed tax concessions. These entities provided around 8% 
percent of employment in Australia (around 900,000 people) and made up 
over 4% of GDP. Over 6 million Australians volunteer each year, 
contributing more than $14.6 billion in unpaid work. 
 
The Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Implementation 
Taskforce (2012, p. 2) noted that the not-for-profit sector: “currently 
comprises around 600,000 entities and accounts for nearly 5 per cent of 
GDP, growing at around 8 per cent per year. The NFP sector is second 
only to mining in relative growth terms.” A more recent Australian Charities 
and Not-for-profits Commission Register of Charities included 
approximately 57,916 registrant details (Australian Charities and Not-for-
profits Commission, 2014).   
 
Given the above, it is reasonable to conclude that the not-for-profit sector, 
of which charities form a part, is an important component of the Australian 
economy. Such significance raises the question of accountability, more so 
in this sector, because as Beattie et al. (2001, p. 244) noted, the customer 
of a charity organisation, i.e. the beneficiary, is in a rather weak 
relationship with the charity. Furthermore, the relationship of donors to 
charities does not necessarily empower them to hold the organisation to 
account to the same extent that an owner of a private sector organisation 
does. The exception to this is grant providers, who may impose 
accountability requirements as a condition of a grant. 
 
This disconnect between the public and charity is considered in a recent 
Canadian study which examined the role of knowledge in closing the gap.  
Bourassa & Stang (2015) found that “respondents who reported who 
reported high levels of knowledge about the sector, measures of trust, 
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accountability and transparency reliability predicted donation amount and 
volunteer status over and above the effect of demographic variables.” 
 
Public interest in the accountability of charities and not-for-profit entities 
has been widely recognised by auditors. The Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board [AASB] (2011, para. 6) noted that there was significant 
public interest in the accountability of not-for-profit entities, because they 
are generally supported by voluntary contributions of both physical and 
financial resources and their purpose is largely to serve some public need 
as opposed to being in business for profit. 
 
The Australian Council for International Development’s (ACID) Code of 
Conduct published in February 2010 also recognises the importance of 
public confidence in the non-profit sector of the Australian economy. One 
aspect of the code is to enhance the public’s confidence in the preparation 
and distribution of audited annual reports. In producing an annual report 
the ACID Code of Conduct stated: “clear, accurate and transparent 
communication is essential in maintaining public confidence in the work of 
overseas aid and development organisations” (Australian Council for 
International Development, 2010, p. 34).  The Code prescribed an “audit 
opinion on the financial reports, clearly identifying the auditor (name, 
company, address and signature) (Australian Council for International 
Development, 2010, p. 35). In section 5.1, it went on to include audit and 
accounting service costs. 
 
In a similar vein, the Senate Economics Legislation Committee, in its Tax 
Laws Amendment (Public Benefit Test) Bill 2010 reported a demand for 
“increased transparency and accountability in the sector” (Hurley, 2010, p. 
1). Growing concerns about terrorism and its financing has also placed a 
spotlight on not-for-profit organisations who have a history of misuse by 
terrorist organisations (Winer, 2008). Bricknell (2011, p. 2) noted that state 
governments had advised the non-profit sector to: 
9 
 
 
 Adopt methods of best practice with respect to financial accounting, 
verification of program specifics and development and 
documentation of administrative and other forms of control; and 
 Perform due diligence and auditing functions on partners, and field 
and overseas operations respectively. 
 
Support for public accountability can be traced back as early as the 
Industry Commission report of 1995 (Industry Commission, 1995, p. 201) 
who noted that: “accountability is an important operational issue for all 
Community Social Welfare Organisations (CSWOs). Their supporters and 
the general public expect and are entitled to information about the 
finances and operations of CSWOs in return for their donations, voluntary 
activities, and taxation exemptions and concessions. Improved confidence 
that funds are being used appropriately by CSWOs can potentially 
increase the overall fundraising resources available to the sector”. 
 
The Productivity Commission, who replaced the Industry Commission, in 
its 2010 report on the not-for-profit sector noted: “corporate and financial 
accountability is an important issue for NFPs, as it is a central element in 
building and maintaining trust in individual NFPs and in the sector as a 
whole.” (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 130).  
 
Following the Productivity Commission report, the Australian Assistant 
Federal Treasurer, Bill Shorten, released a consultation paper on current 
governance arrangements for the not-for-profit sector (The Treasury, 
2011). The intention of the governance review was to assist with the 
formation of governance requirements for registered entities in the 
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission legislation, starting on 
October 1, 2012. A key action area for the Australian Charities and Not-
for-profits Commission Implementation Taskforce (2012, p. 8) was the 
development of a reporting framework for the not-for-profit sector. The 
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Treasury (2012), in its factsheet accompanying the Australian Charities 
and Not-for-Profit Commissions Bill (Factsheet – Reporting and Auditing) 
noted: 
 
Because charities make a very important contribution to Australian 
society, they receive a range of support from Commonwealth, state, 
territory and local governments, including tax concessions and grants, 
and support from the public in terms of donations and volunteering. As 
charities (and NFPs more generally) are in receipt of this generous 
support, there is placed upon them high community expectations, 
making a base level of reporting and accountability important. 
Reporting and auditing requirements will help improve public trust and 
confidence in the sector, through promoting accountability and 
transparency.  
 
A recent survey by Grant Thornton in New Zealand highlighted that 
practical issues of accountability were evident in the sector. The report, 
Not for Profit Survey 2011/2012, noted: “a recent spate of high profile 
frauds have been reported in New Zealand” and since their last survey in 
2009, New Zealand courts had cases appear before them in respect of 
theft of NZ$3 million or $30,000 per week over the period between the 
surveys. Grant Thornton suggested: “there is still room for improvement in 
carefully assessing and monitoring where the risks lie, particularly the 
ones relating to processing financial and cash transactions” (Grant 
Thornton, New Zealand, 2011, p. 4). 
 
The issues with financial management of not-for-profit entities continues to 
part of the discussion in the sector with a 2015 report by Pro Bono 
Australia and Grant Thornton (Pro Bono Australia Pty Ltd & Grant 
Thornton, 2015) highlighting as critical challenge for entity boards the 
ability to “critically evaluate the financial performance of the organisation” 
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and going forward to ensure that there are “strong financial systems and 
processes” in place. 
Concerns over accountability continue to this day. Three Queensland 
charities had their charity status revoked by the Australian Charities and 
Not-for-profits Commission for serious breaches of conduct. The 
Commission has not provided details of the breaches other than to note 
that they acted under subsection 35-10(1)(c) of the ACNC Act (Australian 
Charities and Not-for-profit Commission, 2015b). Smerdon (2015) 
suggested that potential reasons for revoking a charity’s status under 
subsection 35-10(1)(c) of the ACNC Act include “providing information that 
was false or misleading” or “non-compliance with a governance standard 
or external conduct standards.” The Commission is also considering the 
status of 1,400 charities in the short term, and up to 7,000 charities are 
subject to further review for failing to lodge annual information statements 
for at least two years (Australian Charities and Not-for-profit Commission, 
2015a).  
 
While earlier concerns about accountability in the charity sector were 
noted in the Industry Commission report of 1995 (Industry Commission, 
1995), developments to address these concerns have been slow, despite 
evidence that accountability is important to the community and to 
government. The focus of the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits 
Commission during its establishment phase was on minimising red tape 
and promoting public trust. Solomon and Solomon (2004, p. 137) reflected 
that “the external audit represents one of the most indispensable corporate 
governance checks and balances that help monitor company 
managements’ activities, thereby increasing transparency”.  
 
 A similar view was expressed by Cadbury (1992, para. 5.1) who stated: 
“The annual audit is one of the cornerstones of corporate governance… 
The audit provides an external and objective check on the way in which 
the financial statements have been prepared and presented, and it is an 
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essential part of the checks and balances required”. Cadbury (1992 para. 
5.3(c)) further noted: “Audit firms are in competition with each other for 
business. They wish to maximise their business with companies, of which 
auditing may only be a part. To the extent that they compete on the basis 
of their professional reputation, this will act as an incentive to maintain 
high standards”. 
 
Despite an awareness and interest in the role of external auditing of 
charities in signalling its credibility, there is little empirical evidence relating 
to charity auditing from an Australian perspective. Kitching (2009, p. 511) 
found that “audit quality and charity reputation are substitute mechanisms 
for managers to signal the credibility of the financial reports.” Audit fee 
premiums may be a signal of auditor reputation and/or industry leadership 
(Craswell, Francis & Taylor, 1995, Cullinan, 1998; Francis, Reichelt & 
Wang, 2005, Ward et al., 1994), which are are valued by clients 
(Ferguson, Francis & Stokes, 2006). Lowensohn et al. (2007) found a 
positive association with specialisation and perceived audit quality. 
Understanding audit fee pricing in the charity sector can provide further 
insights into the role of independent audits as a tool for providing 
accountability and credibility for charities’ financial reports, as well as the 
behaviour of the charity audit fee market, which has characteristics that 
distinguish it from the private sector. 
 
One characteristic of particular note is the type of legal structures available 
to charities. Unlike the audit market in the private sector where clients are 
predominately public companies, charities can have a legal structure that 
falls under the auspices of the Corporations Act 2001. That is, they can be 
companies limited by guarantee. Alternatively, charities may be 
incorporated under their respective state or territory’s incorporated 
associations’ legislation (Leslie & Connellan, 2011). The nature of the 
incorporation, the annual revenues and/or amount of current assets, are 
criteria which may determine the requirement for an audit. For example, 
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charities incorporated as companies limited by guarantee fall under the 
Corporations Act 2001. Such charities, with annual revenues between 
$250,000 and $1,000,000, or annual revenues less than $250,000 but with 
deductible gift recipient status, can elect to have their financial statements 
reviewed rather than audited, whereas charities limited by guarantee and 
with an annual revenue of $1,000,000 or more are required to be audited1. 
For those charities incorporated under their respective state legislation, 
the minimum audit requirements vary from state to state, and may depend 
on reported revenues and/or current assets (Leslie & Connellan, 2011, p. 
89). 
 
To add further complexity to the audit market in the charity sector, some 
submissions to the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission 
Implementation Taskforce reflected upon audit fees, indicating their 
importance to charities. The taskforce noted: “a repeated concern during 
consultations was whether the ACNC Commissioner would allow a charity 
to report against an alternative accounting period. The off-peak fees or 
pro-bono services offered by accountants and auditors to charities outside 
of the normal financial year is attractive to many charities” (Australian 
Charities Not-for-profits Commission Implementation Taskforce, 2012, p. 
23). 
 
The nature of the charity audit market stands out as an appropriate setting 
in which to further study audit fee determinants, and develop our 
understanding of auditing pricing models and audit specialisation more 
broadly. This study provided an opportunity to examine the existence of 
audit fee premiums in this market and to investigate how, if any, audit fee 
premiums are established. The five objectives of the study were to:  
 
 Develop a model of charity audit fee determinants; 
                                            
1 The charities in this study’s sample all report fees for the provision of a financial 
audit. No charities have distinguished between a review or an audit and where 
provided the report from the auditor was in the form of an audit report. 
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 Evaluate evidence of Big Four brand name audit premiums in a 
market where Big Four audit firms may not dominate;  
 Examine the evidence of the existence of an audit fee premium 
amongst non-Big Four audit firms;  
 Evaluate evidence of an audit fee premium in individual audit firm 
offices (is the audit firm office specialising in charity audits and 
hence commanding an audit fee premium?); and  
 Evaluate the existence of an audit fee premium for individual audit 
firm partners, i.e. are these partners specialising in charity audits?  
 
These objectives were achieved by following the study design outlined 
below. 
 
1.5 Study Design 
 
This study involved an analysis of a sample of Australian charities’ 2011-
2012 financial reports. The dependent variable, audit fee, was obtained 
from the charities’ financial reports. Additional independent variables were 
obtained from annual reports, the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits 
Commission ACNC Register (Australian Charities and Not-for-profits, 
2013b), and the Australian Government Initiative, ABN Lookup (ABN 
Lookup. n.d.). 
 
The remainder of the thesis has been organised as follows: Chapter 2 
reviews the literature in audit fee research in the not-for-profit sector; 
chapter 3 discusses the conceptual framework and hypotheses 
development. Chapter 4 elaborates on the research methods and 
sampling procedures, and chapter 5 presents the data analyses and 
hypotheses testing. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a detailed 
discussion of the findings, an overview of the study’s contribution to 
understanding audit fee determinants and audit fee premiums in the not-
for-profit sector, the limitations of the study, and provides 
recommendations for future research. 
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1.6 Summary 
 
This chapter provided a background for the study and an overview of the 
research. An outline of the research model was presented, together with 
an overview of the study design and the significance of the study.  
16 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Audit fee pricing research is well established in the private sector, but is 
more limited in the not-for-profit sector, where audit-related research can 
be categorised into four areas: a) Audit fee research (Beattie, et al., 2001; 
Vermeer et al., 2009); b) audit quality research (Krishnan & Schauer, 
2000); c) audit change (Tate 2007) and d) auditor choice (Kitching, 2007, 
Kitching, 2009). Following the seminal work of Simunic (1980) research 
into audit fee price premiums dominated the profit sector. Subsequently, 
Hay’s (2013) meta-analysis contained over 200 studies, indicating the 
extent of the research. However, in the context of the public sector there 
has been limited research into audit fees (Ward et al., 1994; Giroux & 
Jones, 2007; Lowensohn et al., 2007) to explore the nature of audit fee 
premiums (municipal audits).  
 
The focus of this study was the Australian charity sector. The remainder of 
this chapter provides a review of the existing research on charity sector 
audit fee pricing, along with a discussion of how the current study adds to 
the body of literature. 
 
2.2 Audit Fee Research: Not-for-profit Sector 
 
Beattie et al. (2001) produced the first paper to extend audit fee pricing 
research from the profit sector to the non-profit-sector, and as such, has 
led the research that followed. Beattie et al. (2001, p. 246) had four 
objectives in their United Kingdom (UK) study into audit fees in the non-
profit sector. They were: 
 
1. To develop and estimate a model of charity audit fee price 
determinants; 
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2. To assess the existence of Big Six brand-name premiums in a market 
where the Big Six were not considered specialists; 
3. To test the pricing impact of expertise in a niche market where there 
was no Big Six dominance; 
4. To compare the audit fees in the charity sector against those in the 
private sector. 
 
These authors examined a sample of 210 charities, taken from the top 500 
charities, identified in the 1998 edition of Baring Asset Management Top 
3000 Charities, with the objective of achieving a sample representation of 
the major UK charities. From this sample the authors tested the following:  
Audit fee as a function of auditee size, auditee complexity, audit 
production costs, non-audit services, audit difficulties and residual, where: 
 
 Auditee size was measured by the variable total incoming resources, a 
dummy variable distinguishing between fund raising and grant-making 
entities, as well as two additional measures: total assets and total 
funds (restricted and unrestricted). 
 Auditee complexity was measured by a series of variables: a dummy 
variable distinguishing between fund raising and grant-making income 
sources; dummy variables categorising the charity according to its 
constitution (company, trust, constitution by Act of Parliament or Royal 
Charter); dichotomous variables for major areas of activity; domestic or 
overseas significant activity; trading activities; proportion of total 
income from fundraising, and number of trustees. 
 Audit production costs were measured by the location of audit staff 
(possibly a UK-specific variable reflective of the costs of locating offices 
in London) and whether the audit needed to be conducted during the 
busy season. 
 Non-audit services were measured by a continuous variable: fee 
payable to auditors for non-audit services.  
18 
 
 Audit difficulties were measured by a dummy variable, audit opinion, 
and a continuous variable measuring the number of days between the 
year-end date and the date of the audit report. 
 
Building on their audit fee-pricing model, the authors tested five 
hypotheses: 
 
1. The brand name of large audit firms (the Big Six) is rewarded by a fee 
premium above non-Big-Six firms in the charity sector; 
2. Individual Big Six firms are rewarded by a brand name fee premium 
above non-Big Six firms in the charity sector; 
3. Non-Big-Six audit firms with expertise (specialist) are rewarded by a 
fee premium above other non-Big-Six firms in the charity sector; 
4. Individual non-Big-Six audit firms with expertise (specialist) are 
rewarded by a fee premium above other non-Big-Six firms in the charity 
sector; and 
5. Charities pay lower audit fees than similar-sized private sector 
companies. 
 
Their findings indicated that the size of the entity was a significant driver in 
determining audit fees, along with characteristics unique to the charity. 
These characteristics were exclusive to fund-raising charities versus grant-
making charities, with fund-raising charities paying a higher audit fee. The 
variables also related to trading subsidiaries, level of non-audit fees, and 
the auditor location (London or non-London) where significant.   
 
In terms of audit fee premiums the authors found mixed evidence in 
support of their hypothesis. Following Cullinan (1998, p.49), Beattie et al. 
(2001, p. 255) argued that: 
 
Higher market share is a signal of greater expertise, which should 
result in higher audit fees. As market concentration is much lower in 
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the charity sector than in the private sector company audit market, 
there is less likelihood of a monopolistic/oligopolistic pricing by a 
few market leaders. Consequently, observation of a fee premium is 
stronger evidence that clients are willing to pay higher audit fees to 
firms with perceived expertise in the sector. 
 
Beattie et al.’s (2001) study returned mixed findings, with some evidence 
of clients willing to pay higher audit fees to firms with perceived expertise 
in the sector. This is borne out in their base model where the size proxy 
was either a natural log of assets, total funds or log-transformed total 
incoming resources plus log-transformed total incoming resources 
squared. They found significant support for a Big Six audit fee premium, 
but where the proxy size was log-transformed total incoming resources or 
log-transformed total incoming resources and natural log of assets, there 
was no statistically significant support for evidence of a Big Six audit fee 
premium. However, when the authors tested for fee premiums relating to 
auditor characteristics, they found evidence of a premium in their 
fundraiser model only, and no support in the all-charities or grant-makers 
model. 
 
In the context of Big Six audit firm fee premiums, Beattie et al. (2001) 
found significant support for the hypothesis that the brand name of the Big 
Six was rewarded above non-Big-Six firms, and that there was a fee 
premium for Big Six audit firms. In their study, KPMG was found to receive 
a fee premium over other Big Six firms. Similarly, with non-Big-Six audit 
firms in the fund-raising sector, there was evidence of audit fee premiums 
for auditors with expertise, and hence support for specialist non-Big-Six 
firms. 
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From the perspective of audit fee pricing determinants in the Australian 
charity sector, possible extensions to Beattie et al. (2001) include:  
 
1. The use of a continuous variable measure of income source to 
evaluate the influence of grant funds versus funds from fundraising 
versus trading activities; 
2. Constitution variables reflective of the Australian regulatory 
environment (Corporations Law versus state-based incorporation); 
3. The influence of trading activities on audit fees where such activities 
may not be as common in Australia; 
4. Examining the focus of the organisation, i.e. domestic activities versus 
overseas aid. 
5. Increasing the size range of charities included in the sample. Beattie et 
al. (2001) restricted their sample to Top 500 United Kingdom charities 
in 1998. 
 
Building on the work of Beattie et al. (2001), Vermeer et al., (2009) 
undertook a study of audit fee pricing in the United States. The authors 
focused on larger charities, as did Beattie et al., in this instance 125 of the 
largest non-profits in the United States. However they extended the early 
work by adding in variables related to the charities’ need for funding, audit 
committee characteristics and internal audit function, amongst other 
control variables (Vermeer et al., 2009, p. 290). The fee audit model was: 
Audit fee = f (auditee size, auditee complexity, audit production costs, non-
audit services, audit difficulties and residual), where: 
 
 Size was measured by the natural log of total assets; 
 Contributions was a ratio of contribution revenue to total revenue; 
 Debt was measured by ratio of tax-exempt bonds, mortgages and 
other notes payable to total assets; 
 Single audit was a dichotomous variable; 
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 Asset composition was measured as a ratio of net accounts receivable 
plus inventories to total assets; 
 Audit committee was measured by existence and structure, 
dichotomous variables; 
 Internal audit was measured by a dichotomous variable; 
 Liquidity was measured by readily available funds as a ratio to total 
expenses; 
 Auditor type was a Big Four dichotomous variable; 
 Hospital was a dichotomous variable 
 University was a dichotomous variable 
 Audit fees was a ratio of non-audit fees to total fees. 
 
The authors found that at the 0.05 significance level, size (measured by 
assets), single audit, internal audit, liquidity, Big Four auditor, university 
and audit fee ratios were significant, and that the overall model was 
significant. The work by Vermeer et al. (2009) added further consideration 
to audit fee pricing in the Australian charity sector, a context not previously 
explored in the literature. 
 
Possible extensions of this paper include: 
 
 The use of a continuous variable measuring debt which is reflective of 
the Australian context; 
 Constitution variables reflective of the Australian regulatory 
environment (Corporations Law versus state-based incorporation); 
 Trading activities are not as common in Australia, hence what impact if 
any, do they have on audit fees, and what impact does this have on the 
model in the Australian context? 
 Focus of the organisation, i.e. domestic activities versus overseas aid. 
 Consideration of the nature of the industry that the charity is involved 
in. Vermeer et al. (2009) limited this to hospitals and universities. 
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 Including a broader range of charities in the sample. Like Beattie et al. 
(2001), Vermeer et al.’s (2009) sample was taken from the largest 
1,000 non-profits in the US as measured by revenue; and 
 More detailed examination of audit specialisation.  
 
2.3 Audit Fee Research: Profit Sector 
 
Audit fee pricing in the private sector is well established in the literature 
and dates back to the seminal work of Simunic (1980) who “presented a 
production view of the audit process and hypothesized that certain drivers 
would be associated with variations in the level of audit fees because 
those drivers cause an auditor to perform more (or less) work during the 
course of the audit” (Hay, Knechel & Wong, 2006). The study of audit fee 
pricing in the charities sector also reflects previous work in private sector 
studies e.g., Beattie et al. (2001). Hence the review of this literature below 
provides a further context for the development of a charity audit fees 
pricing model and the hypotheses put forward in the following chapter. 
 
Simunic (1980) set the tone for future studies into audit fee pricing and 
specialisation by audit firms. He assumed that price competition prevailed 
in the market for small company audits, and tested for evidence that large 
clients were paying for the increasing effect of Big Eight audit firm 
dominance in the marketplace. This led to the development of a model to 
determine whether audit fees were linked to differences in exposure; 
anticipated loss-sharing ratio, differences in auditor production functions 
and auditor identity (Big Eight or non-Big-Eight). Loss exposure, that is the 
liability proxied using size of auditee (total year-end assets), complexity of 
the auditee’s operations (number of consolidated subsidiaries; industry of 
operation; ratio of the auditee’s foreign to total assets at year end), 
auditing problems associated with financial statement components 
(receivables to total assets at year-end; inventories to total assets at year-
end), industry of the auditee, and whether the auditee is a publicly or 
closely held company (Simunic, 1980, p. 172). The loss-sharing ratio, i.e. 
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the probability of auditee financial difficulty was proxied using three 
variables. The first was a measure of the auditee’s accounting rate of 
return in the current year, the ratio of net income to total assets at year-
end (Simunic, 1980, p. 173). The second variable was an indicator of 
whether the auditee incurred a net loss in the current or previous two 
financial years. The third and final variable was an indicator of issuing a 
qualified audit opinion. The differences in auditor production functions 
were proxied by the number of years the auditee had used their current 
auditor. Simunic (1980) applied a stratified sampling approach, according 
to the size of the auditee (sales) and the auditor group (Big Eight, non-Big-
Eight). Data were collected via a survey instrument with 397 useable 
responses. Simunic’s findings confirmed that auditee size, as measured 
by total year-end assets, was a significant determinant of audit fee. He 
also found that the Big-Eight firms passed on the benefits of scale of 
economies in their production costs through lower prices to the auditee. 
 
Since then, numerous studies have examined the determinants of audit 
fees. Those that followed the Simunic (1980) model for the most part have 
been summarised in Table 1. Francis (1984) was the first with a study 
exploring the effect of accounting firm size on audit fees in the Australian 
corporate market. The results supported the hypothesis that larger 
accounting firms (Big Eight) earned significantly higher audit fees.   
 
Subsequent research by Anderson and Zeghal (1994), Beatty (1993), 
Brinn, Peel and Roberts (1994), Campa (2013), DeFond, Francis and 
Wong (2000), Francis and Simon (1987), Francis and Stokes (1986), Lee 
(1996), and Palmrose (1986) all found evidence of a Big 
Eight/Six/Five/Four audit fee price premium.  
 
In contrast, Che-Ahmad and Houghton (1990), Chung and Lindsay (1998), 
Cullinan (1997), Cullinan (1998), Firth (1995), and Hassan and Naser 
(2013) did not find the same results. Firth (1985) adopted a similar 
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approach to examine audit fee determinants in the private sector market in 
New Zealand. Unlike Francis (1984) and Simunic (1980), Firth did not find 
evidence of audit firm size affecting the audit fee price in the New Zealand 
private sector market.   
 
Table 1: Summary of Audit Fee Price Literature (Key Attributes) 
 
Big 
8/6/4 
Audit Firm 
Specialist 
City-
Industry 
Specialist 
Size Complexity Inherent Risk 
Simunic (1980)    S S S 
Francis (1984) S   S S S 
Firth (1985) NS   S NS S 
Francis & Stokes (1986) S [1]   S S S 
Palmrose (1986) S   S S  
Francis & Simon (1987) S   S S  
Che-Ahmad & Houghton (1990) NS   S S S 
Beatty (1993) S   S S S 
Anderson & Zeghal (1994) NS   S S  
Brinn, Peel & Roberts (1994) S [2]   S S  
Ward et al. (1994) S      
Craswell, Francis & Taylor 
 
 S  S S S 
Lee (1996) S   S S S 
Cullinan (1997) NS   S  S 
Langendijk (1997) NS   S S  
Chung & Lindsay (1998) NS   S S S 
Cullinan (1998) NS [3] S  S S S 
DeFond, Francis, & Wong 
 
S S  S S S 
Ferguson & Stokes (2002)  S[6]  S S S 
Ferguson et al. (2003)   S S S S 
Casterella et al. (2004)  S  S S S 
Carson & Fargher (2007)  S S S S S 
Huang et al. (2007)  S  S S [4] S [4] 
Giroux & Jones (2007) NS   S  S 
Lowensohn et al. (2007) NS      
Carson (2009)  S [5]  S  s 
Hay & Jeter (2011)  NS S S S S 
Yuan, Lopez & Forgione (2012)   S S S S 
Campa (2013) S   S  S 
Hassan & Naser (2013) NS   S S NS 
 
[1] Audit firm size was only significant for small auditees. [2] The authors found evidence of an audit fee 
premium for Big Eight audit firms auditing independent companies but not subsidiaries and they also found 
some evidence of regional differences in audit fees. [3] Cullinan (1998) whilst not finding evidence of a Big Six 
audit fee premium did find evidence of an audit firm specialisation audit fee premium. [4] Results varied 
depending on the data year.  [5] Carson (2009) takes a global specialist view versus a national specialist view. 
[6] Ferguson & Stokes (2002) found weak support for audit firm specialisation. 
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Francis and Stokes (1986) found evidence of audit firm size affecting the 
audit fee price in the Australian market, and explored discrepancies 
between Francis’s 1984 findings and Simunic’s 1980 research. The 
authors undertook regression testing for two samples: small auditee firms 
and large auditee firms, from which it was found that size of audit firm (Big 
Eight) was only significant for small auditee firms. They concluded (1986, 
p. 392) that “higher Big Eight prices (due to product differentiation) are 
obscured by higher non-Big-Eight prices arising from diseconomies of 
scale”, thereby explaining the non-significant finding for large clients. 
Francis and Simon (1987) explored contradictory findings in the work of 
Simunic (1980) and Palmrose (1986) that found evidence of Big Eight 
audit fee premiums in what was referred to as the “small auditee market”. 
A United Kingdom study by Che-Ahmad and Houghton (1990) also 
examined the small auditee market, or what the authors described as 
“medium-size” auditees in the UK market, and found no evidence of an 
audit fee premium. Other influences on audit fee prices were found to be 
consistent with the earlier literature that found size, complexity and risk to 
be significant factors. Langendijk (1997) brought a European perspective 
to his study of audit fee pricing, and although he found no evidence of a 
fee premium among the Big Six, he did find evidence of an audit fee 
premium for KPMG. This author also examined the financial services 
industry, and found no support for the existence of an audit fee premium. 
Like previous research, a study by Chung and Lindsay (1998) found size, 
complexity and risk were significant influences on audit fee price, but no 
evidence of Big Eight audit fee premiums in the Canadian market. 
 
Up to this point in time no research had been undertaken on audit fee 
pricing in the initial public offering (IPO) market. Beatty (1993) was the first 
published author in this area to add further understanding to auditor 
compensation with his findings of an audit fee premium in Big Six firms. 
Brinn, Peel and Roberts (1992) took the literature in a new direction by 
looking at the unquoted sector of the UK market and testing for differences 
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in audit fee prices for subsidiaries. They found evidence of an audit fee 
premium for Big Eight audit firms auditing independent companies, but not 
subsidiaries, and also found evidence of regional differences in audit fees. 
Auditee size and complexity were also found to have influenced audit fee 
price. Anderson and Zeghal (1994) contributed to the literature with their 
study of Canadian audit fees across time, audit firm and industry. They did 
not find overall support for a Big Eight audit fee premium, but did find 
evidence of a pricing deferential for pre-merger Big Eight audit firms in the 
small auditee market. 
 
Evidence of an audit fee price effect in the form of an audit fee premium 
for industry specialists was first reported by Craswell et al. (1995) in a 
large study of both industry specialist auditors and non-specialist Big Eight 
auditors in the Australian market. Lee’s 1996 research focused on Hong 
Kong capital markets which explored audit fee pricing from a product 
differentiation perspective. He found evidence of a Big Six audit fee 
premium in the small auditee market but not in the big auditee market, 
lending support to the findings of Francis and Simon’s (1987) United 
States study, where size, risk and complexity were found to significantly 
influence audit fee pricing.   
 
Cullinan (1997) examined audit fee determinants in a specific industry, the 
US pension plan audit market. Consistent with earlier research, Cullinan 
found that size of auditee and risk both influenced audit fee prices, and 
found no support for Big Six audit firm premiums in the pension plan audit 
market. However, he did find evidence of a specialist audit fee price effect, 
whereby non-Big-Six audit firms with industry expertise (firms auditing at 
least 10 pension plans) earned fee premiums that non-specialist firms did 
not. He also found that Big Six audit firms with larger market shares did 
not earn audit fee premiums. 
 
27 
 
More recently, Campa (2013) did a longitudinal study of Big Four audit 
premiums in a sample of listed companies in the United Kingdom. While 
he found evidence of a Big Four audit premium, there was no evidence of 
a significant relationship between audit quality and type of auditor. Hassan 
and Naser (2013) explored audit fee determinants in the context of an 
emerging economy, the Adu Dhabi Stock Exchange. The authors’ 
approach to determine if the audit firm had an effect on the audit fee price 
was reflective of the market in that they classified the audit firms as being 
international or local. Through the application of backwards regression 
models, the status of the audit firm was not found to have a significant 
effect on the audit fee price.  
 
The above literature extended and expanded the work of Simunic (1980) 
in the private sector. Giroux and Jones (2007), Lowensohn et al. (2007) 
and Ward et al. (1994) did the same in the local government sector. Ward 
et al. (1994) found evidence of regional audit firms with the largest number 
of clients receiving an audit premium consistent with brand-name 
reputation and reflective of industry experience. In contrast, Lowensohn et 
al. (2007) found no evidence of an audit fee premium in their studies of 
Florida local government and England and Welsh local governments. 
Giroux and Jones (2007) found evidence of a Big-Four audit fee discount. 
 
One particularly interesting aspect of the literature, industry specialisation, 
first examined by Craswell et al. (1995), is further discussed in the 
following section. 
 
2.3.1 Industry Specialisation 
 
Craswell et al., 1995 first explored the influence of industry specialisation 
on audit fee price. Subsequent studies by Carson (2009), Carson and 
Fargher (2007), Casterella, Francis, Lewis and Walker (2004), Cullinan 
(1998), DeFond et al. (2000), Ferguson et al. (2003), Ferguson and 
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Stokes (2002), Hay and Jeter (2011), and Huang, Liu, Raghunandan and 
Rama (2007) also examined this phenomenon. 
 
“Industry specialist” has been defined in various ways, starting with 
Craswell et al.’s (1995) classification of a firm that audited a minimum of 
30 companies in one of nine industries according to their Australian Stock 
Exchange industry code. Ferguson and Stokes (2002) applied a similar 
methodology by defining audit firms as industry specialist with a cut-off of 
10% of audit fees. Casterella et al. (2004), whilst adopting Craswell et al.’s 
approach, classified an audit firm as a specialist if it had 20% or more 
market share in a particular industry. 
 
Cullinan (1998) classified firms that audit at least 10 audit plans 
(approximately 1% of the plans) as specialists. While this is less than the 
10% market share proposed by Craswell et al. (1995), Cullinan (1998, p. 
51) argued that, given the size of the audit plan industry, the number of 
clients required to be classified an industry specialist was on par with other 
studies. DeFond et al. (2000, p. 52) defined an auditor as an industry 
specialist when their market share of audit fees is among the top three in 
that industry. Ferguson et al. (2002, p. 431) adopted what they referred to 
as an empirical approach to determine which audit firms were industry 
experts. The authors concluded that, from a national perspective, at most 
the top two audit firms in any given industry are perceived as industry 
experts, as evidenced by higher audit fees. When the analysis was refined 
on a city-specific basis, only the top-ranked Big Five auditors had a fee 
premium across industries. From these varying interpretations in the 
literature it can be reasonably concluded that there is no unanimous 
definition of an audit specialist. 
 
In their large study, Craswell et al. (1995) found evidence of a Big-Eight 
audit fee premium for both industry specialist auditors and non-specialist 
Big-Eight auditors in the Australian market. Cullinan (1998) also found 
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evidence of a specialist audit fee price effect, whereby non-Big Six audit 
firms with industry expertise (firms auditing at least 10 pension plans) 
earned fee premiums, while non-specialist audit firms did not. In addition, 
Big-Six audit firms with larger market shares did not earn audit fee 
premiums. DeFond et al. (2000) found evidence of a Big-Six audit fee 
price premium, providing further support for Cullinan (1998). In contrast to 
the above studies, Ferguson and Stokes’ (2002) findings were not so 
conclusive. The authors reported that, where an industry does not have 
specialist auditors, Big Six/Five auditors may charge an audit fee premium. 
However, where specialist auditors existed in an industry, specialist Big 
Six/Five auditors may attract an audit fee premium over non-specialist Big 
Six/Five auditors. This was only true for smaller auditee firms, and aligns 
with earlier Australian studies by Francis and Stokes (1986) that also 
highlighted this differential for small auditee firms.  
 
Casterella et al (2004) also found support for the small auditee effect in 
their study where they noted evidence of a Big-Six specialist audit fee 
premium over non-specialist firms, but only for the lower half of the sample 
based on asset size. The authors concluded that larger companies had 
sufficient clout relative to the audit firm’s client base, giving them greater 
bargaining power, resulting in lower audit fees. Carson and Fargher (2007) 
examined the impact of client size on audit fee pricing in the Australian 
market. Their findings suggested that the larger clients in every industry 
pay an audit fee premium to industry specialists. The authors attributed 
this to the demand for additional audit services. In this study, the 
dependent variable was the natural log of total audit fees paid to the 
auditor, which may explain the difference in findings compared to earlier 
studies. Huang et al. (2007) replicated the findings of Casterella et al, 
finding evidence of an audit fee premium for Big-Six auditors in the 2000 
and 2001 data. However, they also found that, following the 
implementation of Sarbanes Oxley, the results demonstrating 
specialisation only held true for 2004 but not 2003. 
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One aspect of specialisation not previously considered is a global 
perspective as opposed to the national viewpoint. Carson (2009) extended 
the literature on industry specialisation by “viewing industry specialist 
groups within large audit firms as a specific example of coordinated 
operations of global audit firm networks” (p. 355). He found that audit fee 
premiums were associated with global industry specialists, irrespective of 
the audit firm’s national specialisation. 
 
2.3.2 City-specific Industry Specialisation 
 
Ferguson et al. (2003) further expanded the literature on industry 
specialisation with contrasting conceptualisations of the activities of Big-
Five audit firms. The first was a “firm-wide” approach or country-level 
analysis, as adopted in earlier studies, of audit fee and industry 
specialisation. The second approach was termed the “office-level” 
perspective by the authors, which:  
 
viewed each individual practice office in the Big 5 network as a 
unique and relevant unit of analysis in its own right, because audit 
contracting is conducted through local offices, audit engagements 
are administered by an audit team typically located in an office in 
the same city as the client’s headquarters, and audit reports are 
issued on office-specific letterhead of the Big-5 engagement office 
administering the audit (2003, p.430). 
 
Ferguson et al.’s findings supported the view that industry expertise is 
“primarily based on office-level industry leadership in city-specific audit 
markets.” That is, when an auditor is both a city-specific industry leader 
and one of the top two firms in the industry countrywide, it earned an audit 
premium. Francis et al. (2005) replicated the Australian work of Ferguson 
et al. (2003) with a study of audit fee pricing by the Big Five audit firms in 
the United States. Like Ferguson et al., the authors found evidence of an 
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audit premium where the audit firm was both the national top-ranked 
auditor and the client’s city-specific industry leader. They also found that 
being the top-ranked national auditor was not sufficient to earn an audit 
fee premium. Ferguson, Francis and Stokes (2006) revisited the earlier 
work of Ferguson et al. (2003) and “reaffirmed that joint local and national 
auditor industry expertise is valued by audit clients” (Ferguson, et al., 
2006, p. 97). Basioudis and Francis (2007) found evidence of a city-
specific audit fee premium in their study of the United Kingdom private 
sector, but no evidence that the top- or second-ranked audit firms 
nationally earned an audit fee premium. Carson and Fargher (2007) found 
further evidence to support the hypothesis that audit fee premiums were 
earned by city-industry audit firm leaders, however, they found a strong 
client-size relationship, which may be attributable to their dependent 
variable being the natural log of all audit fees paid. 
 
Hay and Jeter (2011) contributed to the literature on audit specialisation 
with their study of listed and unlisted companies in New Zealand, in which 
they sought to determine whether audit fee premiums existed and why. 
These authors found evidence of auditor specialisation at city level but not 
at national level, with audit premiums for larger clients and low-risk firms. 
They concluded this was due to non-specialist firms discounting fees to 
attract desirable clients more so than specialist firms attracted premiums in 
their own right. Yuan, Lopez and Forgione (2012) continued expansion of 
the literature in new directions with their examination of the United States 
for-profit healthcare sector, not previously considered. The authors 
observed audit fee premiums where auditors were both national and city-
specific specialists. 
 
The literature indicates that city-office specialisation by audit firms is a 
likely determinant of audit fees and is worthy of further study. Audit office 
(city specialisation) was taken into consideration in this study, along with a 
number of control variables. 
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2.3.3 Control Variables 
 
Whilst much of the literature is focused on the relationship between the 
audit firm and audit fee price, most studies have included variables 
reflective of the client. In Table 1 the main attributes expressed in the 
literature have been summarised: size, complexity and risk. A more 
extensive analysis of the effects of supply and demand attributes for audit 
fee prices can be found in the meta-analysis by Hay et al. (2006), which 
grouped supply and demand attributes into 18 categories. A second meta-
analysis by Hay (2013) of audit fee pricing categorised these attributes 
into five classifications: size, complexity, inherent risk, internal audit, and 
corporate governance. The groups in Hay’s study are also reflected in the 
earlier meta-analysis. Table 1 focuses on the key variables of interest in 
this study. The first of these variables, size, was included in virtually all the 
studies reviewed here, and with the exception of Simunic (1980), was 
found to be significant. Hay et al. (2006, p. 169) found that size is “an 
extremely critical explanatory variable for any model of audit fees.”  Hay 
(2013) noted that the measures of size: assets, sales and city population, 
were significant across all studies. Market power was the only measure 
found to be not significant. 
 
The second variable of note was complexity. Complexity was measured 
primarily in an organisational context (number of subsidiaries, segments or 
SIC codes) and/or geographically (foreign assets or sales). Hay (2013) 
noted that the measures: number of subsidiaries, number of SIC codes, 
number of business segments, foreign subsidiaries, foreign sales, foreign 
assets, extraordinary or discontinued, were all significant measures. Book 
to market was the only insignificant measure. As per Hay’s findings, all the 
studies reviewed here found complexity had a strong influence on audit 
fee pricing. 
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Inherent risk was the third client attribute of note in the studies reported 
here. As with Hay (2013), a review of the results showed a strong 
influence on the inherent risk factors of audit fee pricing. Hay (2013) noted 
that other attributes, including profitability, leverage and liquidity, internal 
control, and industry, were also found to have a significant influence on 
audit fee pricing. The exception was governance, which showed mixed 
results.  
The literature on charity sector and profit-sector audit fee pricing 
underpinned the development of the Australian charity audit fees 
determinants model explored in this study. This is further described in the 
following section.  
2.4 Summary 
The literature on charity sector audit fees highlights two aspects of audit 
fee pricing: determination of charity audit fee models and audit fee-pricing 
premiums. In regard to charity audit-fee determination, the literature 
indicates that the size of the charity, the value of non-audit fees, and the 
choice of Big Four or Big Six auditors are important drivers of audit fees 
(see Table 2). Furthermore, the models reported R2 in the 0.60 to 0.72 
range, suggesting there was an opportunity to explore more robust models 
of charity audit fee determinants. In addition, Beattie et al. (2001) identified 
models that have more explanatory power, yet those models have not 
been replicated in other contexts. This provides a further opportunity to 
revisit particularly the work of Beattie et al. (2001) in the context of 
Australian charities, as well as examining additional variables reflective of 
the Australian context. The current study extends the early audit fee 
pricing determinants model in the following ways: 
 
 By examining the influence of a charity’s model of incorporation on 
audit fees, i.e., federal incorporation under the Corporations Law 
versus incorporation under the respective state legislation; 
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 By considering three income sources: donations, trading income and 
grants income; 
 By including the sector of the market the charity predominantly 
operates in, e.g. children’s welfare, disabilities, community support 
services, overseas aid; 
 By providing evidence of audit fee price premiums earned by audit firm 
offices specialising in charity audits; 
 By providing evidence of audit fee price premiums earned by audit firm 
partners specialising in charity audits; and 
 By including a broader size range of charities in the sample. 
 
This chapter examined existing not-for-profit audit-related literature and 
research issues. It highlighted opportunities for enhancing our 
understanding of audit fee determinants in the not-for-profit sector through 
development of an Australian charities audit fee model to determine 
whether there is evidence of Big-Four audit fee premiums in a market 
where the Big Four may not dominate; to test for the existence of fee 
premiums amongst non-Big Four audit firms; to test for the existence of 
audit fee premiums by audit firm offices; and to test for the existence of 
audit fee premiums for audit firm partners. 
 
The following chapter builds on the literature review with a further 
evaluation of the relevant private sector literature, and development of this 
study’s research hypotheses. 
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Table 2 Summary of Audit Fee Research: Not-for-Profit Sector 
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Beattie et al. (2001) S* NA NS S* S* S* S* NA NA NA S
+ NA 
Vermeer et al. (2009) S* S NS S* NA NA NA NA NS S* S* S* 
Note:  S* = Significance at the α < 0.05 level; NS = Not significant; NA = Not applicable. 
 S+ = Fundraising charities only 
 * Beattie et al. (2001) reported three models in respect to Big Six brand premium. The adjusted R2 for these models are 0.62, 0.60 and 0.65 and significant at the at the α < 0.05 level.  Three 
models are reported in regards to individual Big Six brand premiums.  The adjusted R2 for these models are 0.63, 0.65 and 0.65 and are significant at the at the α < 0.05 level. Two models are 
reported in regards to non-Big-Six brand specialist premiums.  The adjusted R2 for these models are 0.72, 0.65 and 0.70 and are significant at the at the α < 0.05 level. 
* Vermeer et al. (2009) model adjusted R2 is 0.55. The model is significant at the α < 0.05 level.
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter builds on the literature review with a discussion of the 
research framework, which underpins research hypotheses. The literature 
review in the preceding chapter highlighted several main variables in the 
literature that are expected to influence charities’ audit fees, as well as 
other variables expected to contribute to the determination of audit fee 
pricing. These variables are considered in the context of this research 
study. The chapter concludes with the specific hypotheses developed to 
test the identified variables.   
 
3.2 Research Framework 
 
This study involved charitable entities with no ownership structure in the 
sense of their profit-based counterparts. Given the structure of not-for-
profit entities, a broader theory than agency theory, i.e., resource 
dependency theory, as put forward by Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) was 
used to explain the differences between audit fee price determinants. 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003, p. 2, argued that “organisations survive to the 
extent that they are effective. Their effectiveness derives from the 
management of demands, particularly the demands of interest groups 
upon which the organisation depends for resources and support”. Meeting 
the demands of those parties upon whom the charities are dependent for 
resources will drive the composition of its resources and its decision-
making process. Resources are obtained via grants (e.g. state and federal 
governments), via donations from the wider community, and/or from 
community-focused trading activities. In addition, expectations may be 
placed on the organisation in respect of accountability via regulators such 
as the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission. This 
framework demonstrates the development of the charities’ audit fee pricing 
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model and related hypotheses, to allow for further study of audit fee 
premiums. 
 
3.3 Charity Audit Fee Price Determinants Model 
 
The first objective of this study was to develop and estimate a model of 
Australian charity audit fee pricing determinants. The model (see Figure 1) 
in this study was developed from the earlier literature on both the profit 
and not-for-profit sectors. The model’s variables were classified into three 
non-exclusive categories: auditee size, auditor relationship (non-audit 
fees, Big Four/non-Big Four auditor, audit office, audit partner) and auditee 
characteristics (incorporation, income source, industry, trading), with audit 
fee a function of auditee size, non-audit fees, Big Four/non-Big Four 
auditor, audit office, audit partner, incorporation, income source, industry, 
trading, and residual. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of the Australian Charity Audit Fees Determinant Model 
Audit Fee 
Auditor 
relationship 
Non-audit fees 
Big 4 / non-Big 
4 
Audit office 
Audit partner 
Auditee 
characteristics  
Incorporation 
Income source 
Industry 
Trading 
Auditee Size 
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3.3.1 Audit Fee 
 
Audit fee was the dependent variable in the Australian charity audit fee 
determinants model. This represents the audit fee reported by the charity 
in their 2011-2012 annual report as being paid to their auditor for financial 
auditing services, and was taken directly from the charities’ published 
financial accounts for the financial year. 
 
3.3.2 Auditee Size 
 
Financial auditing involves a review of the charities’ accounting information 
system, internal control system, and a sample of financial transactions. 
Larger charities will in all likelihood have far more transactions; a more 
involved internal control system, and a more sophisticated accounting 
information system. That is, the audit risk level is expected to be higher for 
larger charities and therefore requires a more complex audit program. This 
suggests that larger charities will have higher audit fees than their smaller 
counterparts. Auditee size has been shown to have a significantly strong 
influence on audit fee pricing in the private sector as shown in Table 1. In 
the not-for-profit sector literature, two measures of size were found to be 
significant predictors of the audit fee price. They are: a) total income 
(Beattie et al., 2001) and b) total assets (Vermeer et al., 2009). While 
assets are by far the most common measure of size (Hay, 2013 reported 
87 studies used assets), Hay et al. (2006) reported that sales (income) 
was used in 24 studies, with 22 of these reporting a positive significant 
result. In this study, auditee size was measured as the total income of the 
charity in the financial year under review.   
 
Charities exist to generate income for disbursement in support of their 
program objectives, rather than building up asset bases to generate 
further income. For this reason it is believed that income provides a more 
robust measure of charities’ size, and consequently reported income in 
charities’ financial statements was used in this study. 
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3.3.3 Auditor Relationship 
 
The independent variable category, auditor relationship, was captured by 
two variables related to the auditor: a) the audit process and b) the 
auditor’s relationship with the client, being non-audit services and size of 
the audit firm (Big Four, non-Big Four). 
 
Non-audit services were found to be a significant indicator of audit fee 
prices in 42 out of 51 audit fee pricing studies examined by Hay (2013). In 
the not-for-profit literature both Beattie et al. (2001) and Vermeer et al. 
(2009) found it was a significant variable influencing audit fees. This 
association was accounted for in the current study by including a 
dichotomous variable, non-audit fees paid to the financial auditor. 
 
It can reasonably be argued that audit fees will be higher when the auditor 
is perceived to have a higher status. The common proxy variable for 
“auditor quality” in the literature is a dummy variable for firms classified as 
Big 8/6/5/4 as the case may be, in which it was found that 58% of all 
studies showed a positive significant result (Hay et al., 2006, p. 176). 
Beattie et al. (2001) and Vermeer et al. (2009) used a dummy variable for 
Big Six/Four auditors. Hay (2013) argued this was an issue warranting 
further investigation due to the many studies reporting non-significant 
results. In this study, the influence of Big 4 audit firms on audit fee pricing 
was further explored by including a dichotomous variable for Big Four 
auditor. This was expected to have a positive coefficient in the regression. 
 
More recent research into audit fee premiums in the private sector 
explored the question of whether audit fee premiums was linked to firm-
wide industry expertise, audit firm office-specific expertise, or a 
combination of both (Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Ferguson 
et al., 2006; Carson & Fargher, 2007; and Hay & Jetter, 2011). In his 
meta-analysis, Hay (2013) found that specialist city and national auditor 
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were significant attributes in terms of audit fee pricing in six studies. 
Francis (2011, p. 125) presented for consideration what is described as a 
“general framework for studying factors associated with engagement-level 
audit quality.” While audit quality per se was not the focus of his study, 
Francis (2011) included an examination of the literature in regard to audit 
specialisation. Audit specialisation research has predominantly viewed the 
question from the perspective of audit firm-wide expertise, however 
Francis suggested the real question to be explored was whether auditor 
expertise is office-specific or firm wide.   
 
In the current study two variables were included to further explore 
Francis’s recommendation. One variable examined the relationship 
between the audit fee paid by charities and the audit office responsible for 
the audit. The second variable extended examination of the relationship to 
not only include office level but also partner level; that is to explore the 
relationship between the audit fee paid by the charity and the audit firm 
partner responsible for the audit. 
 
3.3.4 Auditee Characteristics 
 
Aside from size the other two prominent auditee characteristics in the 
literature are auditee complexity and inherent risk. In regard to complexity, 
the three dominant variables are number of subsidiaries, foreign 
subsidiaries, and Standard Industrial classification (Hay, 2013; Hay et al., 
2006). From a not-for-profit perspective, Beattie et al. (2001) argued that 
auditee complexity influences the audit fee incurred by the organisation, 
and it is therefore posited that audit fees will increase with increased levels 
of auditee complexity. Given the structural nature of not-for-profit entities, 
the following independent variables were proposed as proxies of auditee 
complexity rather than the more common variables used in the private 
sector literature: 
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Incorporation: The political/legal system in Australia, namely federalism, 
provides an interesting context to determine whether the incorporation of a 
charity has an influence on audit fees. Charities can be incorporated under 
the Corporations Law in their relevant state jurisdiction, or in some 
instances under their own Act of Parliament. This would suggest auditors 
need to have an understanding of the various laws and their influence on 
the structure and policies of their clients, hence the rigour of audit 
requirements. Differing reporting requirements and legal obligations can 
also influence the depth of the audit undertaken and consequently the fee. 
Incorporation has not been considered in previous research studies on the 
subject; hence a dichotomous variable was used to reflect the nature of 
incorporation (company/non-company). 
 
Income Source: Charities derive their income from three sources: public 
donations, trading activities and government grants. The expectations of 
fund providers and/or the level of risk associated with the source of 
income can vary, and this will influence expectations in terms of the quality 
of financial reporting and auditing. For example, government funds may be 
subject to grant conditions that require further review by auditors, or 
trading activities can add another level of complexity to the audit that will 
impact the fee charged. In this study, source of income was captured 
through the use of dichotomous variables. 
 
Auditee Industry: As noted previously, the third most common variable 
for complexity in the private sector literature is the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC). While there is no equivalent classification in the not-
for-profit sector in Australia, charities contribute to various “industries”. 
This classification of significant areas of activity can influence the 
complexity of the audit and hence the audit fee.   
 
42 
 
In addition to the charity audit fees determinants model, eight hypotheses 
were explored in this study. These are outlined in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
 
3.4 Research Hypotheses 
 
Once the charity audit fee model was established, the existence of auditor 
fee premiums could be evaluated. Beattie et al. (2001) noted: “the audit 
market structure within the sector is especially useful for exploring this 
issue, since Big Six auditors do not dominate the market to the extent that 
is true for the private sector.” It was anticipated that the charity audit 
market in Australia would allow further exploration of this issue, as a 
similar lack of market dominance by Big Four auditors can be expected. 
The following eight alternatives formed hypotheses that were examined in 
this study.  
 
Hypothesis one entailed an investigation into the existence of Big Four 
audit fee premiums in the charity audit market. Unlike the private sector, it 
was not expected that Big Four auditors would dominate the market to the 
same extent, otherwise definitions like auditors having 10% of market 
share, as considered in prior studies by Craswell et al. (1995), Palmrose 
(1986), and Ward et al. (1994) would not apply. Beattie et al. (2001, p. 
254) suggested: “any observed audit fee premium can be attributed to 
brand name rather than any specific sector expertise.” To test for evidence 
of a Big Four audit premium a dichotomous variable was included in the 
model for this study. In Australia the Big Four audit firms are KPMG, PWC, 
Ernst & Young and Deloitte Global Services Limited. The hypothesis in the 
alternative form is: 
 
H1: The brand name of Big Four auditors is rewarded with an audit 
fee premium above non-Big Four audit firms in the Australian 
charity sector. 
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Hypothesis two assumed evidence of Big Four brand premiums and 
examined whether Big Four premiums were specific to individual Big Four 
firms. Dummy variables for the Big Four audit firms identified in the charity 
audit market were introduced to the model to allow for testing the 
hypothesis: 
 
H2:  Individual Big Four audit firms are rewarded with an audit fee 
premium above non-Big Four audit firms in the Australian 
charity sector. 
 
The nature of the not-for-profit sector is such that it comprises diverse 
entities of relatively small size, which may reduce the role of Big Four 
auditors and provide increased opportunities for non-Big Four auditors to 
play a more prominent role. The objective of this hypothesis was to 
determine whether there was any evidence of audit fee premiums for 
expertise or specialisation. The literature on private sector industry 
specialisation suggests that there may be a small auditee effect, but this 
had not yet been well established either way, creating an opportunity for 
further exploration in the context of charities. 
 
Reflecting the earlier work of Cullinan (1998), Beattie et al. (2001, p. 255) 
argued that:  
 
As market concentration is much lower in the charity sector than in 
the private sector company audit market, there is less likelihood of 
monopolistic/oligopolistic pricing by a few market leaders. 
Consequently, observation of a fee premium is stronger evidence 
that clients are willing to pay higher audit fees to firms with 
perceived expertise in the sector. 
 
This led to hypotheses three and four: 
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H3:  Non-Big Four audit firms with expertise are rewarded with an 
audit fee premium above other non-Big Four audit firms in the 
Australian charity sector. 
 
Hypothesis four assumed evidence of non-Big Four audit premiums and 
investigated the existence of audit premiums by non-Big Four market 
leaders in the charity sector.   
 
H4:  Individual non-Big Four audit firms with expertise are rewarded 
with an audit fee premium above other non-Big Four audit 
firms in the Australian charity sector. 
 
The same approach adopted by Beattie et al. (2001), a separate 
regression model for Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms, was used in 
this study. Beattie et al. (2001) tested for a similar hypothesis whereby 
market share was proxied by the number of charities audited by non-Big-
Six firms. The authors also tested a separate model (Model 7) in which the 
regression was based on charities audited by non-Big-Six audit firms.  
 
Audit specialisation research has predominantly looked at the audit fee 
premium question on the basis of firm-wide expertise, however, some 
studies explored audit specialisation at the city level and showed findings 
that indicated specialist audit firms at both national and city levels were 
earning an audit fee premium. In his review of audit quality research, 
Francis (2011) suggested that audit specialisation may be office-specific 
rather than firm-wide.   
 
The nature of the not-for-profit sector may lend itself to more personal 
connections between auditors and charities, with audit firm offices or audit 
partners taking a particular interest in the sector, thereby developing 
expertise which commands an audit fee premium. The nature of the 
personal connection may also enhance the relationship between auditors 
45 
 
and charities in such a way as to override an audit firm’s national 
expertise. This presented an opportunity to not only explore the question 
of charity audit fee premiums, but also to extend the literature by 
considering the question of office-specific charity audit fee premiums 
and/or audit partner charity audit fee premiums. Accordingly the remaining 
four hypotheses were: 
 
H5: Individual offices of Big Four audit firms are rewarded with an 
audit fee premium above other Big Four audit firms in the 
Australian charity sector.  
 
H6: Individual audit partners of Big Four audit firms are rewarded 
with an audit fee premium above other Big Four audit firm 
partners in the Australian charity sector.  
 
H7: Individual offices of multi office non-Big Four audit firms are 
rewarded with an audit fee premium above other multi office 
non-Big Four audit firms in the Australian charity sector.  
 
H8: Individual audit partners of non-Big Four audit firms are rewarded 
with an audit fee premium above partners of other non-Big 
Four audit firms in the Australian charity sector 
 
In summary, the research framework focused on two aspects: an 
Australian charity audit fee determination model and an examination of 
audit fee premiums in the Australian charity audit market. This was 
achieved through analyses of a sample of charities’ annual reports. 
 
The following chapter discusses the research methodology used in this 
study, and provides details about the model construction and data 
collection. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Research Design 
 
The research approach adopted in this study used an analysis of a sample 
of charity annual reports to evaluate the determinants of audit fees paid 
(dependent variable) by Australian charities. The most recently available 
financial reports at the commencement of the study, the 2011-2012 
financial period, were evaluated in this study. Annual reports were used as 
there were no formal reporting channels for this sector, such as those for 
the private sector. Charities’ annual reports were obtained online from 
their website and/or via a written request to the charity where no report 
was available online.   
 
4.2 Sample Selection 
 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2009) suggested that there were 
approximately 41,000 not-for-profit entities in Australia at the 
commencement of this study, yet there was no known database listing of 
these entities2. The most comprehensive list of charities was the 
Australian Taxation Office’s listing of organisations that are endorsed as 
deductible gift recipients. The listing can be downloaded any time and 
reflects the status of recipients at download date. At the time of this study 
it contained approximately 17,400 entities, however, not all the 
organisations included in the listing were charities as defined by the 
Australian Taxation Office.   
 
Given the lack of a charities database and the broad inclusion of entities in 
the Australian Taxation Office listing, an online directory published by Pro 
                                            
2 The Australian Charities and Not-for-profit Commission now provides a database of 
registered charities, ACNC Registered Charities available at 
http://data.gov.au/dataset/acnc-register. 
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Bono Australia Pty Ltd, Guide to Giving: The Australian Directory of Not for 
Profit Organisations (Pro Bono Australia Pty Ltd, 2012), as at December 
28, 2012 was used as the sample source. The directory listed 949 
charities across 40 sectors (significant areas of activity). This number is a 
little misleading as the organisations could self-select as many sectors as 
they deemed relevant to their core activities. To mitigate against this a 
review of the directory was undertaken, involving a review of each listing. 
In cases where a charity was listed in more than one sector, the 
researcher determined a primary sector according to main area of activity, 
and deleted duplicate entries. This process entailed scrutiny of the 
charity’s website to ascertain their primary activity and reduced the 
number of charities listed in the directory to 759 across 37 sectors. Of 
these 37 sectors, 13 contained fewer than 10 entities. A further review was 
undertaken of sectors containing 10 or fewer organisations, and where 
deemed appropriate, these were consolidated into a “parent” sector. For 
example, one sector titled “independent schools” included only one 
organisation, so it was consolidated into the parent sector “education and 
training”. In this way, seven sectors were removed from their associated 
entities and reclassified into more suitable sectors (see Table 3). Following 
this process the directory contained 759 organisations across 30 sectors. 
 
An initial stratified sample of 250 charities in the consolidated directory, 
showed each sector with a random size sample of charities. The charities 
in each sector were sorted alphabetically and counted. The total number 
was then matched to the random number to select the organisation for the 
sample. The random number generator, Stat Trek (n.d.), was used to 
generate a set of random numbers for each stratum. Stat Trek allows for 
duplication avoidance, and specification of the number of random 
required, the number range. 
 
Of the 250 organisations identified for this study, annual reports and/or 
financial reports were obtained for 106 organisations, either via their 
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website or by contacting the organisation directly via email. It was not 
possible to obtain sufficient data from the remaining organisations 
because they either did not publish their financial information on their 
website, did not respond to the email request for information (130 
organisations), or declined the request (9 organisations). Five 
organisations were removed from the initial sample as they were 
subsequently found not to be charitable organisations (e.g., universities 
and state government entities not registered with the Australian Charities 
and Not-for-profits Commission). One charity, the Baptist Community 
Services (NSW & ACT), chose early on to adopt the reduced disclosure 
requirements allowed for in the accounting standard, AASB 2011-2 
Amendments to Australian Accounting Standards, which arose from the 
Trans-Tasman Convergence Project. This meant that the charity did not 
report audit fees paid. 
 
An initial analysis of the sample revealed that only 90 charities reported 
audit fees in their financial reports. In light of this information, the sample 
size was increased by 50 to 300. The same process of representation was 
applied to the additional 50 entities, and Stat Trek (n.d.) was again used to 
generate a random sample of an additional 50 charities. Each sector’s 
representation in the sample was determined by calculating the sample 
ratio for the sector (number in the sector/total sample) x sample size. The 
random number generator Stat Trek (n.d.) then generated a set of random 
numbers for each stratum. Table 4 summarises the sectors, number of 
charities or organisations in each sector, and the make-up by sector of the 
final sample used in this study. 
 
The final sample of charities and their annual and/or financial reports were 
used as the source of dependent and independent financial variables to 
extract data from the Australian Business Names database, as 
appropriate. 
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Table 3: Rationalisation of Industry Sectors in the Guide to Giving: The Australian 
Directory of Not for-profit Organisations 
Original Sector New Sector Number of Entities Moved 
Diabetes Health – General 7 
Gay and Lesbian  
Groups 
Education and Training (2); 
Community Support Services (1) 3 
History and  
Heritage Arts and Culture 2 
Independent  
Schools Education and Training 1 
Libraries and  
Museums Arts and Culture 3 
Rural Community Support Services (3); Foundations and Philanthropy 4 
Safety, Rescue and  
First Aid 
Children (1), Health-General (1); Sport 
and Recreation (1) 3 
Sport and  
Recreation  5 
 
 
4.3 Independent and Dependent Variables 
 
The model includes one dependent variable and 11 independent 
variables. The nature of these variables is discussed in the following 
sections.  
 
4.3.1 The Dependent Variable: Audit Fee 
 
The dependent variable is the audit fee as reported by the charities in their 
2011-2012 annual and/or financial reports as the fee paid to the auditor for 
financial auditing services during that financial year. From the initial 
sample of 106 charities, it was found that only 90 reported their audit fees 
in their 2011-2012 financial reports. The remaining 16 charities simply did 
not report the fee in their published financial statements and/or annual 
reports, and with one exception, no explanation was given. The lack of a 
dependent variable, audit fees, meant that these 16 charities had to be 
removed from the initial sample, and the decision was made to increase 
the initial sample size to 300. The result was that 101 charities’ annual 
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reports were used in the analysis, as their annual and/or financial reports 
were available and the reports included the audit fees. The next step was 
to obtain the independent variables. 
 
Table 4: Guide to Giving: The Australian Directory of Not-for-profit Organisations 
by Sector and Sample Breakdown 
Sector Number of Entities 
Sample 
Representation 
Aged Care and Seniors 39 5 
Affordable Housing 18 4 
Animals and Birds 37 5 
Arts and Culture 31 3 
Asthma and Respiratory 9 0 
Blindness and Deafness 27 3 
Cancer 34 5 
Children 49 8 
Community Support Services 69 11 
Conservation and Environment 38 6 
Diabetes 6 8 
Disabilities 82 4 
Education and Training 32 2 
Families 15 1 
Foundations and Philanthropy 11 2 
Health – General 46 10 
Health – Hospitals and Medical Centres 16 2 
Heart Disease 4 1 
Humanitarian 9 1 
Indigenous 12 0 
Law, Justice and Human Rights 10 1 
Mental Health 32 4 
Overseas Aid and Development 29 8 
Religion and Religious Groups 18 0 
Research 29 2 
Sport and Recreation 6 0 
Veterans and Ex-serviceman/woman 5 0 
Welfare 8 3 
Woman 
 
15 0 
Youth 23 2 
TOTAL 759 101 
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4.3.2 Independent Variables 
 
This study consisted of 11 independent variables reflective of the charity 
audit fee model (Figure 1) plus additional “sub-variables” as applicable to 
the specific hypothesis being tested. The final dependent and independent 
variables are summarised in Table 5. 
 
4.3.2.1 Auditee Size 
 
The independent variable LNINCOME is the natural logarithm of the 
income amount reported by the charity in the financial year. The natural 
logarithm of income was used to address normality concerns. Income was 
used to show the total reported operating revenue for the charity from all 
sources as reported in the profit and loss statement or notes to the 
accounts. Where necessary, an analysis of the financial report was 
undertaken to determine the reported income. The financial reports of all 
the charities in the sample reported their total revenue (income), at least in 
a manner that allowed for it to be calculated where a total amount was not 
reported.  
 
4.3.2.2 Auditor Relationship 
 
In the audit fees model (Figure 1) the independent variable category, 
auditor relationship, consisted of five variables reflective of the relationship 
between the auditor and charity. 
 
The first of the auditee relationship variables, AUDITFIRM, was a nominal 
variable representing the audit firm engaged by the charity. Each audit firm 
was uniquely identified by a categorical value. Multicollinearity analysis of 
the variable AUDITFIRM showed it was significantly correlated to 
AUDITOFFICE (see Table 5), and AUDITOFFICE was therefore used as a 
proxy for AUDITFIRM, which was excluded from the subsequent 
multivariate analysis. 
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Further analysis of auditor relationship was undertaken by identifying the 
firms as Big-Four or non-Big Four. The four firms classified as “Big Four” 
were Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited [DELOITTE], Ernst & Young 
[ERNST&YOUNG], KPMG [KPMG], and PricewaterhouseCoopers [PWC]. 
A nominal variable, BIG FOUR was included in the model. To test for a 
relationship between Big Four audit firms and charities’ audit fees as 
proposed in hypothesis 2, each Big Four audit firm was analysed. For this 
hypothesis, each Big Four audit firm had its own variable, e.g., Deloitte 
was DELOITTE. The identity of the audit firm was obtained from the audit 
report included in the charities’ annual and/or financial report. 
 
Additional sub-variables were created from the AUDITFIRM variable for 
analyses related to hypotheses 3 and 4. In relation to hypothesis 3, non-
Big Four audit firms were reviewed to identify the number of audit clients 
they had. Five variables were created, representing non-Big Four audit 
firms with seven clients [NONB4CLIENTS7], six clients 
[NONB4CLIENTS6], three clients [NONB4CLIENTS3], two clients 
[NONB4CLIENTS2], and one client [NONB4CLIENTS1] respectively. No 
firms were identified as having four or five clients. These variables were 
nominal. 
 
For hypothesis 4, the approach adopted in Beattie et al. (2001) was 
applied to identify the number of clients or percentage of audit fees earned 
by the top non-Big Four audit firms. Four variables were created 
representing the four larger non-Big Four audit firms, namely WHK NG 
(NONB4WHKNG), BDO (NONBIGBDO), Grant Thornton (NONB4GRANT) 
and RSM Bird Cameron (NONB4RSM).  These variables were nominal. 
 
The variables AUDITOFFICE and AUDITPARTNER in the category 
auditor relationship simulated the research of Francis (2011) who explored 
whether auditor expertise was office-specific or firm wide, and earlier work 
exploring whether auditor expertise was partner specific. AUDITOFFICE 
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was a nominal variable code and reflected the audit firm’s office 
undertaking the audit. An audit firm with multiple offices engaging in 
charity audits had a code assigned to each office. The variable, 
AUDITPARTNER, was a nominal variable representing each audit firm’s 
audit partner who signed off the audit report as contained in the annual 
and/or financial report of the charity. The identities of both the office and 
the audit partner were obtained from the audit report included in the 
charities’ annual reports and/or financial reports. 
 
Hypotheses 5 and 7 examined more closely the role of specific audit 
offices in influencing charity audit fees, and additional variables were 
created to identify each specific Big Four and non-Big Four audit firm 
office with multiple offices undertaking charity audits. For Big Four audit 
firms the variable name was in the format B4OFFICE followed by the audit 
firm office location, so for example Deloitte Sydney office variable is 
B4OFFICEDELSYD. For non-Big Four audit firm offices, the variable 
name was in the format NB4 followed by the audit firm office location, so 
for example, BDO Sydney office variable is NB4BDOSYD. Information for 
the variables was obtained from the audit reports provided in the charities’ 
annual financial statements. 
 
Hypotheses 6 and 8 examined the relationship between the audit partners 
of the Big Four audit firms and charity audit fees, and the relationship 
between the audit partners of non-Big Four audit firms whose partners 
were responsible for more than one audit and charity audit fees 
respectively. For Big Four audit firms the variable name was in the format 
B4 followed by the firm name audit partner, e.g., Deloitte’s audit partner, 
Lefevre’s variable is B4DELLEFEVRE. For non-Big Four audit firm offices 
the variable name was in the format NB4 followed by the audit firm partner 
name, so BDO audit partner Paul’s variable is NB4BDOPAUL. Information 
for the variables was obtained from audit reports provided in the charities’ 
annual financial statements. 
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The final variable in the auditor relationship category is NONAUDITFEE, a 
nominal variable indicating whether or not the charity reported non-audit 
fees in its financial and/or annual report. A nominal variable form was used 
to represent the characteristic, non-audit fee, due to the abnormal nature 
of the reported fees. This variable was determined from the reported 
information in the charities’ annual financial reports. 
 
4.3.2.3 Auditee Characteristics 
 
The third independent variable category in the model is auditee 
characteristics (Figure 1), which consisted of six variables reflecting 
various attributes of Australian charities. 
 
The variable ABNCOMPANY was a nominal variable reflecting whether a 
charity has an incorporated structure as a public company or whether it is 
incorporated in another form. An incorporated structure was identified from 
the Australian Business Name database, where an entity’s incorporated 
structure is listed as “entity type.” The Australian Business Register 
describes “entity type” as “the entity associated with an ABN in terms of 
income tax, Australian business number (ABN) and Goods and Services 
Tax (GST) legislation” (Australian Business Register, 2013). The charities 
included in the sample for this study were one of five entity types. These 
entity types, along with their definitions, are as follows: 
 
 Australian public company: “A company is a non-individual client 
type. Company is defined to include a body corporate and any other 
unincorporated association or body of persons but does not include 
a partnership or a non-entity joint venture” (Australian Business 
Register, 2013). 
 
 Australian private company: “A private Australian company is not 
listed on the stock exchange and is not included in the description 
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of Australian public company or cooperative” (Australian Business 
Register, 2013). 
 
 Other incorporated entity: “Other incorporated entity includes an 
entity that has the same characteristics as a company but is not 
incorporated as a corporation's law company. This category 
includes: a branch of an overseas company not incorporated in 
Australia (often the name ends in corporation); incorporated 
associations which are incorporated under a State Act; incorporated 
charitable institutions) (Australian Business Register, 2013). 
 
 Other unincorporated entity: The Australian Business Register 
(2013) defines other unincorporated entity as an “entity [as] a 
number of people grouped together by a common purpose with 
club-like characteristics, for example, a sporting club, social club or 
trade union. Some club-like characteristics are: 
 
• there are members of the association; 
• the members will normally be free to join or leave the 
association;  
• the association will normally continue in existence independently 
of any change to the composition of the association;  
• as a matter of history, there will have been a moment in time 
when a number of persons combined to form the association;  
• there is a contract (which can fall short of a legally enforceable 
contract) binding the members among themselves; and  
• there is a constitutional arrangement for meetings of members 
and for appointing officers.  
“The meaning of any other unincorporated association or body of 
persons does not include a non-entity joint venture” (Australian 
Business Register, 2013). 
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 Other trust: “A trust is a fiduciary relationship where a trustee 
holds property or income for the benefit of others (the 
beneficiaries). A trust is not a separate legal entity” (Australian 
Business Register, 2013). 
 
One charity in the sample, RSPCA Tasmania, was not listed in the 
Australian Business Name database and hence did not appear to have an 
Australian Business Number. It was also not listed in the Australian 
Charities and Not-for-profits Commission register, and since its status, as 
a charity was unclear, it was removed from the sample. 
 
The nature of the charity sector is such that charities are involved in a 
diverse range of “industries” or sectors. In this study, the variable 
INDUSTRY represented the charity purpose or industry sector the charity 
operated in.  The Charities Act 2013 (Cth) s. 12(1) defines 12 charity 
purposes: 
 
• The purpose of advancing health; 
• The purpose of advancing education; 
• The purpose of advancing social or public welfare; 
• The purpose of advancing religion 
• The purpose of advancing culture 
• The purpose of promoting reconciliation, mutual respect and 
tolerance between groups individuals that are in Australia; 
• The purpose of promoting or protecting human rights; 
• The purpose of advancing the security or safety of Australian or the 
Australian public 
• The purpose of preventing or relieving the suffering of animals; 
• The purpose of advancing the natural environment; 
• Any other purpose beneficial to the general public that may be 
reasonably be regarded as analogous to, or within the spirit of, any 
of the purposes mentioned above; 
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• The purpose of promoting a change – the change is in furtherance 
or in aid of one or more of the purposes mentioned above or in the 
case of opposing change – the change in opposition to, or in 
hindrance of, one or more of the purposes mentioned above. 
 
Following a review of the online directory Guide to Giving: The Australian 
Directory of Not for Profit Organisations (Pro Bono Australia Pty Ltd, 
2012), the self-reporting classification of purpose put forward by the 
charities in the sample in their registration with the Australian Charities 
and Not-for-profits Commission and a review of the activities of the charity 
by the research each charity in the sample was coded as being in one of 
the 12 industries or charitable purposes (see Table 6). Each charity was 
coded 1 - 12, reflective of the industry sector or charitable purpose.  
 
Under Australia’s federal system of government, the regulation of charities 
is a state matter, and hence each state imposes inconsistent 
requirements. A nominal variable was included in this study, STATE, 
which reflects the state or territory the charity was registered in. The state 
or territory was determined from the incorporated address of the charity as 
provided in the annual reports and/or financial statements. 
 
The final three variables in the auditee characteristics category reflect their 
income sources and broadly indicate where their income is derived from: 
donations, trading activities and government grants. The expectations of 
fund providers can vary, as can the level of risk associated with the source 
of income, thereby influencing expectations in terms of the quality of 
financial reporting and auditing. For example, government funds may be 
subject to grant conditions that require further review by auditors. The 
source of income in this study was represented by three nominal 
variables: DONATIONS, GRANTS and TRADING. Nominal variables were 
used because there were significant normality issues in the reported 
amounts, which could not be resolved with statistical techniques.   
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A charity was deemed to have received income from donations if it 
reported income as such, or if it could be determined from an analysis of 
the charity’s profit and loss statement and/or notes to the accounts that 
there was no reciprocal service for that income. In cases where a charity 
reported income from donations, it was coded as receiving donations 
income.  
 
Trading income was determined by an examination of each charity’s profit 
and loss statement and/or notes to the accounts, to identify income 
considered to have arisen from trading or commercial activities. As there 
was no consistency in the financial reports of the charities under study, the 
revenue items described as: sales of goods, publication sales, sale of 
product distribution rights, running camps, events income, social 
enterprises, service income, sales, education and training, clinic revenue, 
client fees, accommodation bond draw-downs and periodic payments, 
home care fees, audience fees, fees and services, merchandising, rental, 
subscription revenue, patient fees, conference, training and course 
registration fees, sale of services, sale of merchandise, and corporate 
income, were all treated as “trading income” for the purposes of this study. 
That is, income from activities which is of a commercial nature, or where 
the charity provides something tangible in return for payment. In cases 
where charities reported income from trading activities, it was coded as 
receiving trading income.  
 
A charity was determined to have received income from grants if it 
reported income as such or if income came from the federal government, 
state government, local government, non-government organisations, 
government subsidies, or from government departments (e.g., Department 
of Human Services (Victoria), Department of Health and Human Services 
(Tasmania), Department of Health and Community Services (ACT). 
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This chapter provided details of the dependent and independent variables 
that were applied in the multivariate testing outlined in the following 
chapter. 
 
Table 5: Summary List of Variables 
Variable Name Audit Fee Model Categories 
Measurement 
Level Description 
LNAUDITFEE Dependent Variable Ratio Natural log of the reported audit fee for the financial year 
AUDITFIRM Auditor Relationship Nominal Variable representing each audit firm in the sample [1] 
AUDITOFFICE Auditor Relationship Nominal 
Variable representing the city of the 
audit firm’s office responsible for the 
audit 
B4OFFICEDELMEL Auditor Relationship Nominal Deloitte Melbourne office 
B4OFFICEDELSYD Auditor Relationship Nominal Deloitte Sydney office 
B4OFFICEDELPAR Auditor Relationship Nominal Deloitte Parramatta office 
B4OFFICEEYMEL Auditor Relationship Nominal Ernst & Young Melbourne office 
B4OFFICEEYSYD Auditor Relationship Nominal Ernst & Young Sydney office 
B4OFFICEKPMGMEL Auditor Relationship Nominal KPMG Melbourne office 
B4OFFICEKPMGSYD Auditor Relationship Nominal KPMG Sydney office 
B4OFFICEKPMGPER Auditor Relationship Nominal KPMG Perth office 
B4OFFICEPWCSYD Auditor Relationship Nominal PWC Sydney office 
B4OFFICEPWCNEW Auditor Relationship Nominal PWC Newcastle office 
NB4BDOSYD Auditor Relationship Nominal BDO Sydney office 
NB4BDOPER Auditor Relationship Nominal BDO Perth office 
NB4BDOBRI Auditor Relationship Nominal BDO Brisbane office 
NB4GTMEL Auditor Relationship Nominal Grant Thornton Melbourne office 
NB4GTSYD Auditor Relationship Nominal Grant Thornton Sydney office 
NB4GTADL Auditor Relationship Nominal Grant Thornton Adelaide office 
NB4GTPER Auditor Relationship Nominal Grant Thornton Perth office 
NB4MSPER Auditor Relationship Nominal Moore Stephens Perth office 
NB4MSCAM Auditor Relationship Nominal Moore Stephens Campbell office 
NB4PPADL Auditor Relationship Nominal Pitcher Partners Adelaide office 
NB4PPMEL Auditor Relationship Nominal Pitcher Partners Melbourne office 
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Variable Name Audit Fee Model Categories 
Measurement 
Level Description 
NB4RSMPER Auditor Relationship Nominal RSM Bird Cameron Perth office 
NB4RSMCAN Auditor Relationship Nominal RSM Bird Cameron Canberra office 
AUDITPARTNER Auditor Relationship Nominal Variable representing the audit firm partner signing off audit report 
B4DELBROWN_A Auditor Relationship Nominal Deloitte Partner – Brown, A. 
B4DELLEFEVRE Auditor Relationship Nominal Deloitte Partner – Lefevre 
B4DELPEARCE Auditor Relationship Nominal Deloitte Partner – Pearce 
B4DELBROWN Auditor Relationship Nominal Deloitte Partner – Brown 
B4DELANGLEUCCI Auditor Relationship Nominal Deloitte Partner – Angleucci 
B4DELCOLLIE Auditor Relationship Nominal Deloitte Partner – Collie 
B4EYWALLACE Auditor Relationship Nominal Ernst & Young Partner – Wallace 
B4EYPAINTER Auditor Relationship Nominal Ernst & Young Partner – Painter 
B4EYLEWIS Auditor Relationship Nominal Ernst & Young Partner – Lewis 
B4KPMGSCAMMELL Auditor Relationship Nominal KPMG Partner – Scammell 
B4KPMGNAPIER Auditor Relationship Nominal KPMG Partner – Napier 
B4KPMGMITCHEL Auditor Relationship Nominal KPMG Partner – Mitchel 
B4KPMGTRAVERS Auditor Relationship Nominal KPMG Partner – Travers 
B4KPMGROBINSON Auditor Relationship Nominal KPMG Partner – Robinson 
B4KPMGMATTERA Auditor Relationship Nominal KPMG Partner – Mattera 
B4KPMGCINANNI Auditor Relationship Nominal KPMG Partner – Cinanni 
B4KPWCMCCONEL Auditor Relationship Nominal PWC Partner – McConel 
B4KPWCTURNER Auditor Relationship Nominal PWC Partner – Turner 
B4KPWCMAHER Auditor Relationship Nominal PWC Partner – Maher 
NB4BDOPAUL Auditor Relationship Nominal BDO Partner - Paul 
NB4RSSMITH Auditor Relationship Nominal Ronald Smith Partner - Smith 
NB4AGNWATSON Auditor Relationship Nominal Auditor General NSW - Watson 
NB4DANWINNETT Auditor Relationship Nominal Danby Winnett Partner - Winnett 
NB4WHKFLAKEMOR
E Auditor Relationship Nominal WHK NG Partner - Flakemore 
NB4OHTHERS Auditor Relationship Nominal All other non-Big Four audit partners 
BIG FOUR Auditor Relationship Nominal Variable representing a Big Four audit firm or not a Big Four audit firm 
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Variable Name Audit Fee Model Categories 
Measurement 
Level Description 
DELOITTE Auditor Relationship Nominal Big Four Audit Firm – Deloitte Australia 
ERNST&YOUNG Auditor Relationship Nominal Big Four Audit Firm – Ernst & Young 
KPMG Auditor Relationship Nominal Big Four Audit Firm - KPMG 
PWC Auditor Relationship Nominal Big Four Audit Firm - PricewaterhouseCoopers 
NONB4WHKNG Auditor Relationship Nominal Non-Big Four specialist 
NONB4BDO Auditor Relationship Nominal Non-Big Four specialist 
NONB4GRANT Auditor Relationship Nominal Non-Big Four specialist 
NONB4RSM Auditor Relationship Nominal Non-Big Four specialist 
NONB4CLIENTSS7 Auditor Relationship Nominal Non-Big Four audit firm client numbers 
NONB4CLIENTSS6 Auditor Relationship Nominal Non-Big Four audit firm client numbers 
NONB4CLIENTSS3 Auditor Relationship Nominal Non-Big Four audit firm client numbers 
NONB4CLIENTSS2 Auditor Relationship Nominal Non-Big Four audit firm client numbers 
NONB4CLIENTSS1 Auditor Relationship Nominal Non-Big Four audit firm client numbers 
NONAUDITFEE Auditor Relationship Nominal Log of reported non-audit fees paid to the auditors 
LNINCOME Auditee Characteristic Interval 
Natural log of the total report income for 
the financial year 
ABNCOMPANY Auditee Characteristic Nominal 
Variable representing if the charity is 
structured as a public company or not. 
INDUSTRY Auditee Characteristics Nominal 
Variable representing the industry sector 
that the charity operates in 
STATE Auditee Characteristics Nominal 
Variable identifying the state the charity 
is located in. 
DONATIONS Auditee Characteristics Nominal 
Variable indicating if the charity reports 
income from donations. 
TRADING Auditee Characteristics Nominal 
Variable indicating if the charity reports 
income from trading activities 
GRANTS Auditee Characteristics Nominal 
Variable indicating if the charity reports 
income from grants. 
[1] AUDITFIRM was found to significantly correlated with AUDITOFFICE and was not included in the 
multivariate analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESES TESTING 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the analyses and results of testing the charity audit 
fees model and hypotheses put forward in the study. It commences with 
an examination of the descriptive characteristics of the sample, and a 
profile of the organisations included in the sample of Australian charities. 
This is followed by a preliminary analysis, including descriptive statistics 
and tests of normality undertaken with IBM SPSS Statistics. Correlation 
testing is described, followed by multiple regression analysis. The chapter 
concludes with a summary of the results. 
 
5.2 Sample Profile 
 
The sample of charities in this study consisted of 101 organisations 
representing eight industry sectors or charity purposes. The profile or 
descriptive statistics for the sample organisations are summarised in Table 
6. In the sample a charity was likely to have an entity structure other than 
that of an Australian public company, to be an entity operating in the 
community support services sector, and to be domiciled in Victoria. The 
average income was $18,382,359 and the average cost of an audit was 
$26,536. An auditor of a charity in this study was likely to be a non-Big-4 
auditor with one charity client, and the auditor partner was likely to audit 
only one charity.  A profile of the auditors is summarised in Table 7.  
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Table 6: Profile of the Charities in the Study Sample 
 Variables N % 
INDUSTRY Health 37 36.6 
 Social or Public Welfare 34 33.7 
 Other 13 12.9 
 Natural Environment 6 5.9 
 Animals 5 5.0 
 Culture 3 3.0 
 Education 2 2.0 
 Law 1 1.0 
 TOTAL 101 100.0 
    
STATE Victoria 41 40.6 
 New South Wales 32 31.7 
 Queensland 10 9.9 
 Western Australia 6 5.9 
 Australian Capital Territory 4 4.0 
 South Australia 4 4.0 
 Tasmania 3 3.0 
 Northern Territory 1 1.0 
 TOTAL 101 100.0 
    
ABN ENTITY 
TYPE Australian Public Company 47 46.5 
 Other Incorporated Entity 54 53.5 
 TOTAL 101 100.0 
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Table 7: Profile of the Auditors in the Study Sample 
 Variables N % 
AUDITOR Big Four 23 22.8 
 Non-Big Four 73 72.3 
 Missing 5 5 
 Total 101 100.0 
    
AUDIT FIRMS  Seven clients 3 5.2 
 Six clients 1 1.7 
 Five clients 1 1.7 
 Four clients 1 1.7 
 Three clients 1 1.7 
 Two clients 6 10.3 
 One client 45 77.6 
 Total 63 100.0 
 Missing 5   
    
AUDIT OFFICES Five clients 1 1.4 
 Four clients 2 2.8 
 Three clients 3 4.2 
 Two clients 6 8.3 
 One client 60 83.3 
 Total 79 100.0 
 Missing 7  
    
AUDIT PARTNERS Three clients 1 1.2 
 Two clients 8 9.5 
 One client 75 89.3 
 Total 91 100.0 
 Missing  7  
 
 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Testing the data to determine compliance with the statistical assumptions 
underlying multiple regression techniques is important for successful 
analysis (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 2010). The testing was 
undertaken here through descriptive analysis of the ratio dependent 
variables and the independent variable. The descriptive indicators 
reported were the mean, median, standard deviation (Table 8) and the 
testing of normality via both skewness and kurtosis tests (Table 9). 
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Table 8: Summary Statistics of the Variables 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
AUDITEE FEES        
AUDITFEE $26,536 $15,000 $34,489 0 $221,300 3.289 13.915 
LNAUDITFEE 9.5999 9.6481 1.12984 7.31 12.31 -.045 -.519 
        
AUDITEE SIZE        
INCOME $18,382,359 $52,92,243 $40,117,453 $113,313 $3,449,420,000 5.833 44.154 
LNINCOME 15.4733 15.4818  11.64 19.66 .086 -.634 
R_DONATIONS $2,856,903 $188,313 $8,133,794 $2,044 $47,235,737 4.374 20.660 
R_TRADING $2,242,572 $361,460 $5,691,456 $449 $36,554,659 4.981 28.490 
R_GRANTS $7,197,317 $1,463,121 $14,812,002 $32,294 $68,039,000 3.274 10.621 
        
AUDITOR CHARACTERISTICS        
R_NONAUDITFEE $20,868 $9,450 $28,757 $1,875 $125,500 2.428 6.406 
n = 101 
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Multivariate techniques, such as multiple regressions, are based on a 
fundamental set of assumptions, which represent the underlying statistical 
theory (Hair et al., 2010, p. 71). The four assumptions of interest were: 
normality, homoscedasticity, linearity and the absence of correlated errors. 
 
5.4 Tests of Normality: Ratio Variables 
 
The assumption of normality is a prerequisite for statistical techniques 
such as multiple regression. In multivariate analysis, the complexity of 
relationships, often arising from the use of a large number of variables, 
can result in potential distortions and biases in the results and are more 
pronounced when the assumptions are violated (Hair et al., 2010, p. 70). 
The severity of non-normality is based on two dimensions: the shape of 
the distribution and the sample size. Smaller sample sizes (50 or less) 
tend to be more adversely effected by a lack of normality in comparison to 
larger sample sizes (200 or more) (Hair et al., 2010, p. 72). The sample 
size of 101 in this study falls between what could be considered a small 
and large sample size. The distribution shape of the dependent variable 
and the ratio independent variables were analysed using tests for 
skewness and kurtosis. Kurtosis refers to the “peakedness” (leptokurtic) or 
“flatness” (platykurtic) of the distribution compared to a normal distribution, 
whereas skewness is used to describe the balance of the distribution (Hair 
et al., 2010, p. 41). 
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Table 9: Tests for Skewness and Kurtosis: Ratio Variables  
Variable Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk Skewness Kurtosis 
 Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig. Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
AUDITFEE .224 .000 .654 .000 3.289 .240 13.915 .476 
INCOME .324 .000 .434 .000 5.833 .240 44.154 .476 
R_DONATIONS .358 .000 .408 .000 4.333 .240 21.169 .476 
R_GRANTS .337 .000 .448 .000 3.560 .240 12.421 .476 
R_TRADING  .422 .000 .173 .000 9.138 .240 87.941 .476 
R_NONAUDITFEE .374 .000 .365 .000 4.802 .240 26.741 .476 
n = 101 
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The skewness values for the dependent variable, AUDITFEE, and all five 
independent variables were positive, indicating a distribution shift to the 
left (see Table 9). Similarly the positive kurtosis values denote a leptokurtic 
or peaked distribution. Further testing was done using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic with a Liffiefors significance level for normality (see Table 
9). Coakes (2013) noted that if the significance level is greater than .05 in 
both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk test, then normality 
can be assumed. The significance level is shown to be below .05 (at 0.00) 
for the dependent variable AUDITFEE, and all the ratio independent 
variables of INCOME, R_DONATIONS, R_GRANTS, R_TRADING and 
R_NONAUDITFEE, hence non-normality can be assumed. 
 
In addition to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test results 
reported in Table 9, standard Q-Q plots are shown for AUDITFEE (Figure 
2), INCOME (Figure 3), R_DONATIONS (Figure 4), R_GRANTS (Figure 5) 
R_TRADING (Figure 6), and R_NONAUDITFEE (Figure 7). In each 
standard Q-Q plot the coordinate data points depart quite far from the 
main diagonal line, and in combination with the reported skewness and 
kurtosis values, it can be concluded that each of the variables had non-
normal distributions and therefore did not meet the normality assumption 
for multiple regression procedures. Transformation of the data was 
therefore required.  
 
 
 5.5 Transformations to Achieve Normality: Ratio Variables 
 
The tests for normality reported in the previous section showed that the 
normality assumptions inherent in multiple regression analysis were 
violated, and that correction procedures were required. Hair et al. (2010) 
recommended data transformations as the principal means of correcting 
non-normality and heterosedasticity. As the data in this study were 
positively skewed, it was determined that logarithm or square root 
transformations would work best. Logarithm and square root 
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transformations were initially applied to the dependent variable, 
LNAUDITFEE, and the five ratio independent variables, LNINCOME, 
LNDONATIONS, LNGRANTS, LNTRADING and LNNONAUDITFEES. 
Only the results of the logarithm transformations are reported here, as the 
square root transformations produced similar outcomes. The distribution 
shapes of the transformed dependent variable and the ratio independent 
variables were analysed using tests for skewness and kurtosis. The 
skewness and kurtosis values are summarised in Table 11. 
 
Further testing was undertaken using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic 
with a Liffiefors significance level for normality. As shown in Table 12, the 
Liffiefors significance level was greater than .05 for all the transformed 
variables; hence non-normality could be assumed (Coates, 2013). 
 
Table 10: Tests for Skewness and Kurtosis: Transformed Ratio Variables 
Variable N Skewness Kurtosis 
  Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
LNAUDITFEE 100 -.045 .241 -.519 .478 
LNINCOME 101 .086 .240 -.634 .476 
LNDONATIONS 75 -.077 .277 -.631 .548 
LNGRANTS 80 .141 .269 -.382 .532 
LNTRADING  80 -.288 .269 .028 .532 
LNNONAUDITFE
E 27 .529 .448 -.674 .872 
 
Table 11: Tests for Normality: Transformed Variables 
Variable Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic Df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. 
LNAUDITFEE .061 100 .200 .987 100 .443 
LNINCOME .057 101 .200 .985 101 .331 
LNDONATIONS .080 75 .200 .985 75 .502 
LNGRANTS .077 80 .200 .983 80 .387 
LNTRADING  .058 80 .200 .988 80 .698 
LNNONAUDITFEE .149 27 .126 .948 27 .189 
While the natural logarithm transformations resulted in normality readings 
70 
 
for all five variables, the transformation had a less than ideal impact on 
degrees of freedom for the ratio dependent variables: LNGRANTS, 
LNDONATIONS, LNTRADING and LNNONAUDITFEE. The reduction in 
degrees of freedom is such that it would negatively impact any subsequent 
multiple regression analysis due to pairwise or listwise deletion of “missing 
values.” The cause of the reduction in degrees of freedom is not 
attributable to missing data, but rather to the charities concerned, either for 
not reporting income from donations, trading and grants, or in the absence 
of income from such sources, and the mathematical process of computing 
a natural logarithm. It was also not possible to determine the veracity of 
the non-reported items; hence they couldn’t be treated as missing values. 
In this situation, it was therefore considered not appropriate to apply 
missing value techniques to replace the missing values. The same applied 
to the non-audit fees variable. 
 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2014, p. 105) suggested: “the fact that a value is 
missing is itself a very good predictor of the variable of interest in your 
research. If a dummy variable is created when cases with complete data 
are assigned 0 and cases with missing data 1, the liability of missing data 
could become an asset.” Following the suggestion by these authors, the 
matter of non-normality of the independent variables, R_DONATIONS, 
R_TRADING, R_GRANTS and R_NONAUDITFEE was resolved by 
introducing four new independent dichotomous variables: DONATIONS, 
TRADING, GRANTS and NONAUDITFEE. 
 
The natural logarithm transformation of the dependent variable AUDITFEE 
and the independent variable, INCOME, were applied in the remaining 
analysis, because transformation had the effect of normalising the 
variables, as shown by the skewness and kurtosis values (Table 11), and 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic values with a Liffiefors significance level 
for normality (p > .05) (Table 12). The respective standard Q-Q plots for 
LNAUDITFEE and LNINCOME are shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9. The 
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data points for LNAUDITFEE and LNINCOME are very close to the main 
diagonal line, indicating that both were distributed in an approximately 
normal manner in combination with the skewness and kurtosis values and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic values.  
Subsequent testing showed that the normality assumptions underlying 
multiple regression analysis had been satisfied with respect to the ratio 
variables. The next section looks at the normality of the nominal variables. 
 
 
5.6 Tests of Normality: Nominal Variables 
 
With normalisation of the dependent variable, AUDITFEE, the next series 
of tests determined if LNAUDITFEE was normally distributed across the 
nominal variables. To this end, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk 
tests were undertaken in IBM SPSS Statistics where possible. In situations 
where a nominal variable had only one case, i.e. an audit firm audited only 
one charity, IBM SPSS Statistics determined that no valid case existed 
and that statistics could not be computed for this level. Furthermore, when 
the dependent variable, LNAUDITFEE, was constant for a nominal 
variable, i.e. AUDITFIRM = 7.0, it was omitted from the test. This is 
reflected in limited testing for some variables as noted in Table 13. The 
Kolmogorov-Simirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests highlighted statistics that 
were not significant at the .01 alpha levels. Meyers, Gamst, and Guarino, 
2013, p. 132 recommended the .01 level “as a suitably stringent alpha 
level with these tests, because of their sensitivity to any normality 
departures, and particularly with small sample sizes.” In addition to 
reporting the test results where possible, normal Q-Q plots were reported 
to confirm the statistic tests. As illustrated in Table 13, no nominal variable 
Kolmogorov-Simirnov and Shapiro-Wilk statistics were significant at the 
.01 alpha level, indicating no normality areas of concern. Furthermore, the 
applicable normal Q-Q plots, as reported for the variables ABNCOMPANY 
(Figure 10 and 11), INDUSTRY (Figure 11 to 16), STATE (Figure 27 to 33), 
DONATIONS (Figure 34s and 35), GRANTS (Figure 36 and 37), 
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TRADING (Figure 38 and 39), NONAUDITEE (Figure 40 and 41), BIG 
FOUR auditor (Figure 42 and 43), LNAUDITFEE (Figure 44 to 51), 
AUDITFIRM (Figure 52 to 62), NON-BIG FOUR CLIENTS [number of 
clients] (Figure 63 to 67), NON-BIG FOUR SPECIALIST (Figure 68 to 75), 
AUDITOFFICE (Figure 76 to 85), Big Four audit firm offices (Figure 86 to 
100), non-Big Four specialist audit firm offices (Figure 101 to116), AUDIT 
PARTNERS (Figure 117 to 122), Big Four audit firm partners (Figure 123 
to 144) and the non-Big Four specialist audit firm partners (Figure 145 to 
154). 
 
Table 12: Tests of Normality for Nominal Variables on LNAUDITFEE 
 Kolmogorov-Simirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Variable Statistic Df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. 
ABNCOMPANY 
Other   .088 54 .200 .973 54 .262 
Company   .057 46 .200 .988 46 .919 
INDUSTRY 
Health .111 37 .200 .968 37 .357 
Social or Public Welfare .077 34 .200 .972 34 .530 
Culture .380 3 . .763 3 .028 
Animals .161 5 .200 .974 5 .901 
Natural Environment .275 6 .174 .810 6 .072 
Other .143 13 .200 .966 13 .840 
STATE       
New South Wales .085 27 .200 .990 27 .993 
South Australia .260 2 .    
Tasmania .260 2 .    
Western Australia .276 5 .200 .866 5 .251 
Victoria .048 37 .200 .988 37 .951 
Queensland .2914 8 .045 .865 8 .136 
Australian Capital Territory .297 4 . .847 4 .216 
DONATIONS 
Donations Income .077 64 .200 .979 64 .357 
No Donations Income .083 22 .200 .987 22 .990 
GRANTS 
Grants income .061 71 .200 .978 71 .257 
No grants income .106 15 .200 .961 15 .715 
TRADING 
Trading income .068 66 .200 .983 66 .508 
No trading income .081 20 .200 .978 20 .909 
NONAUDITFEE 
Non-audit fee .121 27 .200 .956 27 .294 
No non-audit fee .083 73 .200 .979 73 .271 
       
       
       
BIG FOUR 
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 Kolmogorov-Simirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Variable Statistic Df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. 
Non-Big Four auditor .067 65 .200 .979 65 .339 
Big Four auditor .107 21 .200 .952 21 .378 
Non Deloittes .068 79 .200 .985 79 .502 
Deloittes .258 7 .176 859 7 .149 
Non Ernst & Young .062 83 .200 .982 83 .311 
Ernst & Young .207 3 . .992 3 .834 
Non KPMG .069 79 .200 .983 79 .361 
KPMG .194 7 .200 .851 7 .126 
Not PWC .066 82 .200 .986 82 .518 
PWC .180 4 . .994 4 .978 
AUDITFIRM 
Audit Firm 6.0 .228 6 .200 .959 6 .812 
Audit Firm 12.0 .260 2 .    
Audit Firm 13.0  .258 7 .176 .859 7 .149 
Audit Firm 15.0  .207 3 . .992 3 .834 
Audit Firm 19.0 .269 6 .199 .926 6 .551 
Audit Firm 33.0  .194 7 .200 .851 7 .126 
Audit Firm 38.0  .260 2 .    
Audit Firm 39.0  .260 2 .    
Audit Firm 40.0  .180 4 . .994 4 .978 
Audit Firm 45.0  .260 2 .    
Audit Firm 57.0 .262 3 . .956 3 .596 
NON-BIG FOUR FIRMS 
Seven Clients .228 6 .200 .959 6 .812 
Six Clients .269 6 .199 .926 6 .551 
Three Clients .262 3 . .956 3 .596 
Two Clients .179 10 .200 .927 10 .418 
One Client .107 40 .200 .961 40 .183 
NON-BIG FOUR SPECIALIST 
Not WHK Auditor .068 83 .200 .982 83 .312 
WHK  .262 3 . .956 3 .596 
Not BDO Auditor .071 80 .200 .985 80 .449 
BDO .228 6 .200 .959 6 .812 
Not Grant Thornton .062 80 .200 .984 80 .409 
Grant Thornton .269 6 .199 .926 6 .551 
Not RSM Bird Cameron .067 84 .200 .985 84 .459 
RSM Bird Cameron .260 2 .    
AUDITOFFICE [1] 
6 .260 2 .    
8 .175 3 . 1.000 3 .998 
14 .260 2 .    
15 .308 5 .137 .860 5 .229 
19 .260 2 .    
25 .368 3 . .791 3 .093 
41 .260 2 .    
43 .235 4 . .969 4 .837 
53 .275 3 . .943 3 .539 
71 .260 2 .    
BIG FOUR AUDIT FIRM OFFICES [2] 
Non Deloitte Melbourne  .068 81 .200 .985 81 .488 
Deloitte Melbourne .308 5 .137 .860 5 .229 
Non Deloitte Sydney  .067 85 .200 .985 85 .428 
Non Deloitte Parramatta .067 85 .200 .985 85 .405 
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 Kolmogorov-Simirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Variable Statistic Df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. 
Non Ernst & Young Melbourne .063 84 .200 .982 84 .296 
Ernst & Young Melbourne .260 2 .    
Non Ernst & Young Sydney .067 85 .200 .985 85 .409 
Non KPMG Melbourne .066 84 .200 .985 84 .457 
KPMG Melbourne .260 2 .    
Non KPMG Sydney .069 82 .200 .982 82 .295 
KPMG Sydney .235 4 . .969 4 .837 
Non KPMG Perth .066 85 .200 .985 85 .423 
Non PWC Sydney .066 83 .200 .986 83 .493 
PWC Sydney .275 3 . .943 3 .539 
Non PWC Newcastle .067 85 .200 .985 85 .424 
NON BIG FOUR SPECIALIST AUDIT FIRM OFFICE [2] 
Non BDO Sydney .070 83 .200 .984 83 .397 
BDO Sydney .175 3 . 1.000 3 .998 
Non BDO Perth .067 85 .200 .985 85 .434 
Non BDO Brisbane .068 84 .200 .985 84 .427 
BDO Brisbane .260 2 .    
Non Grant Thornton Melbourne .068 83 .200 .984 83 .402 
Grant Thornton Melbourne .368 3 . .791 3 .093 
Non Grant Thornton Sydney  .067 85 .200 .985 85 .436 
Non Grant Thornton Adelaide .060 85 .200 .984 .85 .368 
Non Grant Thornton Perth .067 85 .200 .984 85 .401 
Non Moore Stephens Perth .068 85 .200 .985 85 .450 
Non Moore Stephens Campbell  .067 85 .200 .985 85 .408 
Non Pitcher Partners Adelaide  .061 85 .200 .984 85 .377 
Non Pitcher Partners Melbourne .067 85 .200 .985 85 .417 
Non RSM Bird Cameron Perth .067 85 .200 .985 85 .427 
Non RSM Bird Cameron Canberra .066 85 .200 .985 85 .429 
Audit Firm Partner  
10 .175 3 . 1.000 3 .998 
17 .260 2 .    
24 .260 .2 .    
33 .260 2 .    
87 .260 2 .    
89 .260 2 .    
 
BIG FOUR AUDIT FIRM PARTNERS [2]      
Non Deloitte Partner Brown .066 85  .200 .985 85 .438 
Non Deloitte Partner Lefevre .067 85  .200 .985 85 .414 
Non Deloitte Partner Brown .067 85 .200 .985 85 .424 
Non Deloitte Partner Angleucci .068 85 .200 .984 85 .366 
Non Deloitte Partner Collie .067 84 .200 .985 84 .415 
Deloitte Partner Collie .260 2 .    
Non Ernst & Young Partner Wallace .060 85 .200 .984 85 .368 
Non Ernst & Young Partner Painter .068 85 .200 .983 85 .328 
Non Ernst & Young Partner Lewis .067 85 .200 .985 85 .409 
Non Deloitte Partner Pearce .067 85 .200 .985 85 .428 
Non KPMG Partner Scammell .066 85 .200 .985 85 .435 
Non KPMG Partner Napier .067 85 .200 .984 85 .366 
Non KPMG Partner Mitchel .067 85 .200 .985 85 .405 
Non KPMG Partner Travers .069 85 .200 .982 85 .267 
Non KPMG Partner Robinson .066 85 .200 .985 85 .423 
Non KPMG Partner Mattera .066 85 .200 .985 85 .438 
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 Kolmogorov-Simirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Variable Statistic Df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. 
Non KPMG Partner Cinanni .066 85 .200 .985 85 .433 
Non KPMG Partner Bucholz .067 85 .200 .985 85 .438 
Non PWC Partner McConnel .066 85 .200 .985 85 .425 
Non PWC Partner Turner .067 85 .200 .985 85 .424 
Non PWC Partner Scoular .067 85 .200 .985 86 .399 
Non PWC Partner Maher .066 85 .200 .985 85 .438 
NON BIG FOUR AUDIT FIRM PARTNERS 
Non BDO Partner Paul .070 83 .200 .984 83 .397 
BDO Partner Paul .175 3 . 1.000 3 .998 
Non Ronald Smith Partner – Smith .058 84 .200 .984 84 .381 
Non Auditor General NSW Partner 
Watson .060 85 .200 .984 85 .368 
Non Danby Partner Winnett .068 84 .200 .984 84 .411 
Danby Partner Winnett .260 2 .    
Non WHK Partner Flakemore .072 84 .200 .982 84 .298 
WHK Partner Flakemore .260 2 .    
Non Non-Big Four Partners - Other .109 29 .200 .972 29 .613 
Non-Big Four Partners – Other .074 57 .200 .976 57 .327 
[1] Cases omitted where LNAUDITFEE is constant and/or where AUDIT FIRM is a single client case. 
[2] Natural log of audit fee is constant, as the Df equals one hence it has been omitted. 
 
 
 
5.7 Homoscedasticity: Nominal Variables 
 
Following testing of normality with the nominal variables, testing for 
homoscedasticity or homogeneity of variance (equal variance) was also 
undertaken on a univariate basis (Levene test), where the variance of the 
transformed metric dependent variable [LNAUDITFEE] was compared 
across the levels of non-metric variables. Hair et al. (2010, p. 82) 
suggested that this type of analysis is “appropriate in preparation for 
analysis of variance or multivariate analysis of variance, in which 
nonmetric variables are the independent variables.” Table 14 reports the 
Levene statistic results. IBM SPSS Statistics could not run the test on 
some variables due to the many groups (Table 14 footnote 1) or because 
only one group had a computed variance (Table 14 footnote 2).  Where 
the test was able to be undertaken, the Levene statistic was not 
statistically significant (p > .05), with two exceptions; those being the 
variables Big Four audit firm – KPMG and Big Four audit firm – PWC. It 
should be noted that the level of statistical significance was marginal, as 
was any deviation from normality. The next test applied in this study was a 
76 
 
multivariate technique, multiple regression analysis, which is considered 
“fairly ‘robust’ with respect to distribution deviating markedly from 
normality” (Meyers et al., 2013, p. 70). No further data transformation was 
undertaken to correct the significant Levene statistic. 
 
This section summarised the normality testing and transformations that 
were undertaken where appropriate. The following section reports on the 
multicollinearity testing which is important for multiple regression analysis. 
 
5.8 Testing for Multicollinearity 
 
A key aspect in the interpretation of the regression variate is correlation 
between the independent variables. In this study, the question of 
multicollinearity was examined through the application of Pearson product-
moment correlation, Phi coefficient, and one-way between-subjects 
ANOVA, as appropriate for the variable types. All three tests were applied 
because of concerns about meeting the assumptions underlying the use of 
a Pearson product-moment correlation (Coakes, Steed, & Ong, 2010, 
Meyers et al., 2013). The multicollinearity between continuous and 
dichotomous variables was described through the reporting of Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficients (Coakes et al., Meyers et al., 
2013). The multicollinearity between dichotomous and categorical 
variables was described through the reporting of Phi coefficients (Coakes 
et al.), and the multicollinearity between continuous and categorical 
variables was described through the reporting of ANOVA results (Meyer et 
al.).   
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Table 13: Test of Homogeneity of Variances: Natural Log of Audit Fees 
Variable Levene Statistic Df Df2 Sig 
ABNCOMPANY 1.359 2 96 .262 
INDUSTRY 1.461 5 92 .210 
STATE 1.299 6 92 .265 
DONATIONS .036 1 98 .850 
GRANTS .170 1 98 .681 
TRADING .189 1 98 .665 
NONAUDITFEE 2.347 1 98 .129 
BIG FOUR 3.571 1 93 .062 
DELOITTE 3.343 1 98 .071 
ERNST&YOUNG .119 1 98 .731 
KPMG 3.963 1 98 .049 * 
PWC 4.017 1 98 .048 * 
AUDITFIRM [1]    
NONB4CLIENTSS7 3.077 1 98 .083 
NONB4CLIENTSS6 .322 1 98 .572 
NONB4CLIENTSS3 1.557 1 98 .215 
NONB4CLIENTSS2 .015 1 98 .904 
NONB4CLIENTSS1 .151 1 98 .698 
NONB4WHKNG 1.557 1 98 .215 
NONB4BDO 3.077 1 98 .083 
NONB4GRANT .322 1 98 .572 
NONB4RSM 1.633 1 98 .204 
AUDITOFFICE [1]    
B4OFFICEDELMEL 2.542 1 91 .114 
B4OFFICEDELSYD [2]    
B4OFFICEDELPAR [2]    
B4OFFICEEYMEL .731 1 91 .395 
B4OFFICEEYSYD [2]    
B4OFFICEKPMGMEL 3.578 1 91 .062 
B4OFFICEKPMGSYD 1.726 1 91 .192 
B4OFFICEKPMGPER [2]    
B4OFFICEPWCSYD 3.339 1 91 .071 
B4OFFICEPWCNEWMEL [2]    
NB4BDOSYD  1.006 1 91 .319 
NB4BDOPER  [2]    
NB4BDOBRI  3.008 1 91 .086 
NB4GTMEL .159 1 91 .691 
NB4GTSYD [2]    
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Variable Levene Statistic Df Df2 Sig 
NB4GTADL [2]    
NB4GTPER [2]    
NB4MSPER [2]    
NB4MSCAM [2]    
NONB4PPADL [2]    
NONB4PPMEL [2]    
NONB4RSMPER [2]    
NONB4RSMCAN [2]    
AUDITPARTNER [1]    
B4DELBROWN_A [2]    
B4DELLEFEVRE [2]    
B4DELPEARCE [2]    
B4DELBROWN [2]    
B4DELANGLEUCCI [2]    
B4DELCOLLIE .514 1 98 .475 
B4EYWALLACE [2]    
B4EYPAINTER [2]    
B4EYLEWIS [2]    
B4KPMGSCAMMELL [2]    
B4KPMGNAPIER [2]    
B4KPMGMITCHEL [2]    
B4KPMGTRAVERS [2]    
B4KPMGROBINSON [2]    
B4KPMGMATTERA [2]    
B4KPMGCINANNL [2]    
B4KPWCMCCONEL [2]    
B4KPWCTURNER [2]    
B4KPWCMAHER [2]    
NB4BDOPAUL [2]    
NB4RSSMITH [2]    
NB4AGNWATSON 3.197 1 91 .077 
NB4DANWINNETT 3.676 1 91 .058 
NB4WHKFLAKEMORE [2]    
NB4OHTHERS .973 1 91 .326 
B4KPWCMCCONEL 2.454 1 91 .121 
B4KPWCTURNER .110 1 91 .741 
* The Levene Statistic is significant at p < .05  [1] The test of homogeneity of variances 
cannot be performed for Natural Log of Audit Fee because there are too many groups. 
Only 50 groups are allowed. [2] The test of homogeneity of variances cannot be 
performed for Natural Log of Audit Fee because only one group has a computed 
variance. 
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Cohen (1988) classified correlations into small, medium and large effect 
sizes, with a small effect size being r = .10, medium effect size r = .30 and 
large effect size r = .50. This is widely interpreted as absolute r values 
below .10 are insignificant; r values between .10 and .299 are considered 
a small effect; correlations with an absolute r value between .3 and .499 
show a medium effect, and correlations with an absolute r value between 
.5 and 1 show a strong effect. Meyers et al. (2013, p. 294) noted that 
Cohen’s (1988) classifications were based on an absence of context, 
however, because there is almost always context, it was recommended 
that the magnitude of the correlation be considered twice – first in terms of 
statistical significance, and second, whether the strength of the 
relationship is of interest in the context of the study. A narrower 
interpretation by Hair et al. (2010, p. 200) suggested that the presence of 
high correlations, Pearson Correlation scores of 0.90 and higher, are an 
indication of substantial collinearity. 
 
The multicollinearity results reported for the model (Table 15) are followed 
by each of the hypotheses using Cohen’s (1988) interpretation. Significant 
p < .05 small-effect correlations with an absolute r value between .10 and 
.299 were noted between the variables LNAUDITFEE and TRADING (r = -
.227)*; LNAUDITFEE and GRANT (r = .205); LNINCOME and 
ABNCOMPANY (r = .295); ABNCOMPANY and BIG FOUR (r = .243); 
ABNCOMPANY and NONAUDITFEE (r = -.256); and BIG FOUR and 
GRANTS (r = .234). This small effect Pearson correlation was taken into 
further consideration with the multivariate analysis. Significant (p < .05) 
medium effect correlations with an absolute r value between .3 and .499 
were observed between the variables LNAUDITFEE and ABNCOMPANY 
(r = .374); LNAUDITFEE and NONAUDITFEE (r = -.387); LNINCOME and 
BIG FOUR (r = .422); LNINCOME and NONAUDITFEE (r = -.359); and 
BIG FOUR and NONAUDITFEE (r = -.427). Negative r values between the 
variables LNINCOME and NONAUDITFEE, and BIG FOUR and 
NONAUDITFEE were of note in the medium-effect correlations. These 
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were further considered with the multivariate testing, while the remaining 
medium-effect correlations were as expected. Finally, significant (p < .01) 
strong effect correlations with an r value between .5 and 1 were observed 
between the variables LNAUDITFEE and LNINCOME (r = .854); and 
LNAUDITFEE and BIG FOUR (r = .526) (Table 15). These were as 
expected, suggesting that Big Four audit firms were earning a higher audit 
fee and indicating a size influence on audit fee. Once again these 
correlations were taken into further consideration in the multivariate 
testing.  
 
Table 14: Pearson Product-moment Correlations: Audit Fee Model 
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LNAUDITFEE        
LNINCOME .854**       
ABNCOMPANY .374** .295**      
BIG FOUR .526** .422** .243*     
DONATIONS .099 .096 -.038 .070    
TRADING -.227* -.177 -.028 .057 -.023   
GRANTS .205* .062 .070 -.234* .033 .098  
NONAUDITFEE -.387 ** -.359 ** -.256 ** -.427 ** -.105 .034 -.076 
* Correlation is significant p < .05 2-tailed)    ** Correlation is significant p < .01 (2-tailed) 
 
Multicollinearity between dichotomous and categorical variables was 
described through the reporting of Phi coefficients (Coakes et al., 2010). 
The Pearson’s r-values are shown in Table 16. Significant small effect 
correlation relationships can be seen between the variables 
ABNCOMPANY and BIG FOUR (r = .243); ABNCOMPANY and 
NONAUDITFEE (r = -.256); ABNCOMPANY and INDUSTRY (r = -.018); 
ABNCOMPANY and STATE (r = -.250); AUDITFIRM and GRANTS (r = -
.271); AUDITOFFICE and GRANTS (r = -.248); AUDITPARTNER and 
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INDUSTRY (r = -.193); BIG FOUR AND INDUSTRY (r = .187); BIG FOUR 
and GRANTS (r = -.234) and INDUSTRY and DONATIONS (r = -.203). 
The multivariate testing results suggest that these significant small effect 
correlations had no influence on the multivariate testing. Significant 
medium effect correlation relationships were also found between the 
variables BIG FOUR and NONAUDITFEE (r = -.427), and INDUSTRY and 
TRADING (r = .326). As with the significant small effect correlations, these 
were further considered in the multivariate testing. Finally, a strong effect 
correlation relationship was found between the variables AUDITOFFICE 
and AUDITFIRM (r = .999, p < .01), and hence the variable AUDITOFFICE 
was used in the remaining analysis as a proxy for audit firm. 
 
The multicollinearity between continuous and categorical variables was 
described through the reporting of ANOVA results (Meyer et al., 2010). 
The results of the omnibus analysis of the relationship between the 
variables INDUSTRY and LNAUDITFEE and LNINCOME are reported in 
Table 17. The analysis shows that the results of the Levene test were not 
statistically significant, indicating that there was no violation of the 
assumption of equal variances. The ANOVA yielded a non-statistically 
significant F ratio based on 23 and 77 degrees of freedom. 
 
Table 18 reports the results of the omnibus analysis of the relationship 
between the variables STATE and LNAUDITFEE and LNINCOME. The 
analysis showed that the results of the Levene test were not statistically 
significant, suggesting that there was no violation of the assumption of 
equal variances. The ANOVA yielded a non-statistically significant F ratio 
based on 7 and 93 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 15: Phi Coefficient Correlations – Pearson’s R-values: Audit Fee Model 
 
A
B
N
C
O
M
PA
N
Y 
A
U
D
IT
FI
R
M
 
A
U
D
IT
O
FF
IC
E 
A
U
D
IT
PA
R
TN
ER
 
B
IG
 F
O
U
R
 
D
O
N
A
TI
O
N
S 
G
R
A
N
TS
 
IN
D
U
ST
R
Y 
N
O
N
A
U
D
IT
FE
E 
ST
A
TE
 
ABNCOMPANY           
AUDITFIRM .114          
AUDITOFFICE .108 .999**         
AUDITPARTNER -.088 .113 .127        
BIG FOUR .243* -.068 -.077 .021       
DONATIONS -.038 -.111 -.096 .056 .070      
GRANTS .070 -.271** -.248* . 053 .234* .033     
INDUSTRY .008 .070 .047 .066 .028 -.042 -.052    
NONAUDITFEE -.256** .019 .027 .094 -.427** -.105 -.076 .016   
STATE -.250* -.005 -.028 -.045 -.149 .010 -.189 .038 -.055  
TRADING -.028 -.009 -.018 .050 .057 -.023 .098 .176* .034 -.120 
* Pearson’s R-value is significant p < .05 2-tailed)   ** Pearson’s R-value is significant p < .01 (2-tailed) 
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Table 16: Results of the Omnibus Analysis - Industry – Audit Fee Model 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig.   
LNAUDITFEE 1.050 18 76 .418   
LNINCOME 1.234 19 77 ..254   
ANOVA 
  Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
LNAUDITFEE Between Groups 
Within Groups 
TOTAL 
21.768 
104.609 
123.377 
23 
76 
99 
.946 
1.376 
.68
8 
.843 
LNINCOME Between Groups 
Within Groups 
TOTAL 
44.308 
228.793 
273.101 
23 
77 
100 
1.926 
2.971 
.64
8 
.879 
 
 
Table 19 shows the results of the omnibus analysis of the relationship 
between the variables AUDITFIRM and LNAUDITFEE and LNINCOME.  
The ANOVA yielded a statistically significant F ratio based on 37 and 57 
degrees of freedom. The eta square of .792 indicates that 79% of the 
variance natural log of audit fee is explained by the choice of audit firm. 
 
 
Table 17: Results of the Omnibus Analysis – State or Territory – Audit Fee Model 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig.   
LNAUDITFEE 1.299 6 92 .265   
LNINCOME .938 6 93 .472   
ANOVA 
 
 Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
LNAUDITFEE Between Groups 
Within Groups 
TOTAL 
6.126 
120.251 
126.377 
7 
92 
99 
.875 
1.307 
.688 .670 
LNINCOME Between Groups 
Within Groups 
TOTAL 
9.351 
263.751 
273.101 
7 
93 
100 
1.336 
2.836 
.471 .853 
 
 
84 
 
Table 18: Results of the Omnibus Analysis – Audit firm – Audit Fee Model 
ANOVA 
 
 Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Natural log of audit 
fee 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
TOTAL 
95.817 
25.206 
121.023 
57 
37 
94 
1.681 
.681 
2.468 .002 
Natural log of 
income 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
TOTAL 
181.228 
84.050 
265.278 
57 
38 
95 
3.179 
2.212 
1.437 .119 
[1] Test for homogeneity of variances could not be performed because there were too 
many groups. 
 
 
Table 20 reports the results of the omnibus analysis of the relationship 
between the variables AUDITFIRM and LNAUDITFEE and LNINCOME.  
The ANOVA yielded a statistically significant F ratio based on 21 and 71 
degrees of freedom. The eta square of .896 indicates that 90% of the 
variance natural log of audit fee is explained by audit firm office. 
 
Table 19: Results of the Omnibus Analysis – Audit firm office – Audit Fee Model 
ANOVA 
 
 Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Natural log of audit 
fee 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
TOTAL 
104.220 
12.155 
116.374 
71 
21 
92 
1.468 
.579 
2.536 .010 
Natural log of 
income 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
TOTAL 
211.829 
49.326 
261.155 
71 
22 
93 
2.984 
2.242 
1.331 .229 
[1] Test for homogeneity of variances could not be performed because there were too 
many groups. 
 
 
Table 21 shows the results of the omnibus analysis of the relationship 
between the variables AUDITFIRM and LNAUDITFEE and LNINCOME.  
The ANOVA yielded a non-statistically significant F ratio based on 12 and 
81 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 20: Results of the Omnibus Analysis – Audit firm partner – Audit Fee Model 
ANOVA 
 
 Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Natural log of audit 
fee 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
TOTAL 
110.327 
7.118 
117.444 
80 
12 
92 
1.379 
.593 
2.325 .053 
Natural log of 
income 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
TOTAL 
238.673 
24.350 
263.024 
81 
12 
93 
2.947 
2.029 
1.452 .242 
[1] Test for homogeneity of variances could not be performed because there were too 
many groups.   
 
 
Additional multicollinearity analysis was required for the additional 
variables included in the hypothesis. The additional variables were 
encompassed in hypothesis two, which examined whether Big Four audit 
firms were rewarded with an audit fee premium above non-Big Four audit 
firms in the Australian charity sector. As Big Four audit firms were 
represented by a dichotomous variable, describing multicollinearity was 
undertaken via Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. Table 22 
reports the results. A significant small effect correlation was noted 
between the variables LNAUDITFEE and DELOITTE (r = .236), and a 
medium effect correlation between the variables LNAUDITFEE and KPMG 
(r = .390). No multicollinearity was observed between the independent 
variables. 
 
 
Table 21: Pearson Product-moment Correlations – Hypothesis 2 
 
NATURAL 
LOG AUDIT 
FEE 
DELOITTES ERNST & YOUNG KPMG PWC 
LNAUDITFEE  .236 * .116 .390 ** .183 
DELOITTES .236 *  -.055 -.074 -.062 
ERNST&YOUNG .116 -.055  -.055 -.046 
KPMG .390 ** -.074 -.055  -.062 
PWC .183 -.062 -.046 -.062  
* Pearson’s R-value is significant p < .05 (2-tailed)    ** Pearson’s R-value is significant p < .01 (2-tailed)    
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Hypothesis 3 argued that non-Big Four audit firms with expertise are 
rewarded with premium audit fees over other non-Big Four audit firms. As 
non-Big Four audit firms with expertise were represented by a 
dichotomous variable reflective of the number of clients a firm has, 
describing multicollinearity was done via Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficients. Table 23 shows these results. The coefficients 
describe a significant small effect multicollinearity correlation between the 
variables NONB4CLINETSS2 and NONB4CLINETSS1 (r = -.269), and 
between NONB4CLINETSS1 and NONB4CLINETSS1 (r = -.247).  
 
 
Table 22: Pearson Product-moment Correlations – Hypothesis 3 
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LNAUDITFEE  .149 .160 -.126 -.082 -.494 ** 
NONB4CLINETSS7 .149      
NONB4CLINETSS6 .160 -.069 -.069 -.048 -.100 -.269 ** 
NONB4CLINETSS3 -.126 -.048 -.044  -.064 -.172 
NONB4CLINETSS2 -.082 -.100 -.092 -.064  -.327 ** 
NONB4CLINETSS1 -.494 ** -.269** -.247 * -.172 -.327 **  
* Pearson’s R-value is significant p < .05 (2-tailed)    ** Pearson’s R-value is significant p < .01 (2-tailed) 
 
 
A significant medium effect multicollinearity correlation is evident between 
the variables NONB4CLINETSS2 and NONB4CLINETSS2 (r = -.327). 
These correlations were further considered in the multivariate testing. 
 
Hypothesis 4 argued that individual non-Big Four audit firms with expertise 
are rewarded premium audit fees over other non-Big Four audit firms. As 
non-Big Four audit firms with expertise were represented by a 
dichotomous variable, multicollinearity was described via Pearson product-
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moment correlation coefficients, shown in Table 24. No significant 
correlations were found between the independent variables, indicating a 
lack of multicollinearity. 
 
 
Table 23 Pearson Product-moment Correlations – Hypothesis 4 
 LNAUDITFEE NONB4WHKNG NONB4BDO NONB4GRANT NONB4RSM 
LNAUDITFEE  -.126 .149 .160 .127 
NONB4WHKNG -.126  -.048 -.044 -.025 
NONB4BDO .149 -.048  -.069 -.039 
NONB4GRANT .160 -.044 -.069  -.036 
NONB4RSM .127 -.025 -.039 -.036  
 
 
Hypothesis 5 presupposed individual offices of Big Four audit firms with 
expertise are rewarded with premium audit fees over other Big Four audit 
firms. As before, multicollinearity was tested via Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficients – Table 26 to Table 29 report the results. A 
significant medium effect correlation was found between the variables 
B4OFFICEKPMGSYD and LNAUDITFEE (r = .338) and there was a lack 
of multicollinearity as indicated by no significant correlations.  
 
 
Table 24: Pearson Product-moment Correlations – Hypothesis 5 – Deloitte 
Offices 
 LNAUDITFEE B4OFFICEDELMEL B4OFFICEDELSYD B4OFFICEDELPAR 
LNAUDITFEE  .182 .063 .149 
B4OFFICEDELMEL .182  -.025 -.025 
B4OFFICEDELSYD .063 -.025  -.011 
B4OFFICEDELPAR .149 -.025 -.011  
B4OFFICEEYMEL .116 -.043 -.019 -.019 
B4OFFICEEYSYD .028 -.025 -.010 -.011 
B4OFFICEKPMGMEL .159 -.035 -.015 -.015 
B4OFFICEKPMGSYD .338 ** -.050 -.022 -.022 
B4OFFICEKPMGPER .130 -.025 -.010 -.011 
B4 OFFICEPWCSYD .181 -.050 -.022 -.022 
B4OFFICEPWCNEW .053 -.025 -.010 -.011 
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Table 25: Pearson Product-moment Correlations – Hypothesis 5 – Ernst & Young 
Offices 
 LNAUDIT 
FEE 
B4OFFICEEY 
MELB 
B4OFFICEEY 
SYD 
LNAUDITFEE  .116 .028 
B4OFFICEDELMEL .182 -.043 -.025 
B4OFFICEDELSYD .063 -.019 -.010 
B4OFFICEDELPAR .149 -.019 -.011 
B4OFFICEEYMEL .116  -.019 
B4OFFICEEYSYD .028 -.019  
B4OFFICEKPMGMEL .159 -.027 -.015 
B4OFFICEKPMGSYD .338 ** -.038 -.022 
B4OFFICEKPMGPER .130 -.019 -.010 
B4 OFFICEPWCSYD .181 -.038 -.022 
B4OFFICEPWCNEW .053 -.019 -.010 
 
 
Table 26: Pearson Product-moment Correlations – Hypothesis 5 – KPMG Offices 
 LNAUDIT FEE 
B4OFFICE
KPMGMEL 
B4OFFICEKPMG
SYD 
B4OFFICEKPMG
PER 
LNAUDITFEE  .159 .338 ** .130 
B4OFFICEDELMEL .182 -.035 -.050 -.025 
B4OFFICEDELSYD .063 -.015 -.022 -.010 
B4OFFICEDELPAR .149 -.015 -.022 -.011 
B4OFFICEEYMEL .116 -.027 -.038 -.019 
B4OFFICEEYSYD .028 -.015 -.022 -.010 
B4OFFICEKPMGMEL .159  -.031 -.015 
B4OFFICEKPMGSYD .338 ** -.031  -.022 
B4OFFICEKPMGPER .130 -.015 -.022  
B4 OFFICEPWCSYD .181 -.031 -.044 -.022 
B4OFFICEPWCNEW .053 -.015 -.022 -.010 
 
 
Table 27: Pearson Product-moment Correlations – Hypothesis 5 – PWC Offices 
 LNAUDIT 
FEE 
B4OFFICEPWC 
SYD 
B4OFFICEPWC 
NEW 
LNAUDITFEE  .181 .053 
B4OFFICEDELMEL .182 -.050 -.025 
B4OFFICEDELSYD .063 -.022 -.010 
B4OFFICEDELPAR .149 -.022 -.011 
B4OFFICEEYMEL .116 -.038 -.019 
B4OFFICEEYSYD .028 -.022 -.010 
B4OFFICEKPMGMEL .159 -.031 -.015 
B4OFFICEKPMGSYD .338 ** -.044 -.022 
B4OFFICEKPMGPER .130 -.022 -.010 
B4 OFFICEPWCSYD .181  -.022 
B4OFFICEPWCNEW .053 -.022  
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Hypothesis 6 looked at the second aspect of specialisation; that individual 
partners at Big Four audit firms are rewarded with premium audit fees over 
other Big Four audit firm partners. As individual Big Four audit firm 
partners were represented by a dichotomous variable, multicollinearity 
was described via Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. 
These are reported in Table 29 to Table 32. A significant small effect 
correlation was found between the variables B4KPMGRTRAVERS and 
LNAUDITFEE (r = .250), and B4E&YPAINTER and LNAUDITFEE (r = 
.204). No significant correlations were shown between the independent 
variables, indicating no multicollinearity. 
 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 examined audit partner and office specialisation in 
Big Four audit firms. Hypothesis 7 extended this analysis to non-Big Four 
audit firms, hypothesising that individual offices of multi-office non-Big 
Four audit firms are rewarded with premium audit fees over other multi-
office non-Big Four audit firms. Non-Big Four audit firms were represented 
by a dichotomous variable, and multicollinearity was therefore described 
via Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. Table 33 shows these 
coefficients. A significant small effect correlation is evident between the 
variables NB4RSMPER and LNAUDITFEE (r = -.216); and between 
NB4GTMEL and LNAUDITFEE (r = .224). There were no significant 
correlations between the independent variables, indicating no 
multicollinearity. 
 
Hypothesis 8 concluded the examination of specialisations in non-Big Four 
audit firms, theorising that individual partners of non-Big Four audit firms 
are rewarded with premium audit fees over partners of non-Big Four audit 
firms. As individual offices of non-Big Four audit firms were represented by 
a dichotomous variable, multicollinearity was tested via Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficients, as shown in Table 34. A significant 
medium effect correlation was found between the variables NB4OTHERS 
and LNAUDITFEE (r = -.356), and between NB4OTHERS and 
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NB4BDOPAUL (r = -.377). These correlations were taken account in the 
multivariate analysis. 
 
The evaluation found no significant multicollinearity or homoscedasticity 
issues in any of the tests. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to a 
discussion of the multivariate or multiple regression analysis. 
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Table 28: Pearson Product-moment Correlations – Deloitte - Hypothesis 6 
 LNAUDITFEE B4DELBROWN_A BEDELOLEFEVRE B4DELPEARCE B4DELBROWN B4DELANGLEUCCI B4DELCOLLIE 
LNAUDITFEE  .102 .038 .063 .053 -.008 .145 
B4DELBROWN_A .102  -.010 -.010 -.010 -.010 -.014 
BEDELOLEFEVRE .038 -.010  -.010 -.010 -.010 -.014 
B4DELPEARCE .063 -.010 -.010  -.010 -.010 -.014 
B4DELBROWN .053 -.010 -.010 -.010  -.010 -.014 
B4DELANGLEUCCI -.008 -.010 -.010 -.010 -.010  -.014 
B4DELCOLLIE .145 -.014 -.014 -.014 -.014 -.014  
B4EYWALLANCE -.101 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.015 -.011 
B4EYPAINTER .204 * -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.015 -.011 
B4EYLEWIS .028 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.015 -.011 
B4KPMGSCAMMELL .113 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.015 -.011 
B4KPMGNAPIER .170 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.015 
B4KPMGMITCHEL .150 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.015 
B4KPMGTRAVERS .250* -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.015 
B4KPMGROBINSON .135 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.015 
B4KPMGMATTERA .101 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.015 
B4KPMGCINANNI .115 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.015 
B4PWCMCONNEL .133 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.015 
B4PWCBUCHOLZ .085 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.015 
B4PWCTURNER .055 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.015 
B4PWCSCOULAR ** -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.015 
B4PWCMAHER .098 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.015 
* Pearson’s R-value is significant p < .01 (2-tailed)   ** Pearson product-moment correlation cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
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Table 29: Pearson Product-moment Correlations – Ernst & Young - Hypothesis 6 
 B4EYWALLACE B4EYPAINTER B4EYLEWIS 
LNAUDITFEE -.101 .204 * .028 
B4DELBROWN_A -.011 -.011 -.011 
BEDELOLEFEVRE -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4DELPEARCE -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4DELBROWN -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4DELANGLEUCCI -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4DELCOLLIE -.015 -.015 -.015 
B4EYWALLACE  -.011 -.011 
B4EYPAINTER -.011  -.011 
B4EYLEWIS -.011 -.011  
B4KPMGSCAMMELL -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGNAPIER -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGMITCHEL -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGTRAVERS -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGROBINSON -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGMATTERA -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGCINANNI -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4PWCBUCHOLZ -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4PWCMCONNEL -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4PWCTURNER -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4PWCSCOULAR -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4PWCMAHER -.011 -.011 -.011 
* Pearson’s R-value is significant p < .01 (2-tailed) 
** Pearson product-moment correlation cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
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Table 30: Pearson Product-moment Correlations – KPMG - Hypothesis 6 
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LNAUDITFEE .170 .170 .150 .250 .135 .101 .115 
B4DELBROWN_A -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
BEDELOLEFEVRE -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4DELPEARCE -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4DELBROWN -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4DELANGLEUCCI -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4DELCOLLIE -.015 -.015 -.015 -.015 -.015 -.015 -.015 
B4EYWALLANCE -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4EYPAINTER -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4EYLEWIS -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGSCAMMELL -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGNAPIER -.011  -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGMITCHEL -.011 -.011  -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGTRAVERS -.011 -.011 -.011  -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGROBINSON -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011  -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGMATTERA -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011  -.011 
B4KPMGCINANNI -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011  
B4PWCBUCHOLZ -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4PWCMCONNEL -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4PWCTURNER -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4PWCSCOULAR -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4PWCMAHER -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
* Pearson’s R-value is significant p < .01 (2-tailed)   ** Pearson product-moment correlation cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
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Table 31: Pearson Product-moment Correlations – PWC - Hypothesis 6 
 B4PWCBUCHOLZ B4PWCMCONNEL B4PWCTURNER B4PWCSCOULAR B4PWCMAHER 
LNAUDITFEE .085 .133 .055 ** ..098 
B4DELBROWN_A -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
BEDELOLEFEVRE -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4DELPEARCE -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4DELBROWN -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4DELANGLEUCCI -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4DELCOLLIE -.011 -.015 -.015 -.015 -.015 
B4EYWALLANCE -.015 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4EYPAINTER -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4EYLEWIS -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGSCAMMELL -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGNAPIER -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGMITCHEL -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGTRAVERS -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGROBINSON -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGMATTERA -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4KPMGCINANNI -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4PWCBUCHOLZ  -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4PWCMCONNEL -.011  -.011 -.011 -.011 
B4PWCTURNER -.011 -.011  -.011 -.011 
B4PWCSCOULAR -.011 -.011 -.011  -.011 
B4PWCMAHER -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011  
* Pearson’s R-value is significant p < .01 (2-tailed)   ** Pearson product-moment correlation cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
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Table 32: Pearson Product-moment Correlations – Hypothesis 7 
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LNAUDITFEE  .052 .073 .051 .224 * .077 -.104 .020 -.216 * .025 
NB4DBOSYD .052  -.019 -.027 -.033 -.019 -.019 -.019 -.019 -.019 
NB4BDOPER .073 -.019  -.015 -.019 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
NB4BDOBRI .051 -.027 -.015  -.027 -.015 -.015 -.015 -.015 -.015 
NB4GTMEL .224 * -.033 -.019 -.027  -.019 -.019 -.019 -.019 -.019 
NB4GTSYD .077 -.019 -.011 -.015 -.019  -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
NB4GTADL -.104 -.019 -.011 -.015 -.019 -.011  -.011 -.011 -.011 
NB4GTPER .020 -.019 -.011 -.015 -.019 -.011 -.011  -.011 -.011 
NB4MSPER -.216 * -.019 -.011 -.015 -.019 -.011 -.011 -.011  -.011 
NB4MSCAM .025 -.019 -.011 -.015 -.019 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011  
NB4PPADL -.111 -.019 -.011 -.015 -.019 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
NB4PPMEL .040 -.019 -.011 -.015 -.019 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
           
* Pearson’s R-value is significant p < .01 (2-tailed) 
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Table 33: Pearson Product-moment Correlations – Hypothesis 7 continued 
 NB4PPADL NB4PPMEL NB4RSMPER NB4RSMCAN 
LNAUDITFEE -.111 .040 .060 -.019 
NB4DBOSYD -.019 -.019 -.019 -.011 
NB4BDOPER -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
NB4BDOBRI -.015 -.015 -.015 -.011 
NB4GTMEL -.019 -.019 -.019 -.011 
NB4GTSYD -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
NB4GTADL -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
NB4GTPER -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
NB4MSPER -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
NB4MSCAM -.011 -.011 -.011 -.011 
NB4PPADL  -.011 -.011 -.011 
NB4PPMEL -.011  -.011 -.011 
* Pearson’s R-value is significant p < .01 (2-tailed)   
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Table 33: Pearson Product-moment Correlations – Hypothesis 8 
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LNAUDITFEE  -.018 -.172 -.101 .058 -.063 -.356 ** 
NB4BDOPAUL -.018  -.042 -.029 -.042 -.042 -.377 ** 
NB4RSSMITH -.172 -.042  -.015 -.022 -.022 -.196 
NB4AGNWATSON -.101 -.029 -.015  -.015 -.015 -.138 
NB4DANWINNETT .058 -.042 -.022 -.015  -.022 -.196 
NB4WHKFLAKEMORE -.063 -.042 -.022 .015 -.022  -.196 
NB4OTHERS -.356 ** -.377 ** -.196 -.138 -.196 -.196  
** Pearson’s R-value is significant p < .01 (2-tailed) 
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5.9 Multivariate Analysis 
 
In this study, multivariate analysis was used because it has a number of 
advantages over bivariate or univariate research designs as argued by 
Stevens (2009, p. 2), who put forward three reasons for using multivariate 
analysis: 
 
1. [That] any worthwhile treatment will affect the subjects in more than 
one way; 
2. Through the use of multiple criterion measures we can obtain a more 
complete and detailed description of the phenomenon under 
investigation, whether it is teacher method effectiveness, counsellor 
effectiveness, diet effectiveness, stress management techniques 
effectiveness, and so on; and  
3. Treatments can be expensive to implement, while the cost of obtaining 
data on several dependent variables is relatively small and maximizes 
information gain. 
 
Furthermore, Meyers et al., 2013, p. 324 noted “most researchers believe 
that using more than one predictor or potentially explanatory variable can 
paint a more complete picture of how the world works than is permitted by 
simple linear regression, because constructs in the behavioral sciences 
are believed to be multiply determined.” For this reason multivariate 
analysis in the form of multiple regression was used to test the eight 
hypotheses in the current study. Coakes et al. (2010, p.147) supported the 
recommendation to use regression analysis “when independent variables 
are correlated with one another and with the dependent variable.”  
 
Multiple regression analysis is underpinned by four assumptions: the ratio 
of cases to independent variables; treatment of outliers, multicollinearity, 
singularity and normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and independence of 
residuals (Coakes et al, p. 80). These authors suggested the minimum 
requirement should be at least five times more cases than independent 
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variables and this study satisfied that assumption. No outliers of concern 
were noted, again satisfying the assumption. Evaluation of multicollinearity 
and homoscedasticity was discussed earlier in this chapter and reported 
no significant issues. Further testing is reported for multicollinearity in this 
section, and the results for variance inflation factor and tolerance testing 
are provided. 
 
Variance inflation factor (VIF) is an indicator of the effect of the 
independent variables on the standard error of a regression coefficient.  
The variance inflation factor is directly related to the tolerance value. The 
tolerance value is the coefficient of determination for the prediction of the 
variable by the other independent variables in the regression variate. A 
smaller tolerance value suggests collinearity with other independent 
variables, whereas large variance inflation factor values indicate a high 
degree of collinearity or multicollinearity amongst the independent 
variables (Hair et al., 2010). Denis (2011) suggested that variance inflation 
factor values of five and higher warrant further investigation, and 
suggested that the parsimony of the model be reviewed in such 
circumstances. Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken (2003, p. 423) proposed a 
commonly-used rule of thumb: that any variance inflation factor values 
greater than 10, or tolerance values less than .10, may indicate serious 
issues of multicollinearity.  Multicollinearity tolerance and variance inflation 
factor values are reported in Table 35 to Table 99. No variance inflation 
values were greater than 10 and no tolerance values were less than .10, 
indicating no serious issues with multicollinearity and allowing the multiple 
regression analysis to be undertaken without further review of the models.  
 
In addition to normal concerns about multiple regression analysis, one 
limitation of this study, audit report timing, may also have an influence on  
the analysis. This limitation is further discussed in the following section. 
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5.9.1 Audit Report Timing 
 
One limitation of this study was the timing of the audit, i.e. whether it 
occurred inside or outside “peak audit periods”. To determine if timing of 
the audit has any influence on charity audit fee pricing, two additional 
variables were developed: a number of days variable which calculated the 
number of days between the financial year end (AUDITDAYS) and date 
the audit report was signed off, and a second dichotomous variable, 
indicating if an audit report was signed off in the peak audit period (within 
three months of the financial year end) or not (AUDITSEASON). 
 
 
Table 34: Results of Multiple Regression – Days to Audit Report Sign-off 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .827 29.394 .000    
       
Variable B Beta T Siga Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.856  2.615 .011*   
ABNCOMPANY .354 .156 2.846 .006* .778 1.286 
INDUSTRY -.0173 -.057 -1.039 .302 .780 1.282 
LNINCOME .494 .733 12.279 .000** .659 1.519 
DONATIONS -.086 -.032 -.641 .524 .938 1.066 
TRADING -.286 -.104 -2.000 .049 .862 1.160 
GRANTS .157 .056 1.048 .298 .812 1.231 
STATE .008 .015 .287 .775 .831 1.204 
BIG FOUR .430 .162 2.621 .011* .610 1.639 
NONAUDITFEE -.065 -.026 -.450 .654 .713 1.403 
AUDITOFFICE -.003 -.064 -1.199 .234 .824 1.214 
AUDITPARTNER .000 .006 .112 .911 .847 1.181 
AUDITDAYS .000 .018 .341 .734 .858 1.165 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
A review of the financial statements showed that the average number of 
days from financial year-end to audit report sign-off was 105 days. A little 
over 51% of audit reports were signed off outside the peak audit season. 
The multivariate linear regression testing showed that neither variable was 
significant (Table 35 and Table 36), hence the timing of the audit did not 
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appear to influence audit fee pricing.  The results of the audit report timing 
evaluation by the proposed charity audit fees model are shown below.   
 
 
Table 35: Results of Multiple Regression – Peak Audit Season Sign-off 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .893 25.815 .000    
       
Variable B Beta T Siga Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 2.372  3.353 .001**   
ABNCOMPANY .261 .116 2.013 .048* .769 1.300 
INDUSTRY -.020 -.070 -1.219 .227 .786 1.272 
LNINCOME .474 .710 11.512 .000*** .677 1.477 
DONATIONS -.048 -.018 -.348 .729 .923 1.084 
TRADING -.302 -.113 -2.055 .043* .847 1.180 
GRANTS .236 .085 1.526 .131 .825 1.212 
STATE -.003 -.005 -.097 .923 .837 1.194 
BIG FOUR .508 .190 2.430 .017 .419 2.387 
NONAUDITFEE -.043 -.017 -.284 .777 .706 1.415 
AUDITOFFICE -.004 -.076 -1.338 .185 .805 1.243 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.020 -.359 .721 .829 1.207 
AUDITSEASON -.184 -.044 -.647 .519 .566 1.765 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
5.9.2 Multivariate Analysis of the Charity Audit Fees Model 
 
The charity audit fee model (Figure 1) posits that audit fee is a function of 
auditee size measured as total income (LNINCOME); auditor relationship 
measured by four constructs: the value of non-audit services 
(NONAUDITFEE), choice of auditor – Big Four or non-Big Four (BIG 
FOUR), audit office expertise (AUDITOFFICE) and audit partner expertise 
(AUDITPARTNER); auditee complexity measured by form of incorporation 
(ABNCOMPANY and STATE); income source in the form of donations 
(DONATIONS); grants from state and federal government and private 
sources (GRANTS); trading (TRADING); and the charity industry sector 
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the auditee was involved in (INDUSTRY). The basic regression model of 
charity audit fees is: 
 
LNAUDITFEE = α + b1LNINCOME + b2NONAUDITFEE + b2AUDITOFFICE + 
b2AUDITPARTNER + b2BIG FOUR + b2ABNCOMPANY + b2STATE + 
b2DONATIONS + b2GRANTS + b2TRADING + b2INDUSTRY + ε 
 
Initial testing of the predictive value of the model was examined through 
the incorporation of all variables. The raw and standardised regression 
coefficients of the predictors, together with correlations, are shown in Table 
37. The prediction model was statistically significant, F(11,80) = 28.330, p 
= .01, and accounted for approximately 89% of the audit fee variance (R2 
= .891, Adjusted R2 = .794). Audit fees are primarily predicted by higher 
levels of income, the choice of Big Four audit firms, incorporation as a 
company, and to a lesser extent by income through trading. In the context 
of the proposed model, auditee size demonstrated the strongest weight in 
the model, followed by auditor relationship and auditee characteristics. 
 
 
Table 36: Results of Multiple Regressions – Charity Audit Fees Model 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .796 28.330 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 2.338  3.326 .001*   
ABNCOMPANY .267 .129 2.077 .041* .774 1.292 
INDUSTRY -.021 .017 -1.232 .222 .786 1.271 
LNINCOME .475 .041 11.589 .000** .678 1.475 
DONATIONS -.060 -.023 -.437 .663 .939 1.065 
TRADING -.290 -.109 -1.997 .049* .860 1.162 
GRANTS .246 .089 1.612 .111  .835 1.197 
STATE -.004 -.007 -.132 .895 .840 1.191 
BIG FOUR .432 .162 2.500 .014* .607 1.648 
NONAUDITFEE -.061 -.024 -.414 .680 .732 1.366 
AUDITOFFICE -.004 .003 -1.223 .225 .854 1.171 
AUDITPARTNER .000 .002 -.195 .846 .891 1.122 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
103 
 
Further examination of the auditor fees charity model was undertaken to 
consider a more simplified version, and one that was reflective of the 
literature in both the private and not-for-profit sectors. This simplified or 
base model posits that audit fees are a function of auditee size measured 
as total income (LNINCOME); auditor relationship measured as choice of 
auditor (Big Four or non-Big Four); auditee complexity measured by 
incorporation form (ABNCOMPANY); income source in the form of grants 
from state, federal and private sources (GRANTS); and trading activities 
(TRADING). The simplified charity audit fees regression model is:  
 
LNAUDITFEE = α + b1LNINCOME + b2BIG4 + b2ABNCOMPANY + b2GRANTS + 
b2TRADING + ε 
 
The prediction model (Table 38) was statistically significant, F(5,89) = 
65.951, p = .01, and accounted for approximately 79% of the audit fee 
variance (R2 = .787, Adjusted R2 = .776). The simplified charity audit fees 
model accounted for approximately 79% of the variance of the audit fee as 
in the full model, however, it revealed an additional explanatory variable, 
grants or grant income. This is not unexpected, as grants may come with 
expectations of accountability for the recipient and may incur higher audit 
costs.  
 
Analysis of the charity audit fees model provided insights into the pricing of 
audit fees in the Australian charity sector. As reported, the models were 
reflective of the not-for-profit and private sector literature, adapted for the 
Australian economy. Once the charity audit fee model had been 
established, the focus changed to evaluating the existence of auditor fee 
premiums. The remainder of this chapter presents a discussion of the 
multivariate testing of the eight hypotheses put forward in this study. 
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Table 37: Results of Multiple Regressions – Simplified Charity Audit Fees Model 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .787 65.951 .000    
Variable B Beta T Siga Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.800  3.019 .003*   
ABNCOMPANY .250 .111 2.150 .034* .909 1.101 
LNINCOME .490 .723 12.584 .000** .865 1.156 
TRADING -.326 -.120 -2.357 .021* .841 1.188 
GRANTS .354 .130 2.572 .012* .973 1.028 
BIG FOUR .396 .148 2.549 .013* .876 1.142 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
5.9.3  Multivariate Analysis of Hypothesis One: Big Four Audit Fee  
Premium 
 
The first of the eight hypotheses to be evaluated explored the existence of 
Big Four audit fee premiums in the Australian charity audit market. The 
alternative form of hypothesis one with the basic regression model is: 
 
H1: The brand name of Big Four auditors is rewarded with an audit 
fee premium above non-big Four audit firms in the Australian 
charity sector. 
 
LNAUDITFEE = α + b1LNINCOME + b2NONAUDITFEE + b2AUDITOFFICE + 
b2AUDITPARTNER + b2BIG4 + b2ABNCOMPANY + b2STATE + 
b2DONATIONS + b2GRANTS + b2TRADING + b2INDUSTRY + ε 
 
From the audit fee model multiple regression (Table 37 and Table 38) the 
BIG FOUR coefficient was positive and significant at p < .05 (t = 2.274, p < 
.05), suggesting that in aggregate, there was evidence to support a Big 
Four audit fee premium in the Australian charity audit market, leading to 
acceptance of hypothesis one. The existence of a Big Four audit fee 
premium in the private sector is strongly supported in the literature, but in 
this study it was not a conclusive finding, as shown in Table 1 and as 
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discovered by Hay, 2013. Beattie et al. (2001) found a similar variance 
reporting mixed results depending on the model. Their model, with income 
as the size proxy, found no support for a Big Six audit fee premium, hence 
these results contrast with their findings. However, Vermeer et al. (2009) 
did find evidence of a significant Big Four audit fee premium. While the 
current study adds to our understanding of audit fee premiums in the 
charity sector, further exploration is warranted to enhance our 
understanding of the drivers of such premiums. Evidence of Big Four audit 
fee premiums amongst Australian charities led to the second hypothesis: 
Do individual Big Four audit firms command audit fee premiums over other 
firms? 
 
5.9.4 Multivariate Analysis of Hypothesis Two: Individual Big Four 
Audit Fee Premiums 
 
The hypothesis that Big Four audit firms are rewarded with an audit fee 
premium above non-Big Four audit firms in the Australian charity sector, 
led to testing for evidence of influence on charity audit fees by the 
individual Big Four audit firms, and in turn to hypothesis two. The 
alternative form for hypothesis two with the basic regression model is: 
 
H2: Individual Big Four audit firms are rewarded with an audit free 
premium above other Big Four audit firms in the Australian 
charity sector. 
 
LNAUDITFEE = α + b1LNINCOME + b2NONAUDITFEE + 
b2AUDITOFFICE + b2AUDITPARTNER + b2BIG4 + b2ABNCOMPANY + 
b2STATE + b2DONATIONS + b2GRANTS + b2TRADING + b2INDUSTRY + 
b2Individual Big Four audit firm + ε 
 
Table 39 to Table 42 report the results of the regression testing for 
individual Big Four audit fee premiums. All four firms had positive 
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coefficients. None of the coefficients were significantly positive at p < .05, 
leading to the rejection of hypothesis two and suggesting that no Big Four 
audit firms were obtaining a premium over other audit firms in the 
Australian charity sector.   
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 examined audit fee premiums in the context of Big 
Four audit firms. Hypothesis three continued the examination of audit 
premiums, but within non-Big Four audit firms. 
 
 
Table 38: Results of Multiple Regression – Hypothesis 2 - Deloitte 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .884 26.029 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.971  2.781 .007**   
ABNCOMPANY .310 .138 2.352 .021* .788 1.268 
INDUSTRY -.013 -.044 -.765 .447 .814 1.229 
LNINCOME .503 .753 12.389 .000** .739 1.353 
DONATIONS -.053 -.020 -.372 .711 .923 1.083 
TRADING -.245 -.092 -1.639 .105 .869 1.150 
GRANTS .314 .113 2.017 .047* .863 1.159 
STATE -.008 -.016 -.279 .781 .842 1.187 
NONAUDITFEE -.175 -.069 -1.195 .236 .809 1.236 
AUDITOFFICE -.003 -.066 -1.129 .262 .809 1.236 
AUDITPARTNER .000 .009 .167 .868 .869 1.150 
DELOITTES .200 .047 .823 .413 .821 1.219 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01   
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Table 39: Results of Multiple Regression – Hypothesis 2 – Ernst & Young 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .783 26.228 .000  Tolerance VIF 
Variable B Beta T Sig.a   
(CONSTANT) 1.871  2.645 .010*   
ABNCOMPANY .300 .134 2.278 .025* .784 1.276 
INDUSTRY -.014 -.047 -.818 .416 .809 1.235 
LNINCOME .511 .766 12.746 .000** .752 1.330 
DONATIONS -.020 -.008 -.143 .886 .933 1.071 
TRADING -.273 -.102 -1.814 .073 .854 1.171 
GRANTS .294 .106 1.883 .063 .850 1.177 
STATE -.009 -.018 -.315 .753 .841 1.189 
NONAUDITFEE -.147 -.058 -.991 .325 .782 1.279 
AUDITOFFICE -.004 -.067 -1.174 .244 .835 1.197 
AUDITPARTNER .000 -.010 -.171 .865 .869 1.150 
ERNST&YOUNG .387 .061 1.077 .285 .835 1.198 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 40: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 2 – KPMG 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .788 27.071 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 2.253  3.133 .002*   
ABNCOMPANY .302 .135 2.326 .023* .787 1.270 
INDUSTRY -.006 -.021 -.359 .720 .807 1.239 
LNINCOME .485 .726 11.681 .000** .685 1.461 
DONATIONS -.002 -.001 -.016 .987 .926 1.080 
TRADING -.283 -.106 -1.911 .060 .858 1.166 
GRANTS .269 .097 1.736 .086 .840 1.191 
STATE -.006 -.011 -.193 .847 .841 1.189 
NONAUDITFEE -.130 -.052 -.893 .375 .785 1.274 
AUDITOFFICE -.005 -.093 -1.650 .103 .838 1.193 
AUDITPARTNER .000 -.010 -.190 .849 .885 1.130 
KPMG .450 .107 1.789 .077 .746 1.341 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 41: Results of Multiple Regression – Hypothesis 2 – PWC 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .780 25.752 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.936  2.717 .008*   
ABNCOMPANY .310 .138 2.327 .022* .778 1.285 
INDUSTRY -.011 -.039 -.648 .519 .758 1.319 
LNINCOME .507 .760 12.570 .000** .753 1.329 
DONATIONS -.038 -.015 -.265 .792 .909 1.100 
TRADING -.250 -.094 -1.665 .100 .870 1.149 
GRANTS .315 .114 2.016 .047* .863 1.159 
STATE -.008 -.015 -.258 .797 .834 1.200 
NONAUDITFEE -.174 -.069 -1.169 .246 .785 1.273 
AUDITOFFICE -.004 -.078 -1.359 .178 .841 1.189 
AUDITPARTNER 3.134E-5 .001 .014 .989 .891 1.122 
PWC .027 .005 .084 .934 .782 1.278 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
5.9.5 Multivariate Analysis of Hypothesis Three: Non-Big Four Audit 
Fee Premiums 
 
Having established the existence of Big Four audit fee premiums in the 
Australian charity sector, hypothesis three extended the study of audit fee 
premiums to non-Big Four audit firms. The alternative form for hypothesis 
3 with the basic regression model is: 
 
H3: Non-Big Four audit firms with expertise are rewarded with an 
audit free premium above other non-Big Four audit firms in the 
Australian charity sector. 
 
LNAUDITFEE = α + b1LNINCOME + b2NONAUDITFEE + 
b2AUDITOFFICE + b2AUDITPARTNER + b2BIG4 + b2ABNCOMPANY + 
b2STATE + b2DONATIONS + b2GRANTS + b2TRADING + b2INDUSTRY + 
b2Individual Big Four audit firm + ε 
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As in the work of Beattie et al. (2001), expertise was proxied by market 
share in this study, measured by the number of charities audited by the 
firm. Non-Big Four audit firms were identified as having seven clients, six 
clients, four clients, three clients, two clients, and one client respectively. 
None of the non-big Four audit firms had five clients, four clients or more 
than seven clients. Multivariate linear regression tests were conducted for 
each group of audit firms (based on number of clients); and the results are 
reported in Table 43 to Table 47. The regression analysis showed that there 
was no support for the hypothesis that non-Big Four audit firms with 
expertise were being rewarded with an audit fee premium above other 
non-Big Four audit firms in the Australian charity audit market. 
 
Whilst no evidence of an audit premium was found, there was evidence of 
discounted audit fees by non-Big Four audit firms for one client. Table 47 
shows that the correlation between non-Big Four audit firms with one client 
and the natural log of audit fee were statistically significant. This 
correlation suggests that non-Big Four audit firms with a single client 
charged lower audit fees than those firms with two or more clients.  
 
The sample included 40 audit firms with a single client. The number of 
days to sign-off of the audit report after the financial year-end for these 
auditors ranged from 32 to 319 days, with an average of 105 days. 
Twenty-six firms completed the audit within the audit season. Audit fees 
charged by these single-client auditors ranged from $1,600 to $62,500, 
with an average of $12,812. The average audit fee for this group of 
auditors was in the lower range, since the average audit fee for the total 
sample was $26,536, with a maximum of $221,300. This study was unable 
to explain the negative coefficient for single-client audit firms, and may be 
evidence of corporate philanthropy or of audit firms with two or more 
clients charging higher audit fees based on perceived auditor expertise. 
Either way, this was an interesting finding, not in evidence in earlier 
studies of the charity sector, and hence warrants further exploration. 
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Table 42: Results of Multiple Regression – Hypothesis 3 – Non-Big Four with 
Seven Clients 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .781 25.986 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.888  2.659 .009*   
ABNCOMPANY .296 .132 2.221 .029* .771 1.297 
INDUSTRY -.010 -.036 -.619 .538 .828 1.208 
LNINCOME .507 .760 12.642 .000** .756 1.322 
DONATIONS -.038 -.014 -.266 .791 .943 1.060 
TRADING -.249 -.093 -1.667 .100 .871 1.148 
GRANTS .345 .125 2.148 .035* .808 1.238 
STATE -.006 -.012 -.204 .839 .836 1.196 
NONAUDITFEE -.188 -.075 -1.277 .205 .801 1.248 
AUDITOFFICE -.003 -.059 -.951 .344 .722 1.385 
AUDITPARTNER .000 .003 .048 .962 .897 1.115 
NONB4CLIENTS7 .202 .045 .757 .451 .785 1.274 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 43: Results of Multiple Regression – Hypothesis 3 – Non-Big Four with Six 
Clients 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .783 26.279 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 2.057  2.884 .005*   
ABNCOMPANY .309 .138 2.358 .021* .788 1.268 
INDUSTRY -.010 -.033 -.582 .562 .826 1.210 
LNINCOME .498 .746 12.181 .000** .723 1.384 
DONATIONS -.022 -.008 -.153 .879 .936 1.069 
TRADING -.273 -.102 -1.817 .073 .856 1.169 
GRANTS .347 .125 2.201 .031* .835 1.197 
STATE -.008 -.015 -.271 .787 .843 1.187 
NONAUDITFEE -.197 -.078 -1.342 .183 .797 1.254 
AUDITOFFICE -.004 -.067 -1.186 .239 .839 1.191 
AUDITPARTNER -5.145E-5 -.001 -.023 .982 .896 1.116 
NONB4CLIENTS6 .283 .062 1.133 .261 .894 1.119 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
The analysis of non-Big Four audit premiums did not show support for the 
hypothesis, but did find evidence of discounting by single-client firms and 
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possibly, higher audit fees based on perceived auditor expertise.   
Hypothesis 4 attempted to shed further light on the existence or otherwise 
of audit fee premiums by non-Big Four firms with a larger share of the 
charity audit market. 
 
 
Table 44: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 3 – Non-Big Four with 
Three Clients 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .780 25.778 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.894  2.616 .011*   
ABNCOMPANY .310 .138 2.341 .022* .787 1.270 
INDUSTRY -.011 -.036 -.626 .533 .823 1.215 
LNINCOME .510 .764 12.398 .000** .724 1.380 
DONATIONS -.039 -.015 -.275 .784 .936 1.068 
TRADING -.246 -.092 -1.631 .107 .861 1.161 
GRANTS .314 .114 2.011 .048* .862 1.160 
STATE -.008 -.015 -.268 .790 .843 1.187 
NONAUDITFEE -.174 -.069 -1.181 .241 .806 1.241 
AUDITOFFICE -.004 -.082 -1.372 .174 .762 1.313 
AUDITPARTNER .000 .005 .084 .933 .845 1.183 
NONB4CLIENTS3 .098 .016 .265 .792 .793 1.262 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 45: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 3 – Non-Big Four with 
Two Clients 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .781 25.928 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.924  2.716 .008*   
ABNCOMPANY .293 .131 2.179 .032* .757 1.321 
INDUSTRY -.012 -.042 -.720 .474 .821 1.218 
LNINCOME .509 .763 12.660 .000** .754 1.326 
DONATIONS -.052 -.020 -.362 .718 .916 1.091 
TRADING -.249 -.093 -1.663 .100 .871 1.148 
GRANTS .321 .116 2.059 .043* .859 1.164 
STATE -.009 -.016 -.286 .775 .842 1.188 
NONAUDITFEE -.173 -.069 -1.181 .241 .809 1.237 
AUDITOFFICE -.004 -.074 -1.304 .196 .852 1.173 
AUDITPARTNER .000 .006 .112 .911 .880 1.136 
NONB4CLIENTS2 -.121 -.036 -.657 .513 .891 1.122 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 46: Results of Multiple Regression Hypothesis 3: Non-Big Four with One 
Client 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .796 27.025 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 2.598  3.458 .001**   
ABNCOMPANY .257 .113 1.872 .065 .738 1.355 
INDUSTRY -.011 -.037 -.652 .517 .820 1.219 
LNINCOME .475 .709 11.232 .000** .672 1.487 
DONATIONS -.021 -.008 -.152 .880 .935 1.069 
TRADING -.291 -.107 -1.920 .059 .858 1.165 
GRANTS .389 .132 2.372 .020* .869 1.151 
STATE -.007 -.013 -.224 .823 .826 1.211 
NONAUDITFEE -.118 -.047 -.808 .422 .800 1.250 
AUDITOFFICE -.003 -.061 -1.098 .276 .871 1.148 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.025 -.458 .648 .876 1.141 
NONB4CLIENTS1 -.330 -.145 -2.470 .016* .779 1.283 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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5.9.6 Multivariate Analysis of Hypothesis Four: Individual Non-Big 
Four Audit Fee Premium 
 
As noted above, no evidence of an audit fee premium was found for non-
Big Four audit firms in the Australian charity market. However, there was 
evidence of single-client firms discounting audit fees and of auditors with 
more than one client earning higher fees, but not sufficient to be classified 
as a premium. Hypothesis four continued examination of the behaviour of 
the non-Big Four auditors by exploring the existence of non-Big four audit 
firms audit fee premiums in the charity market. The alternative form for 
hypothesis 4 with the basic regression model is: 
 
H4: Individual non-Big Four audit firms with expertise are rewarded 
with an audit free premium above other non-Big Four audit 
firms in the Australian charity sector. 
 
LNAUDITFEE = α + b1LNINCOME + b2NONAUDITFEE + 
b2AUDITOFFICE + b2AUDITPARTNER + b2BIG4 + b2ABNCOMPANY + 
b2STATE + b2DONATIONS + b2GRANTS + b2TRADING + b2INDUSTRY + 
b2specialist non-big four audit firm + ε  
 
The approach adopted by Beattie et al. (2001) was applied to this study, 
whereby top non-Big Four audit firms were identified by the number of 
clients or percentage of audit fees earned. Four firms were identified as 
dominating the non-Big Four, either in terms of number of clients and/or 
percentage of audit fees, those being WHK NG, BDO, Grant Thornton and 
RSM Bird Cameron. Multivariate regression analysis was undertaken for 
each of these four firms and the results reported in Table 48 to Table 51. 
The multivariate results showed no support for the hypothesis that non-Big 
Four audit firms with expertise were rewarded with an audit fee premium 
above other non-Big Four audit firms. This is interesting in itself, as 
despite lacking a feasible explanation, it provides further insights into 
hypothesis three and the finding that single-client audit firms were 
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reducing fees. Hypotheses 5 to eight explored the personal connections 
between auditors and charities with particular audit firm offices or partners 
who had taken an interest in the sector, hence developing specific 
expertise that commanded audit fee premiums.  
 
 
Table 47: Results of Multiple Regression – Hypothesis 4 – Non-Big Four 
Specialist WHK NG 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .780 25.778 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.894  2.616 .011*   
ABNCOMPANY .310 .138 2.341 .022* .787 1.270 
INDUSTRY -.011 -.036 -.626 .533 .823 1.215 
LNINCOME .510 .764 12.398 .000** .724 1.380 
DONATIONS -.039 -.015 -.275 .784 .936 1.068 
TRADING -.246 -.092 -1.631 .107 .861 1.161 
GRANTS .314 .114 2.011 .048* .862 1.160 
STATE -.008 -.015 -.268 .790 .843 1.187 
NONAUDITFEE -.174 -.069 -1.181 .241 .806 1.241 
AUDITOFFICE -.004 -.082 -1.372 .174 .762 1.313 
AUDITPARTNER .000 .005 .084 .933 .845 1.183 
NONB4WHKNG .098 .016 .265 .792 .793 1.262 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 48: Results of multiple regressions – Hypothesis 4 – Hypothesis 4 – Non-
Big Four Specialist BDO 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .781 25.986 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.888  2.659 .009*   
ABNCOMPANY .296 .132 2.221 .029* .771 1.297 
INDUSTRY -.010 -.036 -.619 .538 .828 1.208 
LNINCOME .507 .760 12.642 .000** .756 1.322 
DONATIONS -.038 -.014 -.266 .791 .943 1.060 
TRADING -.249 -.093 -1.667 .100 .871 1.148 
GRANTS .345 .125 2.148 .035* .808 1.238 
STATE -.006 -.012 -.204 .839 .836 1.196 
NONAUDITFEE -.188 -.075 -1.277 .205 .801 1.248 
AUDITOFFICE -.003 -.059 -.951 .344 .722 1.385 
AUDITPARTNER .000 .003 .048 .962 .897 1.115 
NONB4BDO .202 .045 .757 .451 .785 1.274 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 49: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 4 – Non-Big Four 
Specialist Grant Thornton 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .783 26.279 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 2.057  2.884 .005*   
ABNCOMPANY .309 .138 2.358 .021* .788 1.268 
INDUSTRY -.010 -.033 -.582 .562 .826 1.210 
LNINCOME .498 .746 12.181 .000** .723 1.384 
DONATIONS -.022 -.008 -.153 .879 .936 1.069 
TRADING -.273 -.102 -1.817 .073 .856 1.169 
GRANTS .347 .125 2.201 .031* .835 1.197 
STATE -.008 -.015 -.271 .787 .843 1.187 
NONAUDITFEE -.197 -.078 -1.342 .183 .797 1.254 
AUDITOFFICE -.004 -.067 -1.186 .239 .839 1.191 
AUDITPARTNER -5.145E-5 -.001 -.023 .982 .896 1.116 
NONB4GRANT .283 .062 1.133 .261 .894 1.119 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 50: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 4 - Non-Big Four 
Specialist RSM Bird Cameron 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .782 26.165 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 2.127  2.905 .005*   
ABNCOMPANY .308 .138 2.343 .022* .788 1.269 
INDUSTRY -.009 -.032 -.557 .579 .822 1.216 
LNINCOME .499 .748 12.191 .000** .723 1.383 
DONATIONS -.047 -.018 -.335 .738 .937 1.067 
TRADING -.250 -.094 -1.677 .097 .871 1.148 
GRANTS .312 .113 2.013 .047* .862 1.159 
STATE -.014 -.027 -.466 .642 .808 1.237 
NONAUDITFEE -.202 -.080 -1.366 .176 .785 1.274 
AUDITOFFICE -.005 -.088 -1.529 .130 .830 1.204 
AUDITPARTNER .000 -.005 -.091 .928 .887 1.128 
NONB4RSM .433 .056 1.003 .319 .859 1.165 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
5.9.7 Multivariate Analysis of Hypothesis Five: Big Four Audit Offices 
Earning Audit Fee Premiums 
 
More recent literature on private sector audit premiums (Ferguson et al., 
2003) extended the research by looking for evidence of “office-level” or 
“city-level” audit fee premiums. Francis (2011) strongly advocated that 
audit specialisation may be office-specific rather than firm-wide and 
recommended further studies of auditor specialisation at this lower level.  
The remaining four hypotheses in this study took up the challenge by 
exploring the question of audit fee premiums at the audit firm office or 
partner level in both Big Four and non-Big Four firms.  
 
The first hypothesis in this series, hypothesis 5, examined whether 
individual Big Four audit firm offices commanded an audit premium in the 
Australian charity sector. The alternative form for hypothesis 5 with the 
basic regression model is: 
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H5: Individual offices of Big Four audit firms are rewarded with an 
audit fee premium above other non-Big Four audit firms in the 
Australian charity sector. 
 
LNAUDITFEE = α + b1LNINCOME + b2NONAUDITFEE + 
b2AUDITOFFICE + b2AUDITPARTNER + b2BIG4 + b2ABNCOMPANY + 
b2STATE + b2DONATIONS + b2GRANTS + b2TRADING + b2INDUSTRY + 
b2Big Four audit firm office + ε 
 
Table 52 to Table 61 report the results of the analysis of hypothesis five with 
regression testing of Big Four audit firm offices. Ten audit firm/audit office 
combinations were examined, with no support for the hypothesis that 
individual Big Four audit firm offices were rewarded with an audit fee 
premium above other Big Four audit firms, and hence the null hypothesis 
was not rejected. This suggests that Big Four audit firm offices in the 
Australian charity market were not earning audit fee premiums as 
specialist charity auditors. 
 
Table 51: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 5 – Big Four Offices – 
Deloitte Melbourne 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .778 28.444 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.830  2.626 .010*   
ABNCOMPANY .293 .131 2.248 .027* .804 1.243 
INDUSTRY -.016 -.056 -.995 .322 .855 1.170 
LNINCOME .506 .758 12.493 .000** .743 1.346 
DONATIONS -.063 -.024 -.438 .663 .895 1.117 
TRADING -.245 -.092 -1.642 .104 .872 1.146 
GRANTS .366 .132 2.447 .017* .934 1.071 
STATE -.011 -.021 -.369 .713 .828 1.208 
NONAUDITFEE -.174 -.069 -1.187 .239 .810 1.235 
AUDITPARTNER 8.979E-5 .002 .040 .969 .878 1.138 
B4OFFICEDELMEL .328 .066 1.161 .249 .837 1.195 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 52: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 5 – Big Four Offices – 
Deloitte Sydney 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .777 28.637 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.684  2.432 .017*   
ABNCOMPANY .286 .127 2.181 .032* .796 1.256 
INDUSTRY -.016 -.054 -.966 .337 .862 1.160 
LNINCOME .517 .771 12.927 .000** .764 1.309 
DONATIONS -.018 -.007 -.129 .897 .941 1.062 
TRADING -.229 -.085 -1.531 .130 .875 1.143 
GRANTS .380 .136 2.519 .014* .928 1.077 
STATE -.007 -.014 -.249 .804 .826 1.210 
NONAUDITFEE -.171 -.068 -1.160 .250 .801 1.249 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.022 -.402 .689 .932 1.073 
B4OFFICEDELSYD .030 .003 .051 .959 .946 1.058 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 53: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 5 – Big Four Offices – 
Deloitte Parramatta 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .775 27.899 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
ABNCOMPANY 1.693  2.436 .017*   
INDUSTRY .283 .126 2.155 .034* .809 1.237 
LNINCOME -.016 -.054 -.945 .347 .848 1.179 
DONATIONS .515 .771 12.835 .000** .769 1.300 
TRADING -.023 -.009 -.159 .874 .946 1.057 
GRANTS -.234 -.088 -1.549 .125 .865 1.156 
STATE .364 .132 2.378 .020* .904 1.106 
NONAUDITFEE -.005 -.009 -.162 .871 .831 1.203 
AUDITPARTNER -.163 -.065 -1.093 .277 .793 1.261 
B4OFFICEDELPAR .000 -.011 -.199 .843 .917 1.091 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 54: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 5 – Big Four Offices – 
Deloitte Parramatta 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .780 28.800 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.733  2.527 .013   
ABNCOMPANY .277 .124 2.137 .036 .808 1.238 
INDUSTRY -.022 -.074 -1.267 .209 .803 1.246 
LNINCOME .517 .774 13.033 .000 .769 1.301 
DONATIONS -.014 -.006 -.103 .918 .945 1.059 
TRADING -.248 -.093 -1.667 .099 .872 1.146 
GRANTS .355 .129 2.381 .020 .929 1.077 
STATE -.011 -.021 -.365 .716 .835 1.198 
NONAUDITFEE -.150 -.060 -1.029 .306 .803 1.245 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.031 -.566 .573 .887 1.127 
B4OFFICEEYMEL .629 .082 1.466 .146 .867 1.153 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 55: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 5 – Big Four Offices – 
Ernst & Young Sydney 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .777 28.640 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.675  2.407 .018   
ABNCOMPANY .286 .127 2.185 .032 .800 1.251 
INDUSTRY -.016 -.053 -.940 .350 .843 1.186 
LNINCOME .517 .771 12.937 .000 .764 1.309 
DONATIONS -.017 -.007 -.123 .902 .938 1.066 
TRADING -.233 -.087 -1.527 .131 .845 1.184 
GRANTS .376 .135 2.466 .016 .906 1.103 
STATE -.007 -.014 -.249 .804 .834 1.199 
NONAUDITFEE -.168 -.066 -1.124 .264 .783 1.278 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.021 -.393 .696 .935 1.070 
B4OFFICEEYSYD .064 .006 .105 .917 .861 1.161 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 56: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 5 – Big Four Offices – 
KPMG Melbourne 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .775 27.937 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.683  2.420 .018*   
ABNCOMPANY .278 .124 2.109 .038* .803 1.246 
INDUSTRY -.017 -.056 -.978 .331 .832 1.201 
LNINCOME .517 .775 12.769 .000** .753 1.328 
DONATIONS -.033 -.013 -.232 .817 .928 1.077 
TRADING -.240 -.090 -1.598 .114 .873 1.145 
GRANTS .384 .139 2.525 .014* .918 1.090 
STATE -.005 -.009 -.160 .874 .835 1.197 
NONAUDITFEE -.184 -.073 -1.224 .225 .779 1.283 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.014 -.252 .802 .932 1.073 
B4OFFICEKPMGMEL -.198 -.026 -.454 .651 .863 1.158 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 57: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 5 – Big Four Offices – 
KPMG Sydney 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .779 28.586 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.869  2.675 .009*   
ABNCOMPANY .271 .121 2.084 .040* .805 1.242 
INDUSTRY -.015 -.052 -.920 .360 .859 1.165 
LNINCOME .502 .752 12.273 .000** .726 1.378 
DONATIONS -.018 -.007 -.128 .899 .946 1.057 
TRADING -.271 -.102 -1.795 .076 .850 1.176 
GRANTS .359 .130 2.400 .019* .930 1.075 
STATE .002 .003 .052 .959 .811 1.233 
NONAUDITFEE -.143 -.057 -.970 .335 .794 1.260 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.024 -.438 .663 .912 1.097 
B4OFFICEKPMGSYD .421 .077 1.292 .200 .775 1.291 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 58: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 5 – Big Four Offices – 
KPMG Perth 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .787 30.227 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.800  2.646 .010   
ABNCOMPANY .252 .112 1.943 .055 .785 1.275 
INDUSTRY -.013 -.045 -.825 .412 .856 1.169 
LNINCOME .513 .764 13.091 .000 .764 1.309 
DONATIONS .002 .001 .012 .990 .940 1.064 
TRADING -.228 -.085 -1.556 .123 .877 1.141 
GRANTS .390 .140 2.648 .010 .933 1.071 
STATE -.013 -.026 -.457 .649 .829 1.207 
NONAUDITFEE -.200 -.079 -1.384 .170 .797 1.254 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.031 -.579 .564 .930 1.075 
B4OFFICEKPMGPER 1.078 .099 1.882 .063 .943 1.061 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 59: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 5 – Big Four Offices – 
PWC Sydney 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .777 28.227 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.703  2.466 .016*   
ABNCOMPANY .267 .119 2.030 .046* .796 1.257 
INDUSTRY -.019 -.065 -1.108 .271 .812 1.232 
LNINCOME .514 .770 12.881 .000** .769 1.300 
DONATIONS -.034 -.013 -.240 .811 .941 1.062 
TRADING -.222 -.083 -1.472 .145 .861 1.162 
GRANTS .393 .142 2.598 .011* .919 1.089 
STATE -.004 -.008 -.133 .895 .839 1.192 
NONAUDITFEE -.154 -.061 -1.042 .301 .798 1.252 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.015 -.274 .785 .932 1.073 
B4OFFICEPWCSYD .328 .052 .928 .356 .877 1.140 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 60: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 5 – Big Four Offices – 
PWC Newcastle 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .787 30.338 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.537  2.258 .027*   
ABNCOMPANY .297 .132 2.320 .023* .800 1.250 
INDUSTRY -.009 -.029 -.522 .603 .818 1.223 
LNINCOME .524 .780 13.367 .000** .761 1.313 
DONATIONS .043 .016 .302 .764 .899 1.113 
TRADING -.186 -.069 -1.261 .211 .857 1.167 
GRANTS .424 .152 2.850 .006* .912 1.096 
STATE -.012 -.022 -.400 .690 .834 1.200 
NONAUDITFEE -.208 -.082 -1.432 .156 .793 1.261 
AUDITPARTNER .000 -.003 -.061 .951 .909 1.100 
B4OFFICEPWCNEW  -1.215 -.112 -1.947 .055 .790 1.265 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 91; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
5.9.8 Multivariate Analysis of Hypothesis Six: Big Four Audit Partners 
Earning Audit Fee Premium 
 
Hypothesis 6 explored whether Big Four audit partners were earning audit 
fee premiums as specialist charity auditors and continued the theme of 
audit specialisation at city and office level, as advocated by Francis 
(2011). This had not been previously explored in the private or not-for-
profit literature. The alternative form for hypothesis 6 with the basic 
regression model is: 
 
H6: Individual audit partners of Big Four audit firms are rewarded 
with an audit fee premium above other Big Four audit firm’s partners 
in the Australian charity sector. 
 
LNAUDITFEE = α + b1LNINCOME + b2NONAUDITFEE + 
b2AUDITOFFICE + b2AUDITPARTNER + b2BIG4 + b2ABNCOMPANY + 
b2STATE + b2DONATIONS + b2GRANTS + b2TRADING + b2INDUSTRY + 
b2Big Four audit firm partner + ε 
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Table 62 to Table 80 report the results of the analysis of hypothesis six with 
regression testing of Big Four audit partner. The analysis showed no 
support for the hypothesis that individual Big Four audit firm partners were 
rewarded with an audit fee premium above other Big Four audit firms, and 
hence the null hypothesis was not rejected. In summary, hypotheses 5 
and 6 did not show support for city- or office-level Big Four audit firms 
earning an audit premium in the Australian charity audit market, which 
partly contrasts with the private-sector literature.  Hypotheses seven and 
eight continued testing for evidence of audit fee premiums earned by audit 
firms and/or audit partners in non-Big Four audit firms.  
 
 
Table 61: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
Deloitte Brown, A. 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .780 29.026 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.758  2.537 .013*   
ABNCOMPANY .301 .134 2.295 .024* .791 1.265 
INDUSTRY -.015 -.052 -.932 .354 .860 1.162 
LNINCOME .512 .763 12.742 .000** .750 1.333 
DONATIONS -.044 -.017 -.306 .760 .913 1.096 
TRADING -.228 -.085 -1.530 .130 .877 1.141 
GRANTS .380 .137 2.546 .013* .935 1.070 
STATE -.009 -.017 -.295 .769 .836 1.196 
NONAUDITFEE -.186 -.073 -1.262 .211 .797 1.254 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.013 -.237 .813 .911 1.098 
B4DELBROWN_A  .555 .051 .933 .354 .901 1.110 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 62: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
Deloitte Lefevre 
Model 
 
 
 
 
R2 F Sig.    
Regression .777 28.650 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.671  2.407 .018*   
ABNCOMPANY .284 .126 2.159 .034* .792 1.263 
INDUSTRY -.017 -.057 -.981 .330 .800 1.249 
LNINCOME .518 .772 12.887 .000** .756 1.323 
DONATIONS -.025 -.010 -.174 .863 .891 1.123 
TRADING -.227 -.084 -1.508 .136 .867 1.153 
GRANTS .381 .137 2.530 .013* .931 1.075 
STATE -.008 -.015 -.264 .793 .836 1.196 
NONAUDITFEE -.166 -.065 -1.112 .269 .784 1.276 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.022 -.406 .686 .937 1.067 
B4DELLEFEVRE  .113 .010 .183 .855 .854 1.171 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 63: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
Deloitte Pearce 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .777 28.637 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.684  2.432 .017   
ABNCOMPANY .286 .127 2.181 .032 .796 1.256 
INDUSTRY -.016 -.054 -.966 .337 .862 1.160 
LNINCOME .517 .771 12.927 .000 .764 1.309 
DONATIONS -.018 -.007 -.129 .897 .941 1.062 
TRADING -.229 -.085 -1.531 .130 .875 1.143 
GRANTS .380 .136 2.519 .014 .928 1.077 
STATE -.007 -.014 -.249 .804 .826 1.210 
NONAUDITFEE -.171 -.068 -1.160 .250 .801 1.249 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.022 -.402 .689 .932 1.073 
B4DELPEARCE  .030 .003 .051 .959 .946 1.058 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 64: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
Deloitte Brown 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .777 28.641 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.698  2.411 .018*   
ABNCOMPANY .288 .128 2.192 .031* .793 1.261 
INDUSTRY -.016 -.055 -.973 .334 .857 1.167 
LNINCOME .516 .769 12.714 .000** .741 1.350 
DONATIONS -.018 -.007 -.129 .897 .945 1.058 
TRADING -.233 -.087 -1.526 .131 .839 1.191 
GRANTS .375 .135 2.430 .017* .886 1.128 
STATE -.008 -.015 -.269 .789 .826 1.210 
NONAUDITFEE -.173 -.068 -1.165 .247 .795 1.257 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.020 -.376 .708 .915 1.093 
B4DELBROWN  .072 .007 .116 .908 .837 1.194 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 65: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
Deloitte Angleucci 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .781 29.230 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.698  2.411 .018*   
ABNCOMPANY .288 .128 2.192 .031* .793 1.261 
INDUSTRY -.016 -.055 -.973 .334 .857 1.167 
LNINCOME .516 .769 12.714 .000** .741 1.350 
DONATIONS -.018 -.007 -.129 .897 .945 1.058 
TRADING -.233 -.087 -1.526 .131 .839 1.191 
GRANTS .375 .135 2.430 .017* .886 1.128 
STATE -.008 -.015 -.269 .789 .826 1.210 
NONAUDITFEE -.173 -.068 -1.165 .247 .795 1.257 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.020 -.376 .708 .915 1.093 
B4DELANGLEUCCI  .072 .007 .116 .908 .837 1.194 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 66: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
Deloitte Collie 
 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .779 29.938 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.726  2.497 .015*   
ABNCOMPANY .290 .129 2.224 .029* .800 1.249 
INDUSTRY -.015 -.049 -.877 .383 .852 1.174 
LNINCOME .513 .765 12.803 .000** .755 1.325 
DONATIONS -.027 -.010 -.191 .849 .941 1.062 
TRADING -.228 -.085 -1.533 .129 .877 1.141 
GRANTS .384 .138 2.563 .012* .933 1.071 
STATE -.010 -.018 -.321 .749 .833 1.201 
NONAUDITFEE -.169 -.067 -1.152 .252 .807 1.239 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.014 -.266 .791 .915 1.093 
B4DELCOLLIE  .342 .044 .820 .414 .931 1.074 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 67: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
Ernst & Young Wallace 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .778 28.679 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.673  2.417 .018*   
ABNCOMPANY .278 .123 2.070 .042* .763 1.311 
INDUSTRY -.017 -.057 -1.005 .318 .839 1.192 
LNINCOME .519 .774 12.837 .000** .746 1.340 
DONATIONS -.018 -.007 -.129 .898 .946 1.057 
TRADING -.236 -.088 -1.565 .121 .859 1.164 
GRANTS .369 .133 2.412 .018* .898 1.114 
STATE -.009 -.018 -.304 .762 .816 1.226 
NONAUDITFEE -.173 -.068 -1.175 .243 .805 1.243 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.024 -.448 .655 .910 1.099 
B4EYWALLACE  .196 .018 .313 .755 .820 1.220 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 68: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
Ernst & Young Painter 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .786 30.158 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.790  2.630 .010*   
ABNCOMPANY .328 .146 2.518 .014* .778 1.286 
INDUSTRY -.022 -.075 -1.337 .185 .827 1.209 
LNINCOME .508 .757 12.888 .000** .755 1.325 
DONATIONS -.006 -.002 -.044 .965 .944 1.060 
TRADING -.210 -.078 -1.426 .158 .872 1.147 
GRANTS .399 .143 2.701 .008* .930 1.075 
STATE -.007 -.013 -.236 .814 .838 1.194 
NONAUDITFEE -.122 -.048 -.833 .407 .781 1.281 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.035 -.649 .518 .921 1.085 
B4EYPAINTER  1.099 .101 1.841 .069 .868 1.152 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
 
128 
 
Table 69: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
Ernst & Young Lewis 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .777 28.640 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.675  2.407 .018*   
ABNCOMPANY .286 .127 2.185 .032* .800 1.251 
INDUSTRY -.016 -.053 -.940 .350 .843 1.186 
LNINCOME .517 .771 12.937 .000** .764 1.309 
DONATIONS -.017 -.007 -.123 .902 .938 1.066 
TRADING -.233 -.087 -1.527 .131 .845 1.184 
GRANTS .376 .135 2.466 .016* .906 1.103 
STATE -.007 -.014 -.249 .804 .834 1.199 
NONAUDITFEE -.168 -.066 -1.124 .264 .783 1.278 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.021 -.393 .696 .935 1.070 
B4EYLEWIS .064 .006 .105 .917 .861 1.161 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 70: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
KPMG Scammell 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .778 28.670 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.688  2.440 .017*   
ABNCOMPANY .293 .130 2.208 .030* .778 1.285 
INDUSTRY -.015 -.053 -.931 .355 .852 1.174 
LNINCOME .516 .770 12.905 .000** .763 1.311 
DONATIONS -.015 -.006 -.106 .916 .937 1.067 
TRADING -.228 -.085 -1.520 .132 .875 1.143 
GRANTS .369 .132 2.393 .019* .885 1.129 
STATE -.008 -.016 -.273 .786 .835 1.198 
NONAUDITFEE -.163 -.064 -1.091 .278 .781 1.281 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.023 -.423 .673 .930 1.075 
B4KPMGSCAMMELL  .170 .016 .279 .781 .865 1.156 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 71: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
KPMG Napier 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .777 28.647 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.679  2.427 .017*   
ABNCOMPANY .287 .128 2.191 .031* .801 1.248 
INDUSTRY -.016 -.055 -.978 .331 .853 1.172 
LNINCOME .518 .772 12.923 .000** .761 1.313 
DONATIONS -.021 -.008 -.148 .883 .937 1.067 
TRADING -.231 -.086 -1.542 .127 .875 1.143 
GRANTS .384 .138 2.510 .014* .902 1.108 
STATE -.008 -.015 -.270 .788 .831 1.203 
NONAUDITFEE -.174 -.069 -1.171 .245 .793 1.260 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.021 -.391 .697 .936 1.069 
B4KPMGNAPIER  -.098 -.009 -.163 .871 .893 1.120 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 72 Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
KPMG Mitchel 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .780 29.029 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.719  2.494 .015*   
ABNCOMPANY .283 .126 2.177 .032* .801 1.249 
INDUSTRY -.015 -.050 -.899 .371 .857 1.167 
LNINCOME .513 .765 12.838 .000** .757 1.320 
DONATIONS -.005 -.002 -.035 .972 .936 1.069 
TRADING -.262 -.097 -1.715 .090 .832 1.202 
GRANTS .395 .142 2.628 .010* .922 1.085 
STATE -.005 -.009 -.161 .873 .829 1.206 
NONAUDITFEE -.151 -.060 -1.024 .309 .791 1.264 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.024 -.454 .651 .935 1.070 
B4KPMGMITCHEL  .564 .052 .936 .352 .880 1.137 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 73: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
KPMG Travers 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .778 28.656 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.728  2.389 .019*   
ABNCOMPANY .285 .127 2.179 .032* .799 1.251 
INDUSTRY -.016 -.054 -.965 .337 .862 1.160 
LNINCOME .515 .767 12.402 .000** .709 1.410 
DONATIONS -.025 -.009 -.170 .865 .913 1.095 
TRADING -.228 -.085 -1.527 .131 .876 1.142 
GRANTS .372 .134 2.422 .018* .893 1.119 
STATE -.007 -.014 -.248 .805 .836 1.196 
NONAUDITFEE -.177 -.070 -1.179 .242 .777 1.288 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.023 -.421 .675 .926 1.080 
B4KPMGTRAVERS  .134 .012 .213 .832 .811 1.233 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 74: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
KPMG Robinson 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .787 30.227 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.800  2.646 .010*   
ABNCOMPANY .252 .112 1.943 .055 .785 1.275 
INDUSTRY -.013 -.045 -.825 .412 .856 1.169 
LNINCOME .513 .764 13.091 .000** .764 1.309 
DONATIONS .002 .001 .012 .990 .940 1.064 
TRADING -.228 -.085 -1.556 .123 .877 1.141 
GRANTS .390 .140 2.648 .010* .933 1.071 
STATE -.013 -.026 -.457 .649 .829 1.207 
NONAUDITFEE -.200 -.079 -1.384 .170 .797 1.254 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.031 -.579 .564 .930 1.075 
B4KPMGROBINSON  1.078 .099 1.882 .063 .943 1.061 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 75: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
KPMG Mattera 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .782 29.494 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.640  2.395 .019*   
ABNCOMPANY .278 .124 2.144 .035* .799 1.251 
INDUSTRY -.020 -.068 -1.214 .228 .833 1.200 
LNINCOME .518 .772 13.129 .000** .767 1.305 
DONATIONS -.010 -.004 -.071 .944 .944 1.059 
TRADING -.262 -.098 -1.751 .084 .855 1.169 
GRANTS .407 .146 2.718 .008* .917 1.090 
STATE -.002 -.004 -.068 .946 .822 1.216 
NONAUDITFEE -.133 -.053 -.901 .370 .780 1.282 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.027 -.510 .611 .932 1.073 
B4KPMGMATTERA  .833 .076 1.383 .170 .867 1.154 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 76: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
KPMG Cinanni 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .780 28.993 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.634  2.367 .020*   
ABNCOMPANY .293 .130 2.244 .028* .799 1.251 
INDUSTRY -.018 -.061 -1.083 .282 .846 1.182 
LNINCOME .522 .778 13.022 .000** .754 1.327 
DONATIONS -.031 -.012 -.220 .827 .937 1.067 
TRADING -.226 -.084 -1.519 .133 .876 1.141 
GRANTS .374 .134 2.500 .014* .933 1.071 
STATE -.005 -.010 -.184 .854 .832 1.202 
NONAUDITFEE -.183 -.072 -1.244 .217 .800 1.250 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.027 -.495 .622 .927 1.079 
B4KPMGCINANNI  -.526 -.048 -.892 .375 .918 1.090 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 77: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
PWC McConnel 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .778 28.728 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.675  2.423 .018*   
ABNCOMPANY .287 .128 2.198 .031* .801 1.248 
INDUSTRY -.016 -.053 -.954 .343 .861 1.161 
LNINCOME .518 .773 12.969 .000** .763 1.311 
DONATIONS -.008 -.003 -.054 .957 .918 1.089 
TRADING -.233 -.087 -1.559 .123 .874 1.144 
GRANTS .373 .134 2.476 .015* .927 1.078 
STATE -.010 -.018 -.319 .751 .821 1.218 
NONAUDITFEE -.179 -.071 -1.211 .230 .793 1.261 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.020 -.377 .707 .936 1.069 
B4PWCMCCONEL  -.271 -.025 -.454 .651 .901 1.109 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 78 Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
PWC Turner 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .787 30.338 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.537  2.258 .027*   
ABNCOMPANY .297 .132 2.320 .023* .800 1.250 
INDUSTRY -.009 -.029 -.522 .603 .818 1.223 
LNINCOME .524 .780 13.367 .000** .761 1.313 
DONATIONS .043 .016 .302 .764 .899 1.113 
TRADING -.186 -.069 -1.261 .211 .857 1.167 
GRANTS .424 .152 2.850 .006* .912 1.096 
STATE -.012 -.022 -.400 .690 .834 1.200 
NONAUDITFEE -.208 -.082 -1.432 .156 .793 1.261 
AUDITPARTNER .000 -.003 -.061 .951 .909 1.100 
B4PWCTURNER  -1.215 -.112 -1.947 .055 .790 1.265 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 79 Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 6 – Big Four Partners – 
PWC Maher 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .778 28.774 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.705  2.465 .016*   
ABNCOMPANY .281 .125 2.145 .035* .796 1.256 
INDUSTRY -.018 -.060 -1.054 .295 .833 1.200 
LNINCOME .516 .769 12.925 .000** .764 1.308 
DONATIONS -.017 -.006 -.117 .907 .945 1.058 
TRADING -.222 -.083 -1.485 .141 .870 1.149 
GRANTS .387 .139 2.569 .012* .926 1.080 
STATE -.005 -.010 -.180 .858 .822 1.216 
NONAUDITFEE -.178 -.070 -1.207 .231 .800 1.249 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.023 -.433 .666 .935 1.070 
B4PWCMAHER  .329 .030 .556 .580 .917 1.091 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
5.9.9 Multivariate Analysis of Hypothesis Seven: Non-Big Four Audit 
Offices Earning Audit Fee Premiums 
 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 tested for evidence of audit fee premiums earned by 
Big Four audit firm offices and/or partners as advocated by Francis (2011). 
Hypotheses seven and eight extended the study by testing for evidence of 
an audit premium earned by non-Big Four audit firm offices and/or 
partners in the Australian charity market. Specifically, hypothesis 7 
proposed an audit fee premium for specialist non-Big Four audit firm 
offices with an alternative form with the basic regression model as follows:  
 
H7: Individual offices of multi-office non-Big Four audit firms are 
rewarded with an audit fee premium above other multi-office 
non-Big Four audit firms in the Australian charity sector. 
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LNAUDITFEE = α + b1LNINCOME + b2NONAUDITFEE + 
b2AUDITOFFICE + b2AUDITPARTNER + b2BIG4 + b2ABNCOMPANY + 
b2STATE + b2DONATIONS + b2GRANTS + b2TRADING + b2INDUSTRY + 
b2Non-big Four audit firm office + ε 
 
As with hypothesis 4, the approach adopted by Beattie et al. (2001) was 
applied. The number of clients or percentage of audit fees earned was 
used to identify the top non-Big Four audit firms with multiple offices. Four 
firms were identified as dominating the non-Big Four audit firms: WHK NG, 
BDO, Grant Thornton and RSM Bird Cameron. The offices of these firms 
were identified as separate variables and a control variable was included 
for all remaining audit firm offices.  
 
Table 81 to Table 92 report the results of the analysis of hypothesis seven, 
which showed no support for non-Big Four audit firm offices being 
rewarded with an audit fee premium above other non-Big Four audit firms.  
Hypothesis 7 was therefore rejected, suggesting that in the Australian 
charity audit market, non-Big Four audit firm offices were not earning audit 
fee premiums as specialist charity auditors. Having tested for the 
existence of non-Big Four audit firm office premiums in the Australian 
charity market, hypothesis 8 explored a further aspect; whether non-Big 
Four audit partners were earning audit fee premiums as specialist charity 
auditors.  
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Table 80: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 7 – Non-Big Four Offices 
– BDO Sydney 
 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .789 28.039 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.688  2.380 .020*   
ABNCOMPANY .319 .140 2.337 .022* .782 1.278 
INDUSTRY -.021 -.071 -1.252 .215 .880 1.136 
LNINCOME .520 .770 12.731 .000** .769 1.301 
DONATIONS -.046 -.017 -.308 .759 .927 1.078 
TRADING -.271 -.099 -1.759 .083 .885 1.130 
GRANTS .372 .136 2.450 .017* .913 1.096 
STATE -.009 -.018 -.305 .761 .817 1.223 
NONAUDITFEE -.173 -.068 -1.156 .251 .808 1.238 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.027 -.501 .618 .942 1.061 
NB4BDOSYD  -.274 -.044 -.813 .419 .947 1.056 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 81: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 7 – Non-Big Four Offices 
– BDO Perth 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression ..794 28.843 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.507  2.156 .034   
ABNCOMPANY .280 .123 2.058 .043 .769 1.300 
INDUSTRY -.026 -.089 -1.563 .122 .848 1.179 
LNINCOME .531 .786 13.115 .000** .766 1.306 
DONATIONS -.028 -.010 -.192 .848 .935 1.070 
TRADING -.262 -.096 -1.714 .091 .883 1.133 
GRANTS .401 .147 2.693 .009* .929 1.076 
STATE -.015 -.028 -.479 .633 .803 1.245 
NONAUDITFEE -.129 -.051 -.860 .393 .789 1.268 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.022 -.401 .689 .937 1.067 
NB4BDOPER  .918 .087 1.540 .128 .868 1.152 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 82: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 7 – Non-Big Four Offices 
– BDO Brisbane 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .792 28.595 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.651  2.364 .021*   
ABNCOMPANY .279 .123 2.041 .045* .764 1.309 
INDUSTRY -.023 -.079 -1.403 .165 .874 1.145 
LNINCOME .523 .775 12.978 .000** .777 1.287 
DONATIONS -.058 -.021 -.387 .700 .924 1.083 
TRADING -.294 -.107 -1.913 .060 .878 1.139 
GRANTS .418 .153 2.774 .007* .913 1.095 
STATE -.005 -.009 -.163 .871 .825 1.213 
NONAUDITFEE -.193 -.076 -1.295 .199 .796 1.257 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.019 -.357 .722 .929 1.076 
NB4BDOBRI  -.566 -.075 -1.358 .179 .903 1.107 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 83: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 7 – Non-Big Four Offices 
– Grant Thornton Melbourne 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .787 27.729 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.613  2.283 .025*   
ABNCOMPANY .311 .137 2.239 .028* .761 1.315 
INDUSTRY -.021 -.072 -1.266 .209 .877 1.140 
LNINCOME .523 .775 12.822 .000** .777 1.288 
DONATIONS -.035 -.013 -.233 .817 .934 1.070 
TRADING -.275 -.100 -1.771 .081 .883 1.133 
GRANTS .390 .142 2.579 .012* .931 1.074 
STATE -.007 -.013 -.221 .826 .823 1.214 
NONAUDITFEE -.166 -.066 -1.103 .274 .800 1.250 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.028 -.508 .613 .924 1.082 
NB4GTMEL  -.004 -.001 -.010 .992 .919 1.088 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 84: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 7 – Non-Big Four Offices 
– Grant Thornton Sydney 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .777 28.164 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.720  2.488 .015*   
ABNCOMPANY .273 .122 2.076 .041* .802 1.247 
INDUSTRY -.015 -.053 -.929 .356 .858 1.165 
LNINCOME .514 .770 12.865 .000** .769 1.300 
DONATIONS -.016 -.006 -.109 .913 .942 1.062 
TRADING -.230 -.086 -1.534 .129 .870 1.150 
GRANTS .386 .140 2.561 .012* .928 1.078 
STATE -.003 -.006 -.106 .916 .832 1.201 
NONAUDITFEE -.179 -.071 -1.217 .227 .806 1.240 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.022 -.396 .693 .902 1.109 
NB4GTSYD  .500 .046 .847 .399 .924 1.082 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 85 Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 7 – Non-Big Four Offices 
– Grant Thornton Adelaide 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .787 27.779 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.569  2.184 .032*   
ABNCOMPANY .312 .137 2.286 .025* .786 1.273 
INDUSTRY -.021 -.070 -1.233 .222 .872 1.146 
LNINCOME .526 .779 12.666 .000** .749 1.334 
DONATIONS -.033 -.012 -.216 .830 .933 1.072 
TRADING -.284 -.104 -1.805 .075 .855 1.169 
GRANTS .393 .144 2.599 .011* .926 1.080 
STATE -.007 -.013 -.224 .824 .826 1.210 
NONAUDITFEE -.165 -.065 -1.099 .275 .810 1.235 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.029 -.526 .601 .941 1.062 
NB4GTADL  .195 .018 .327 .745 .890 1.123 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 86: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 7 – Non-Big Four Offices 
– Grant Thornton Perth 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .779 28.570 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.456  2.037 .045   
ABNCOMPANY .263 .117 2.007 .048 .797 1.255 
INDUSTRY -.019 -.064 -1.122 .265 .835 1.198 
LNINCOME .530 .795 12.754 .000 .703 1.423 
DONATIONS -.046 -.018 -.326 .745 .933 1.072 
TRADING -.185 -.069 -1.193 .236 .808 1.238 
GRANTS .362 .131 2.420 .018 .932 1.073 
STATE -.004 -.008 -.148 .883 .842 1.187 
NONAUDITFEE -.148 -.059 -1.006 .318 .799 1.252 
AUDITPARTNER .000 -.006 -.115 .908 .923 1.084 
NB4GTPER  -.787 -.073 -1.277 .205 .836 1.196 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 87 Results of multiple regressions – Hypothesis 7 – Non-Big Four Offices – 
Moore Stephens Perth 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .775 27.861 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.683  2.385 .019*   
ABNCOMPANY .284 .127 2.159 .034* .807 1.239 
INDUSTRY -.015 -.051 -.888 .377 .850 1.177 
LNINCOME .516 .773 12.658 .000** .745 1.342 
DONATIONS -.022 -.008 -.156 .876 .941 1.062 
TRADING -.244 -.091 -1.598 .114 .849 1.178 
GRANTS .376 .136 2.490 .015* .932 1.074 
STATE -.006 -.012 -.206 .837 .844 1.185 
NONAUDITFEE -.169 -.067 -1.149 .254 .809 1.236 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.014 -.254 .800 .931 1.074 
NB4MSPER .112 .010 .186 .853 .897 1.115 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 88: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 7 – Non-Big Four Offices 
– Moore Stephens Campbell 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .776 28.030 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.685  2.430 .017*   
ABNCOMPANY .273 .122 2.071 .042* .798 1.253 
INDUSTRY -.016 -.055 -.970 .335 .851 1.175 
LNINCOME .517 .774 12.871 .000** .765 1.306 
DONATIONS -.034 -.013 -.237 .813 .936 1.068 
TRADING -.240 -.090 -1.599 .114 .874 1.145 
GRANTS .372 .135 2.473 .015* .935 1.069 
STATE -.003 -.005 -.091 .928 .818 1.222 
NONAUDITFEE -.187 -.075 -1.255 .213 .785 1.274 
AUDITPARTNER .000 -.009 -.156 .876 .915 1.093 
NB4MSCAM -.391 -.036 -.646 .520 .879 1.138 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 89: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 7 – Non-Big Four Offices 
– Pitcher Partners Adelaide 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .780 28.664 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.771  2.574 .012*   
ABNCOMPANY .259 .116 1.981 .051 .795 1.259 
INDUSTRY -.011 -.039 -.678 .499 .834 1.199 
LNINCOME .513 .769 12.930 .000** .769 1.301 
DONATIONS -.029 -.011 -.204 .839 .946 1.057 
TRADING -.262 -.098 -1.750 .084 .862 1.160 
GRANTS .359 .130 2.403 .019* .931 1.075 
STATE -.013 -.024 -.424 .673 .823 1.216 
NONAUDITFEE -.168 -.067 -1.152 .253 .810 1.234 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.017 -.313 .755 .930 1.075 
NB4PPADL -.795 -.074 -1.358 .178 .925 1.081 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 90: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 7 – Non-Big Four Offices 
– Pitcher Partners Melbourne 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .775 27.882 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.719  2.472 .016*   
ABNCOMPANY .286 .128 2.170 .033* .803 1.245 
INDUSTRY -.016 -.054 -.936 .352 .850 1.176 
LNINCOME .514 .771 12.820 .000** .769 1.301 
DONATIONS -.028 -.011 -.194 .847 .940 1.064 
TRADING -.240 -.090 -1.593 .115 .873 1.145 
GRANTS .372 .135 2.469 .016* .934 1.071 
STATE -.006 -.011 -.188 .852 .841 1.190 
NONAUDITFEE -.177 -.070 -1.186 .239 .793 1.261 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.014 -.259 .796 .930 1.075 
NB4PPMEL -.168 -.016 -.287 .775 .940 1.063 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 91: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 7 – Non-Big Four Offices 
– RSM Bird Cameron Perth 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .775 27.858 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.720  2.461 .016*   
ABNCOMPANY .285 .127 2.158 .034* .797 1.255 
INDUSTRY -.015 -.051 -.892 .375 .851 1.176 
LNINCOME .514 .770 12.661 .000** .753 1.329 
DONATIONS -.022 -.008 -.154 .878 .939 1.065 
TRADING -.239 -.089 -1.585 .117 .873 1.145 
GRANTS .375 .136 2.488 .015* .934 1.071 
STATE -.006 -.012 -.205 .838 .844 1.185 
NONAUDITFEE -.172 -.068 -1.165 .247 .806 1.241 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.014 -.257 .798 .928 1.078 
NB4RSMPER .097 .009 .166 .869 .943 1.061 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 92: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 7 – Non-Big Four Offices 
– RSM Bird Cameron Canberra 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .777 28.190 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.839  2.601 .011*   
ABNCOMPANY .259 .116 1.945 .055 .777 1.288 
INDUSTRY -.015 -.052 -.926 .357 .859 1.165 
LNINCOME .511 .765 12.698 .000** .759 1.317 
DONATIONS -.049 -.019 -.338 .736 .911 1.097 
TRADING -.240 -.090 -1.600 .113 .874 1.145 
GRANTS .375 .136 2.502 .014* .936 1.069 
STATE -.014 -.027 -.445 .657 .778 1.285 
NONAUDITFEE -.192 -.076 -1.291 .200 .788 1.269 
AUDITPARTNER -.001 -.020 -.367 .715 .915 1.093 
NB4RSMCAN .544 .050 .881 .381 .843 1.186 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
5.9.10 Multivariate analysis of hypothesis eight: Non-Big Four audit 
partners earning audit fee premiums. 
 
The final hypothesis tested in this study, hypothesis 8, also explored a 
heretofore untested element in the private and not-for-profit sectors, 
namely the existence of an audit fee premium for non-Big Four audit firm 
partners in the Australian charity market. The alternative form for 
hypothesis eight with the basic regression model is: 
 
H8: Individual audit partners of non-Big Four audit firms are rewarded 
with an audit fee premium above other non-Big Four audit firms 
partners in the Australian charity sector. 
 
LNAUDITFEE = α + b1LNINCOME + b2NONAUDITFEE + 
b2AUDITOFFICE + b2AUDITPARTNER + b2BIG4 + b2ABNCOMPANY + 
b2STATE + b2DONATIONS + b2GRANTS + b2TRADING + b2INDUSTRY + 
b2Big Four audit firm partner + ε 
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As with hypothesis 6, the approach adopted by Beattie et al. (2001) was 
applied, with top non-Big Four audit firm partners identified by number of 
clients or percentage of audit fees earned. Five audit firm partners were 
identified as dominating the non-Big Four firms, either in terms of number 
of clients and/or percentage of audit fees earned. The partners of these 
firms were identified via separate variables, and a control variable was 
included for all remaining audit firm partners.  
 
Table 94 to Table 99 report the results of the analysis of hypothesis eight. 
The analysis showed no support for partners in non-Big Four audit firms 
being rewarded with an audit fee premium above other non-Big Four audit 
firm partners. Hypothesis eight was therefore rejected, suggesting that 
individual non-Big Four audit firm partners were not earning audit fee 
premiums as specialist charity auditors in the Australian charity market. 
 
 
Table 93: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 8 – Non-Big Four 
Partners – BDO Paul 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .779 28.623 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 2.007  2.808 .006*   
ABNCOMPANY .295 .132 2.218 .029* .772 1.296 
INDUSTRY -.010 -.034 -.610 .543 .871 1.148 
LNINCOME .507 .750 12.507 .000** .757 1.321 
DONATIONS -.018 -.007 -.128 .898 .943 1.060 
TRADING -.271 -.100 -1.798 .076 .883 1.132 
GRANTS .338 .122 2.207 .030* .885 1.130 
STATE -.011 -.021 -.366 .715 .797 1.255 
NONAUDITFEE -.185 -.075 -1.285 .203 .807 1.239 
AUDITOFFICE -.005 -.093 -1.518 .133 .731 1.368 
NB4BDOPAUL -.163 -.039 -.651 .517 .772 1.295 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 94: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 8 – Non-Big Four 
Partners – Ronald Smith – Smith 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .783 29.522 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 2.051  2.891 .005*   
ABNCOMPANY .273 .122 2.065 .042* .761 1.314 
INDUSTRY -.013 -.044 -.787 .434 .866 1.155 
LNINCOME .504 .752 12.665 .000** .752 1.330 
DONATIONS -.031 -.012 -.227 .821 .931 1.075 
TRADING -.274 -.102 -1.850 .068 .867 1.154 
GRANTS .330 .121 2.203 .030* .877 1.140 
STATE -.014 -.028 -.472 .638 .776 1.289 
NONAUDITFEE -.195 -.078 -1.371 .174 .813 1.230 
AUDITOFFICE -.004 -.069 -1.240 .219 .863 1.158 
NB4RSSMITH -.374 -.048 -.861 .392 .836 1.196 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 95: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 8 – Non-Big Four 
Partners – Auditor General NSW – Watson 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .785 29.573 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.991  2.848 .006*   
ABNCOMPANY .330 .147 2.479 .015* .751 1.332 
INDUSTRY -.016 -.055 -.982 .329 .853 1.172 
LNINCOME .501 .741 12.436 .000** .748 1.337 
DONATIONS -.006 -.002 -.045 .965 .940 1.064 
TRADING -.243 -.090 -1.641 .105 .891 1.122 
GRANTS .359 .130 2.363 .021* .877 1.140 
STATE -.006 -.012 -.215 .830 .823 1.214 
NONAUDITFEE -.155 -.062 -1.076 .285 .790 1.266 
AUDITOFFICE -.004 -.068 -1.230 .222 .877 1.141 
NB4AGNWATSON .945 .088 1.590 .116 .876 1.142 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 96: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 8 – Non-Big Four 
Partners – Danby Winnett 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .778 28.436 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.949  2.723 .008*   
ABNCOMPANY .294 .132 2.202 .030* .768 1.303 
INDUSTRY -.011 -.038 -.678 .500 .875 1.142 
LNINCOME .508 .751 12.415 .000** .747 1.339 
DONATIONS -.018 -.007 -.126 .900 .931 1.074 
TRADING -.261 -.096 -1.722 .089 .873 1.146 
GRANTS .333 .121 2.154 .034* .874 1.144 
STATE -.008 -.015 -.263 .793 .801 1.249 
NONAUDITFEE -.195 -.079 -1.339 .184 .793 1.262 
AUDITOFFICE -.004 -.075 -1.347 .182 .872 1.147 
NB4DANWINNETT .038 .005 .089 .929 .900 1.111 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 97: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 8 – Non-Big Four 
Partners – WKH NG Flakemore 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .782 29.523 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 1.784  2.489 .015*   
ABNCOMPANY .303 .135 2.287 .025* .770 1.299 
INDUSTRY -.010 -.035 -.633 .528 .881 1.135 
LNINCOME .517 .765 12.614 .000** .733 1.365 
DONATIONS -.036 -.014 -.256 .798 .933 1.072 
TRADING -.239 -.088 -1.592 .115 .882 1.133 
GRANTS .341 .123 2.234 .028* .885 1.130 
STATE -.004 -.008 -.131 .896 .815 1.228 
NONAUDITFEE -.168 -.068 -1.162 .249 .794 1.259 
AUDITOFFICE -.005 -.092 -1.620 .109 .830 1.205 
NB4WKHFLAKEMORE .489 .064 1.142 .257 .864 1.158 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 98: Results of Multiple Regressions – Hypothesis 8 – Non-Big Four 
Partners – Others 
Model R2 F Sig.    
Regression .784 29.400 .000    
Variable B Beta T Sig.a Tolerance VIF 
(CONSTANT) 2.094  2.951 .004*   
ABNCOMPANY .291 .130 2.228 .029* .783 1.277 
INDUSTRY -.011 -.039 -.712 .478 .879 1.138 
LNINCOME .501 .750 12.544 .000** .746 1.341 
DONATIONS -.041 -.016 -.297 .767 .944 1.059 
TRADING -.256 -.096 -1.741 .085 .879 1.137 
GRANTS .300 .109 1.964 .053 .872 1.146 
STATE .000 -.001 -.009 .993 .807 1.238 
NONAUDITFEE -.144 -.057 -.990 .325 .791 1.264 
AUDITOFFICE -.003 -.065 -1.170 .245 .866 1.155 
NB4OTHERS -.171 -.073 -1.261 .211 .790 1.266 
Note: a = one-tailed; N = 92; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
5.8.11 Summary 
 
This chapter reported the results of testing the eight hypotheses put 
forward in the study and found support for the existence of an audit fee 
premium in Big Four audit firms, indications of a Big Four auditor 
discounting charity audit fees, and evidence of non-Big Four audit firms 
with single clients earning lower fees than those with more than two 
clients. It also identified that audit fees paid by Australian charities are 
influenced by client size, corporate structure, choice of auditor (Big Four or 
non-Big Four), trading income and grant income. These results were 
reported in the context of the descriptive characteristics of the charities 
that made up the sample in this study, by undertaking tests of normality 
and multivariate regression analysis.   
 
This chapter concludes the statistical analyses and testing of the 
hypotheses in this study, and is followed by the closing chapter, which 
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summarises the study, discusses the major findings, implications and 
limitations of the study, and provides suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter summarises the previous chapters and discusses the major 
findings of this study. It concludes with a discussion of the implications and 
limitations of the study, and puts forward suggestions for future research.  
 
Below is a summary of the preceding chapters: 
 
 Chapter 1 introduced the study and provided the background, 
including a definition of charities in the context of an Australian 
political and economic milieu. The significance of the study and the 
design format were also outlined. 
 Chapter 2 provided a review of the limited literature on audit-related 
issues in the not-for-profit sector, and highlighted opportunities for 
extending our understanding of audit fee pricing, with a particular 
focus on the Australian charity sector. 
 Chapter 3 developed the conceptual framework for the study, as 
well as the hypotheses. It expanded the literature review with a 
focus on the private sector, and explored its influence on the pricing 
model for Australian charities and related hypotheses. 
 Chapter 4 outlined the research methodology applied in this study. 
Sample selection, independent variable constructs and dependent 
variable constructs were described and justified. 
 Chapter 5 presented the analyses and results of testing the charity 
audit fee model in the context of the eight hypotheses examined in 
this study. The results of descriptive statistics, tests of normality, 
correlation testing and multiple regression analyses were reported 
in this chapter. 
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 The final chapter, Chapter 6, concludes the study with a summary 
of the major findings. It presents the limitations of the project and 
provides suggestions for future research.  
 
6.2 Findings from this Study 
 
This study developed a model of Australian charity audit fee determinants 
in conjunction with an examination of eight additional resource questions 
related to: 
 
1. Big Four audit firm premiums in the charity sector at an industry level, 
firm level, audit office level and audit firm partner level; 
2. Non-big Four audit firm premiums in the charity sector at an industry 
level, firm level, audit office level and audit firm partner level. 
 
The proposed charity audit fees model encompasses aspects of the 
existing not-for-profit and private sector literature, adapted to reflect the 
Australian economy. As discussed in Chapter 3, the private sector 
literature contains evidence of the influence on audit fee pricing of choice 
of a Big Four/Six/Eight audit firm, auditee complexity and inherent risk. 
This study concurred in its findings, with choice of auditor (Big Four versus 
non-Big Four) showing an influence on audit fee pricing. Auditee size was 
also found to be a significant attribute, and supports the literature in both 
the not-for-profit and private sectors. Auditee complexity, a well-
established attribute in the private sector, also indicated an effect on audit 
fee pricing, as measured by the form of incorporation variable, and in 
cases where a charity’s income was sourced at least in part from trading 
activities. 
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The audit fee-pricing model (Figure 1), as reported in Table 37, outlines 
76.5% of charities’ audit fee prices. Audit fee prices are primarily predicted 
by income (measure of size), choice of Big Four audit firm, incorporation 
as a company, and to a lesser extent, income from trading activities. Using 
size as an explanatory variable is well established in the private sector 
literature (see Table 1, Hay 2013, Hay et al., 2011). Beattie et al. (2001) 
and Vermeer et al. (2009) also found size to be an explanatory variable, 
and the results of this study reflect this literature. 
 
The second explanatory variable was choice of audit firm, i.e. Big Four or 
non-Big-Four. The results of this study were consistent with the findings of 
Vermeer et al. (2009), but did not concur with Beattie et al. (2001) when 
income was used as the measure of size. In the private sector literature 
there is strong support for a Big 4/5/6/8 effect on audit fee price, but this is 
not consistent across all sectors. This study also found inconsistent 
results. There was no apparent reason for Big Four audit firms obtaining a 
higher audit fee, and this aspect warrants further research to determine, 
for example, whether there is a small auditee effect in play. 
 
Incorporation as a variable had not previously been explored in the private 
sector literature, but form of ownership had been examined in a small 
number of studies, with significant results (Hay et al., 2011). In the not-for-
profit literature, Beattie et al. (2001) included a similar variable (company 
or constitution – Trust or Act of Parliament) and did not find any 
explanatory power. In contrast to the findings in the UK market, the results 
of this study suggest that the incorporated form does have explanatory 
power, and may reflect the nature of the Corporations Law in Australia that 
imposes stringent demands on auditors. Similar variables shown to have 
explanatory power in private sector studies, supports this view. 
 
Trading activities was a proxy in this study for auditee complexity, a well-
established attribute in the private sector literature shown to have an 
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influence on audit fee pricing. As in Beattie et al. (2001), trading activities, 
measured by a dichotomous variable in this study, was shown to have 
some explanatory power, suggesting that charities with trading activities 
add an element of complexity to the audit, which in turn is reflected in the 
audit fee pricing. 
 
In summary, the audit fee-pricing model in this study has explanatory 
power and substantially supports earlier studies, thereby adding to our 
understanding of audit fee pricing in the Australian charity sector. 
Following establishment of the Australian charity audit fee-pricing model, a 
series of hypotheses, which encompassed elements of the existing 
literature, were tested in the context of the Australian charity sector.  
These hypotheses examined three aspects: 
 
1. The existence of a Big Four audit fee premium in the charity market. 
This was examined from both a nationwide Big Four perspective and 
an individual Big Four audit firm view. Hypotheses 1 and 2 refer. 
2. A similar approach was taken for the non-Big Four firms to determine if 
there was evidence of a small auditee effect in the market. Hypotheses 
3 and 4 refer. 
3. Hypotheses 5 to 8 further explore a relatively new aspect of audit fee 
pricing: city level (referred to as offices in this study) specialisation. 
This was examined from the perspective of audit firm offices and audit 
partners earning audit fee premiums.   
 
The existence of a Big Four audit fee premium in the private sector market 
is strongly supported in the literature but was not a conclusive finding in 
this study as shown in Table 1, or as found by Hay, 2013. From the 
perspective of the not-for-profit literature, a similar variance was found in 
Beattie et al. (2001), who reported mixed results depending on the model. 
Their model used income as the size proxy and found no support for Big 
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Six audit premiums. In contrast, Vermeer et al. (2009) did find evidence of 
significant Big Four audit fee premiums. 
 
In this study of Australian charity audit fee pricing, significant evidence of a 
Big Four audit premium was present. This is a preliminary finding and 
worthy of further exploration to determine if it represents a quality premium 
or is reflective of other attributes such as auditee characteristics. While the 
current study enhances our understanding of audit fee premiums in the 
charity audit fee market, further exploration is needed to better 
comprehend the drivers of this phenomenon. 
 
Confirmation of a Big Four audit fee premium led to further exploratory 
analysis to determine whether one or more Big Four audit firms were 
earning an audit fee premium. No evidence of this was found. 
 
Analysis was also undertaken to detect evidence of an audit premium in 
non-Big Four audit firms. No evidence was found, however a significant 
negative coefficient for non-Big Four audit firms with a single client 
suggested that these firms may have been providing audit services as an 
act of corporate philanthropy. 
 
Further analysis was undertaken to determine if any evidence existed of 
the non-Big Four audit firms dominating the market in terms of number of 
clients and/or percentage of audit fees earned, attracting audit fee 
premiums. In this study no evidence of an audit fee premium was found, 
which was to be expected given the lack of audit fee premiums for non-Big 
Four firms.  
 
Other aspects of the study explored the relatively new aspect of city level 
(referred to as offices in this study) specialisation not previously explored 
in the not-for-profit or charity literature. Hypotheses were tested for 
evidence of an audit fee premium at the Big Four audit firm office and 
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partner levels. This was repeated for the dominant non-Big Four firms. No 
evidence was found of a premium at either the city level (office) or partner 
level for Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms. Earlier research on the 
private sector does suggest some evidence of audit fee premiums at the 
city level (Basioudis & Francis, 2007, Francis et al., 2005), however this 
was more likely to be evident where the audit firm was both a national and 
city specialist. Further investigation into specialist audit fee premiums in 
the charity sector will be valuable to increase our knowledge and 
understanding. 
 
 
6.3 Implications of this Study 
 
The research questions were answered in the context of the findings as 
discussed in the preceding chapters, providing insights into audit fee 
pricing in the Australian charity sector, exploring evidence of audit fee 
premiums, and developing an audit fee pricing model for the sector. 
 
A base model of audit fee pricing will give charities a better understanding 
of the attributes that influence audit fee costs. The Australian charity fees 
model developed in this study is robust in the context of the existing 
literature, and signifies a first attempt at modelling audit fee pricing in the 
Australian not-for-profit sector. The model demonstrates that knowledge 
gained from private sector studies also has some explanatory power in the 
Australian charities sector. 
 
In this study, Big Four audit fee premiums were found to be present, which 
is consistent with the private sector literature, and to a lesser extent the 
literature on the not-for-profit sector, opening up the way for further 
investigation. In contrast to its competitors and of particular note was 
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ significant discounting of audit fees, possibly as 
an act of corporate philanthropy. Their actions suggest there are 
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opportunities for audit firms to make a positive contribution to the charity 
market through gestures of philanthropy.  
 
Non-Big Four auditors who only audited one charity were also significantly 
discounting their audit fees as compared with other non-Big Four auditors 
with multiple clients. Whilst there was no evidence of a non-Big Four audit 
fee premium, there was evidence of single-client firms discounting, hence 
multiple client firms were earning higher fees. The motives remain unclear, 
and further exploration of audit fee pricing in this market will help to clarify 
and interpret these findings.   
 
Finally, this study is the first exploration of city and partner specialisation in 
the Australian charities sector, and the first in the not-for-profit sector. The 
results showed no evidence of specialisation at this level, which reflects 
the findings of some studies on the private sector. However, this could be 
an indication of larger numbers of small audit firms undertaking audits in 
the charity sector, or a combined national/city specialisation factor at play. 
The early results of this study should not limit further exploration of this 
aspect of audit fee pricing. 
 
 
6.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
By its very nature research of this type has its limitations. First and 
foremost is the clearly defined definition of what a charity is in the 
Australian economy, hence the lack of a well-established database from 
which to draw a representative sample of charities. Secondly and related 
to this is the sample size of the study, which in part reflects the difficulty of 
identifying Australian charities and obtaining annual reports and financial 
data. Future studies would benefit from work to develop a definition of a 
charity and build a more substantive sample of appropriate entities. Work 
in progress by the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission 
may enhance the collection of financial reporting data in the future. The 
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second limitation is the analysis of one year’s financial data. A deeper 
understanding of audit fees and the tenure of audit firms will serve to 
clarify the issue of charity audit fees more broadly. For example, future 
research could be undertaken as a time-series analysis. Related to this is 
the use of 2012 financial year data. With the formation of the Australian 
Charities and Not-for-profits Commission, changes in regulatory 
requirements may also have an influence on the role played by the 
auditor, and this will provide fertile ground for future research into the 
influence and impact of the Commission. 
 
In addition, the suitability of the variables used to predict the independent 
variable may not be robust representations of the attributes being 
measured. In this study there where issues with normality, which meant 
that dichotomous variables had to be used in place of more robust interval 
variables. For example, Beattie et al. (2001) used alternate attributes for 
charity size with varying results. The validity of using a natural logarithm of 
income for size could also be further explored. 
 
The examination of specialisation at city (office) and partner level was 
exploratory in this study and limited by the sample size. The small sample 
size brings into question the robustness of the testing of the hypothesis 
and the results should be interpreted with care. Further examination of this 
effect is warranted with a larger sample size and a combined national and 
city specialist explanatory attribute. Auditee size (small auditees versus 
large auditees) was not explored in this study. Some private sector studies 
noted an effect and recommended further exploration. 
 
This study places a spotlight on audit fee pricing research in the Australian 
charity sector and adds to international research in the field. It provides 
evidence to support the private sector and international not-for-profit 
sector audit fee pricing models, and confirms that these models are robust 
across jurisdictions and different sectors of the economy. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Standard Q-Q Plots 
 
 
Figure 2: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFEE 
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Figure 3: Standard Q-Q plot of INCOME 
 
Figure 4: Standard Q-Q plot of R_DONATIONS 
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Figure 5: Standard Q-Q plot of R_GRANTS 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Standard Q-Q plot of R_TRADING 
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Figure 7: Standard Q-Q plot of R_NONAUDITFEE 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Standard Q-Q plot of LNAUDITFEE 
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Figure 9: Standard Q-Q plot of LNINCOME 
 
 
Figure 10: Standard Q-Q plot of ABNCOMPANY: Other Entity Type 
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Figure 11: Standard Q-Q plot of INDUSTRY: Health 
 
 
Figure 12: Standard Q-Q plot of INDUSTRY: Social or Public Welfare 
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Figure 13: Standard Q-Q plot of INDUSTRY: Culture 
 
 
Figure 14: Standard Q-Q plot of INDUSTRY: Animals 
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Figure 15: Standard Q-Q plot of INDUSTRY: Natural Environment 
 
 
Figure 16: Standard Q-Q plot of INDUSTRY: Other 
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Figure 17: Standard Q-Q plot of ABNCOMPANY: ABN Public Company 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Standard Q-Q plot of STATE: New South Wales 
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Figure 19: Standard Q-Q plot of STATE: South Australia 
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Figure 20: Standard Q-Q plot of STATE: Tasmania 
 
Figure 21: Standard Q-Q plot of STATE: Western Australia 
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Figure 22: Standard Q-Q plot of STATE: Victoria 
 
 
Figure 23: Standard Q-Q plot of STATE: Queensland 
 
 
174 
 
 
Figure 24: Standard Q-Q plot of STATE: Australian Capital Territory 
 
Figure 25: Standard Q-Q plot of DONATIONS: Donations Income 
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Figure 26: Standard Q-Q plot of DONATIONS: No Donations Income 
 
Figure 27: Standard Q-Q plot of GRANTS: Grants Income 
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Figure 28: Standard Q-Q plot of GRANTS: No Grants Income 
 
 
Figure 29: Standard Q-Q plot of TRADING: Trading Income 
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Figure 30: Standard Q-Q plot of TRADING: No Trading Income 
 
 
Figure 31: Standard Q-Q plot of NONAUDITFEE: Non-audit fee 
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Figure 32: Standard Q-Q plot of NONAUDITFEE: No Non-audit fee 
 
Figure 33: Standard Q-Q plot of BIG FOUR: Non Big Four auditor 
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Figure 34: Standard Q-Q plot of BIG FOUR: Big Four auditor 
 
 
Figure 35: Standard Q-Q plot of DELOITTE: Not Deloitte 
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Figure 36: Standard Q-Q plot of DELOITTE: Deloitte 
 
 
Figure 37: Standard Q-Q plot of ERNST&YOUNG: Not Ernst & Young 
 
 
181 
 
 
Figure 38: Standard Q-Q plot of ERNST&YOUNG: Ernst & Young 
 
 
Figure 39: Standard Q-Q plot of KPMG: Not KPMG 
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Figure 40: Standard Q-Q plot of KPMG: KPMG 
 
 
Figure 41: Standard Q-Q plot of PWC: Not PWC 
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Figure 42: Standard Q-Q plot of PWC: PWC 
 
 
Figure 43: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM = 6 
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Figure 44: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM = 12 
 
Figure 45: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM = 13 
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Figure 46: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM = 15 
 
Figure 47: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM = 19 
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Figure 48: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM = 33 
 
Figure 49: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM = 38 
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Figure 50: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM = 39 
 
Figure 51: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM = 40 
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Figure 52: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM = 45 
 
Figure 53: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM = 57 
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Figure 54: Standard Q-Q plot of NONB4CLIENTSS7: Seven Clients 
 
 
Figure 55: Standard Q-Q plot of NONB4CLIENTSS6: Six Clients 
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Figure 56: Standard Q-Q plot of NONB4CLIENTSS3: Three Clients 
 
 
Figure 57: Standard Q-Q plot of NONB4CLIENTSS2: Two Clients 
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Figure 58: Standard Q-Q plot of NONB4CLIENTSS1: One Client 
 
 
Figure 59: Standard Q-Q plot of NONB4WHKNG: Not WHK Auditor 
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Figure 60: Standard Q-Q plot of NONB4WHKNG: WHK NG 
 
 
Figure 61: Standard Q-Q plot of NONB4BDO: Not BDO Auditor 
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Figure 62: Standard Q-Q plot of NONB4BDO: BDO Auditor 
 
Figure 63: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4GRANT: Not Grant Thornton Auditor 
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Figure 64: Standard Q-Q plot of NONB4GRANT: Grant Thornton 
 
Figure 65: Standard Q-Q plot of NONB4RSM: Not RSM Bird Cameron Auditor 
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Figure 66: Standard Q-Q plot of NONB4RSM: RSM Bird Cameron
 
Figure 67: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITOFFICE = 6 
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Figure 68: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITOFFICE = 8 
 
Figure 69: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITOFFICE = 14 
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Figure 70: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITOFFICE = 15 
 
Figure 71: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITOFFICE = 19 
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Figure 72: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITOFFICE = 25 
 
Figure 73: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITOFFICE = 41 
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Figure 74: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITOFFICE = 43 
 
Figure 75: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITOFFICE = 53 
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Figure 76: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITOFFICE = 71 
 
Figure 77: Standard Q-Q plot of B4OFFICEDELMEL: Non Deloitte Melbourne 
Office 
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Figure 78: Standard Q-Q plot of B4OFFICEDELMEL: Deloitte Melbourne Office 
 
Figure 79: Standard Q-Q plot of B4OFFICEDELSYD: Non Deloitte Sydney Office 
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Figure 80: Standard Q-Q plot of B4OFFICEDELPAR: Non Deloitte Parramatta 
Office 
  
Figure 81: Standard Q-Q plot of B4OFFICEDEYMEL: Non Ernst & Young 
Melbourne Office 
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Figure 82: Standard Q-Q plot of B4OFFICEDEYMEL: Ernst & Young Melbourne 
Office 
 
Figure 83: Standard Q-Q plot of B4OFFICEDEYSYD: Non Ernst & Young Sydney 
Office 
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Figure 84: Standard Q-Q plot of B4OFFICEKPMGMEL: Non KPMG Melbourne 
Office 
 
Figure 85: Standard Q-Q plot of B4OFFICEKPMGMEL: KPMG Melbourne Office 
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Figure 86: Standard Q-Q plot of B4OFFICEKPMGSYD: Non KPMG Sydney 
Office 
 
 
Figure 87: Standard Q-Q plot of B4OFFICEKPMGSYD: Non KPMG Sydney 
Office 
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Figure 88: Standard Q-Q plot of B4OFFICEKPMGPER: Non KPMG Perth Office 
 
 
Figure 89: Standard Q-Q plot of B4OFFICEPWCSYD: Non PWC Sydney Office 
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Figure 90: Standard Q-Q plot of B4OFFICEPWCSYD: PWC Sydney Office 
 
Figure 91: Standard Q-Q plot of B4OFFICEPWCNEW: Non PWC Newcastle 
Office 
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Figure 92: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4BDOSYD: Non BDO Sydney Office 
 
Figure 93: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4BDOSYD: BDO Sydney Office 
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Figure 94: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4BDOPER: Non BDO Perth Office 
 
Figure 95: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4BDOBRI: Non BDO Brisbane Office 
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Figure 96: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4BDOBRI: BDO Brisbane Office 
 
Figure 97: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4GTMEL: Non Grant Thornton Melbourne 
Office 
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Figure 98: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4GTMEL: Grant Thornton Melbourne Office 
 
Figure 99: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4GTSYD: Non Grant Thornton Sydney Office 
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Figure 100: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4GTADL: Non Grant Thornton Adelaide 
Office 
 
Figure 101: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4GTPER: Non Grant Thornton Perth Office 
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Figure 102: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4MSPER:  Non Moore Stephens Perth 
Office 
 
Figure 103: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4MSCAM: Non Moore Stephens Campbell 
Office 
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Figure 104: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4PPADL:Non Pitcher Partners Adelaide 
Office 
 
Figure 105: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4PPMEL: Non Pitcher Partners Melbourne 
Office 
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Figure 106: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4RSMPER: Non RSM Bird Cameron Perth 
Office 
 
Figure 107: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4RSMCAN: Non RSM Bird Cameron 
Canberra Office 
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Figure 108: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM_PARTNER = 10 
 
Figure 109: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM_PARTNER = 17 
 
 
217 
 
 
Figure 110: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM_PARTNER = 24 
 
Figure 111: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM_PARTNER = 33 
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Figure 112: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM_PARTNER = 87 
 
Figure 113: Standard Q-Q plot of AUDITFIRM_PARTNER = 89 
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Figure 114: Standard Q-Q plot of B4DELBROWN_A Non Deloitte Partner 
Brown_A 
 
Figure 115: Standard Q-Q plot of B4DELLEFEVRE Non Deloitte Partner Lefevre 
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Figure 116: Standard Q-Q plot of B4DELPEARCE Non Deloitte Partner Pearce 
  
 
Figure 117: Standard Q-Q plot of B4DELBROWN Non Deloitte Partner Brown 
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Figure 118: Standard Q-Q plot of B4DELBANGLEUCCI Non Deloitte Partner 
Angleucci 
 
Figure 119: Standard Q-Q plot of B4DELCOLLIE: Non Deloitte Partner Collie 
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Figure 120: Standard Q-Q plot of B4DELCOLLIE: Deloitte Partner Collie 
 
 
Figure 121: Standard Q-Q plot of B4EYWALLANCE: Non Ernst & Young Partner 
Wallace 
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Figure 122: Standard Q-Q plot of B4EYPAINTER: Non Ernst & Young Partner 
Painter 
 
Figure 123: Standard Q-Q plot of B4EYLEWIS: Non Ernst & Young Partner Lewis 
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Figure 124: Standard Q-Q plot of B4KPMGSCAMMELL: Non KPMG Partner 
Scammell 
 
Figure 125: Standard Q-Q plot of B4KPMGNAPIER: Non KPMG Partner Napier 
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Figure 126: Standard Q-Q plot of B4KPMGMITCHEL: Non KPMG Partner Mitchel 
 
 
Figure 127: Standard Q-Q plot of B4KPMGTRAVERS: Non KPMG Partner 
Travers 
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Figure 128: Standard Q-Q plot of B4KPMGROBINSON: Non KPMG Partner 
Robinson 
 
Figure 129: Standard Q-Q plot of B4KPMGMATTERA: Non KPMG Partner 
Mattera 
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Figure 130: Standard Q-Q plot of B4KPMGCINANNL: Non KPMG Partner 
Cinannl 
 
Figure 131: Standard Q-Q plot of B4KPWCBUCHOLZ: Non PWC Partner 
Bucholz 
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Figure 132: Standard Q-Q plot of B4KPWCMCCONNEL: Non PWC Partner 
McConnel 
 
Figure 133: Standard Q-Q plot of B4KPWCTURNER: Non PWC Partner Turner 
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Figure 134: Standard Q-Q plot of B4KPWCTURNER: Non PWC Partner Scoular 
 
 
Figure 135: Standard Q-Q plot of B4KPWCMAHER:- Non PWC Partner Maher 
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Figure 136: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4BDOPAUL: Non BDO Partner Paul 
 
Figure 137: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4BDOPAUL: BDO Partner Paul 
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Figure 138: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4RSSMITH: Non Ronald Smith Partner  
Smith 
 
Figure 139: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4AGNWATSON: Non Auditor General NSW 
Partner Watson 
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Figure 140: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4DANWINNETT: Non Danby Partner 
Winnett 
 
Figure 141: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4DANWINNETT: Danby Partner Winnett 
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Figure 142: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4WHKFAKEMORE: Non WHK NG Partner  
Flakemore 
 
Figure 143: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4WHKFLAKEMORE: WHK NG Partner 
Flakemore 
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Figure 144: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4OTHERS: Non Non-Big Four Partners  
Other 
 
Figure 145: Standard Q-Q plot of NB4OTHERS: Non-Big Four Partners - Other 
 
 
